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SUMMARY
This study is concerned with the structure, development and working of the
monetary sector in the State of Kuwait. Initially, the characteristics of the
Kuwaiti economy are examined in order to put the monetary sector into
perspective. It is shown that the Kuwaiti economy possesses the general
characteristics of less developed economies together with some distinguishing
properties. It is argued that since there exists no one-to-one relationship
between government revenue and expenditure, the money supply, in the short
run, tends to be insulated from the effect of the external balance.
-	 The working of Kuwait's monetary sector is studied through the balance sheets
of the Central Bank and commercial banks, and that leads on to an analysis of
the money supply process. The definition of money is discussed, and it is
argued on the basis of empirical evidence that the broad money suppiy is the
most appropriate for the purpose of monetary control. Causality testing
reveals a unidirectional effect from money to income, and the estimation of
velocity equations indicates that financing economic development by monetary
injections is inflationary in the short run.
A multiplier reduced-form model reveals the viability of short-run monetary
control in Kuwait, but it is argued that monetary policy has been ineffective
in this respect. It is also postulated that the combination of interest and
exchange rate policies gives rise to the recurring problem of capital outflows.
A structural econometric model of the monetary sector shows that the
equilibrium stock of money is determined by supply and demand factors, and
that the control of banks' reserves can (in part) accomplish the objective of
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monetary control. The model also. reveals that both monetary and fiscal actions
affect real output and prices, but the former tend to be more powerful.
It is recommended on the basis of this study that the Central Bank should be
given greater autonomy in formulating and executing monetary policy, and that
its research capabilities need to be improved. Urgent attention must be paid
to developing financial markets and upgrading tools of monetary policy.
Finally, It Is argued that the Ministry of Finance should take part in the
control of money and credit by manipulating its deposits and, perhaps,
adopting a simple constant change rule in government expenditure.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Motivating Problem
The study of money and monetary policy was neglected to a considerable extent
following the publication of Keynes' General Theory until it was revived by
the monetarists with the advent of inflation as a major problem. This tendency
was evident in much of the theoretical and empirical work during that period.
On the theoretical side, Keynesian economic theory was dominant, and the
academic literature was flooded with articles addressing the issue of fiscal
stabilisation policies and the theories behind them. On the empirical side,
early econometric models of the U.S. and the U.K. had, at best, a Keynesian
liquidity preference function as the only concession to the monetary sector.
As a result, economic stabilisation policies used in practice were primarily
Keynesian, concentrating on the manipulation of government revenue and
expenditure, whereas policies directed at interest rates and the money supply
were ignored or relegated to a secondary role.
There was once a vaild reason for this neglect, namely that fiscal policy is
an effective cure of unemployment in an environment of stable prices. However,
the advent of inflation, and more importantly stagflation, prompted a
re-examination of the importance of money such that monetary policy emerged
from its general neglect. This development on the policy side followed the
challenge posed by the monetarists to Keynesian economics and, as a result,
the importance of money has been officially recognised since the early 1970s.
This was demonstrated by the support given to the recommendation that the
central bank should specify a target time path for the money supply, and then
direct its efforts at the objective of making the actual stock follow this
target closely. It must be mentioned, however, that money, as such, is neither
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an actual instrument of the central bank, nor an ultimate objective of
monetary policy. More recently, extensive theoretical and empirical research
has tended to reject the extreme views that "money does not matter" and "only
money matters."
In less developed countries (LDCs), the story was much the same. Following
World War 2, as LDCs began to obtain independence from the colonial powers,
attention was focused on economic growth in a Keynesian framework. This was
logical, given the need to develop the necessary infrastructure and raise the
standard of living. Thus, a policy of "cheap money" was thought to be
- appropriate until it induced inflation that consequently started to retard
growth. Again, attention shifted to the other extreme of the quantity theory,
and when this failed, the view emerged that economic concepts applied to
developed countries should not be applied to LDCs and hence new and more
appropriate concepts must be tailored for the latter. This view was
particularly based on the proposition that monetary policy plays a limited
role in LDCs because they do not have developed banking systems and financial
markets. In general, it is believed that the scope for active monetary policy
is limited by the effect of capital flows on the money supply. However, a
growing body of empirical and theoretical work on money and monetary policy in
LDCs, as well as improved knowledge of monetary and credit management, has
revealed that the old concepts can work, provided that they are looked at
within the framework of the unique characteristics of LDCs (see Coats and
Khatkhate (1980) for a comprehensive survey).
In oil-exporting LDCs, the problem of capital deficiency is not generally
present, at least for some time in some of them. The principal objective in
these countries has been to achieve rapid economic growth in an environment of
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price stability. Traditionally, the realisation of this objective is believed
to be related to the development of the infrastructure, linked to high
employment, and constrained by the availability of skilled manpower. Moreover,
literature on oil-exporting LDCs contains a diversified menu of objectives,
most of which do not pertain, at least directly, to the role of money and
monetary policy. The following are examples:
(i) Diversification of the production base, given that oil reserves are
finite.
(ii) Convertion of oil into a productive economic base and a skilled labour
force. This objective pertains to the optimum rate of oil extraction
(see Samii (1979)).
(iii) Spreading the benefits of oil revenue to the largest segment of the
population without reducing incentives.
Obviously, the fulfilment of these objectives requires massive government
spending financed by oil revenues. By the mid-l970s, expansionary fiscal
policies in oil-exporting countries had pushed the inflation rate to the
double digit arena, forcing them to review their development strategies and
cut back expenditure. The result was not only a lower inflation rate but also
slower economic activity, implying the inadequacy of government expenditure as
the sole tool of demand management.
Moreover, it is traditionally believed that the scope of an active monetary
policy in oil-exporting LDCs is limited, not only by the openness of their
economies but also by the large size of the public sector. Both of these
factors take the money supply out of the control of the monetary authorities.
However, research has shown that there is scope for short-run manipulation of
the money supply (see for example Aghevli and Khan (1976)).
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In Kuwait, which is a major oil-exporting country, policy makers have
similarly been preoccupied with the major problems facing oil-exporting
countries with the general neglect of the role of money arid monetary policy.
Indicative of this tendency is the following two interesting numbers: in 1981,
a year of heightened activity in the stock market (which eventually collapsed
in the second half of 1982), the rate of growth of Ml was 81 percent, whereas
in 1984, a year of recession, the growth rate was -18 percent. These two
numbers serve to illustrate the absence of "monetary discipline", and similar
implications can be derived from figures on the growth'rates and sectoral
distribution of bank credit to the private sector. Thus, in the 1980s it
became apparent that monetary developments in Kuwait, specifically the
behaviour of commercial banks operating with few constraints, contributed
significantly to the emergence of inflationary pressures in the l970s,
intensive speculation and volatility in the stock and real estate markets
-both of which ended up in the doldrums from 1983 onwards- and the general
recession of the 1980g.
A prominent economist has recently asserted that a strong central bank could
have prevented the collapse of the stock market in 1982. In this respect, it
is noteworthy that the January 1982 ban imposed by the Central Bank of Kuwait
preventing commercial banks from discounting post-dated cheques, was crucial
in shielding the banks from the worst of the fallout from the crash of August
1982 (see Muehring (1985)). A similar belief arose regarding the ability of
Kuwait's banking system to contribute to reviving the economy, this fact was
particularly recognised by officials of the Central Bank of Kuwait. On May 7th
1985, the Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait addressing a conference on
banking control and supervision in London said: "there is a great need for
Kuwait's banking system to tune itself towards the new course of the country's
economy, where emphasis will be placed on sustaining a renewable and
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ever-enlarging productive base." He stressed that "the banking system should
closely supervise the end use of its funds, and give more attention to helping
the economy respond effectively to the demands of rapid change." Since his
appointment in 1983, the present Governor has strived to exert more control
over the activities of commercial banks, even via "moral suasion" conducted
through regular monthly meetings of the Governor with the banks' general
managers. As such he has become an "unpopular" man.
The comparative neglect of the role of money and monetary policy in Kuwait
might have been due to, or encouraged by, the lack of knowledge of the
behaviour of the monetary sector and its effect on the real sector. Until
1981, the "best" published model of the Kucaiti economy (Khouja and Sadler
(1979)) only contained a badly-specified money supply function. Some
fragmented efforts were later made to shed some light on the monetary sector,
but some of the more critical issues in monetary economics still remain a
mystery, or at least disputed, in the case of Kuwait. These issues include the
theoretical and empirical definition of money, the appropriate specification
of the demand for and supply of money functions, the effect of the monetary
sector on the real sector and the role these macroeconomic relationships play
in the conduct of monetary policy. This study addresses these and other issues
using theoretical, descriptive and empirical-methods. The ultimate objective
is to use the findings of this study to upgrade monetary policy and make it
more effective. Naturally, the satisfaction derived from shedding some light
on the mysterious or debated issues has its own purely academic reward.
1.2. An Outline of the Study
This study deals with the structure and development of Kuwait's monetary
sector and its influence/interaction with the real sector itt the period
-6-
1969-82. The year 1969 is significant in that it was the year the Central Bank
of Kuwait started its operations. Prior to that, monetary developments were of
little importance and detailed data for the period are scarce. When work on
this study started in early 1984, some time series were only available till
the end of 1982 (e.g. GDP and imports). Therefore, the descriptive work is
based on annual data for the period 1969-82. Much of the empirical work uses
quarterly data for the period 1975-82, but the major part (including the model
presented in Chapter 6) is restricted to the period 1977-82 because it was not
possible to obtain quarterly data on domestic interest rates before 1977.
everthe1ess, it is arguable that this period is the most critical and
representative in Kuwait's modern economic history. It encompasses periods of
boom and slump in the oil market (1979-80 and 1981-82 respectively); periods
of boom in the stock market (1981-82) and the two crashes of 1977 and 1982;
periods of expansionary and less-expansionary fiscal policy; periods of
extremely high U.S. interest rates together with sharp downturns; and the
breakout of the Iraq-Iran war. Moreover, the major tools of monetary policy
now in use were developed in this period, in particular the liquidity and
reserve ratios (1977 and 1980 respectively). Finally, the choice of this
period to estimate the model allows us to conduct out-of-sample simulations
for 1983.
Apart from this introductory chapter, there are seven other chapters and a
statistical appendix. In Chapter 2 an overview of the Kuwaiti economy is
presented. Topics covered In Chapter 2 include economic and sectoral growth,
public finance and foreign trade, all of which are highly relevant to the
monetary sector and important for the purpose of specifying the model. The
treatment is generally descriptive, although some elementary empirical work is
presented and reference is made to previous empirical studies on the real
sector of the Kuwaiti economy.
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Chapter 3 is entirely descriptive and focuses on the monetary sector. It
begins with a brief historical survey and then looks at the behaviour of the
Central Bank and commercial banks through an analysis of their balance sheets.
The critical issue of Central Bank independence is discussed. Subsequently,
the money supply process is studied through the consolidated balance sheet of
the monetary sector, leading to an exposition of monetary phenomena in Kuwait
in the period 1969-82. Chapter 3 ends with a brief outline of other financial
institutions and financial markets.
Chapter 4 contains some analytical and empirical work on a variety of topics
in monetary economics as applied to Kuwait. The first issue concerns the most
appropriate definition of money, this is treated both theoretically and
empirically using tests of correlation, stability and predictability. The
controversial Granger-Sims causality testing is evaluated and applied to
Kuwait to resolve the "chicken and egg problem in the money-income
relationship. Another important issue discussed in Chapter 4 is that of the
velocity of circulation, this is handled from a theoretical point of view, and
empirical evidence is presented for Kuwait. The final two sections of Chapter
4 deal with the debate of time-series versus econometric models of
forecasting, and a time-series model is presented to forecast the money supply
in Kuwait.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the discussion of monetary policy. It starts with the
theoretical background to the viability of controlling the money supply using
the multiplier framework, this is subsequently applied to Kuwait, together
with the estimation of two behavioural equations for the currency-deposits
ratio and the reserve-deposits ratio. Then a thorough elucidation of monetary
policy in Kuwait is undertaken with a review of the historical development of
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tools and an assessment of their efficacy in the light of their achievements.
Interest rate and exchange rate policies are evaluated -particularly in
relation to the recurring liquidity crisis. Policy alternatives are then
presented, including the possibility of using a monetary rule.
In Chapter 6 a quarterly econometric model of Kuwait's monetary sector is
presented. It starts with a review of the pros and cons of niacroeconometric
model building -including the famous Lucas critique. This is followed by a
survey of previous econometric work on Kuwait and a discussion of some
econometric issues. The specification of the model is presented after a
thorough discussion of each function with reference to existing empirical
evidence. The model is then estimated and validated by looking at the
significance of the estimated coefficients. Chapter 6 has three appendices:
the first contains selected empirical results from previous econometric
studies of the Kuwaiti economy, the second presents different estimates of the
price equation to test the effect of the exchange rate, and the third tests
for money illusion and presents alternative estimates of the demand for money
function.
As a natural extension to Chapter 6, Chapter 7 is devoted to model validation
mainly by testing its predictive power. The concept of validation is
discussed, then various measures of predictive power are evaluated. Both
within and out of sample predictions are then calculated for six endogenous
variables. Some further validation procedures are applied to the model
including dynamic stability, symmetry, and stochastic simulations. The concept
of dynamic elasticity as applied to the demand for money is also considered.
Finally, Chapter 8 contains a summary of the main findings of the study,
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recotnmendations based on these findings, and suggestions for further research.
A statistical appendix is enclosed that contains all of the basic data used
throughout the study.
1.3. Economic and Monetary Developments since 1982
Since the analysis and estimation period do not go beyond 1982, for reasons
mentioned earlier, it would be beneficial to give a brief account of the
economic and monetary developments since the end of 1982.
In the post-1982 period, the Kuwaiti economy has experienced some difficult
times, due mainly to a combination of depressed oil markets (both lower
exports and lower prices), and the aftermath of the collapse of the stock
market in the second half of 1982. Some would also argue that the Iraq-Iran
war has been a significant negative factor, but I would not give it the same
weight as the other two factors. While the war made an initial impact, people
gradually learnt to live with the situation, and its effect paled into
insignificance, this will be confirmed by empirical evidence with respect to
imports in Chapter 6. However, it must be mentioned that the war became a more
significant factor in 1984-'85 when the "tankers war" started as Iraq aimed at
blocking the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island.
Depressed oil markets resulted in lower oil revenue, forcing the government to
cut back expenditure on "non essential" items, in particular, consumption
expenditure. Although expenditure did not decline in absolute value, its
growth decelerated, adversely affecting activity in the non-oil sectors.
Similarly, the stock market crisis resulted in a staggering gross debt of
about lOO billion, and as long as the debt situation was unsolved, resources
could not be released and channelled to real economic activity. A further
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ramification of the stock market crisis was government intervention to support
stock prices in a multi-billion dollar operation lasting between early 1983
and April 1984. The operation had to be financed by withdrawals from the
general reserves, resulting in a sharply lower investment income in the fiscal
year 1983/84 (International Herald Tribune, April 18th 1985). These
developments have resulted in a combination of slower activity in non-oil
sectors, wider budget deficit (excluding investment income), and narrower
trade surplus.
In view of this state of affairs, an eminent economist described the Kuwaiti
economy as "passing through an adjustment period towards a lower level of
equilibrium" (Kuwait Times, March 7th 1985). This process of adjustment is
believed to have started in 1983 and continued throughout 1984, signalling
that the economic boom as experienced during the period 1973-82 was over, and
that the economy has been adjusting to a normal level of activity. This also
seems to have been the view of the Economic Reactivation Committee formed by
the Council of Ministers to study the economic situation. In its report to the
government, the Committee emphasised the "process of normalisation to moderate
and sustainable levels of growth after the hectic developments of the 1970s."
It must be mentioned, however, that Kuwait is still accumulating reserves and
is the only Gulf state to have substantially reduced its dependence on oil by
continuing to expand its investments overseas. Lastly, at the current rate of
extraction, oil reserves are sufficient for 180 years -and perhaps half as
much again- if new finds are proven (International Herald Tribune, April
18th 1985).
Monetary developments since 1982 have largely been determined by two factors:
(i) the stock market crisis (and government measures to solve it) and (ii)
high U.S. interest rates (coupled with a strong dollar). The result has been a
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slow, or negative, monetary growth, high demand for foreign-currency deposits,
slower rate of domestic credit expansion arid capital outflows. In 1981, the
growth rate of Ml (currency and demand deposits) was a staggering 81.4
percent, but it declined to -5.6 and -17.9 percent in 1983 and 1984
respectively. Demand deposits, in particular, fell by 23.8 percent in 1984.
The growth rate of the broad money supply M2 declined from 35.4 percent in
1981 to 4.5 and 3 percent iii 1983 and 1984 respectively. Against this,
foreign-currency deposits, which fell by 44 percent in 1982, increased by 79.4
and 20.1 percent in 1983 and 1984 respectively, reflecting the switch away
from demand deposits as the domestic economy was slowing down and the stock
market effectively "dead." Outstanding domestic bank credit Increased by
KD 460.2 million and KD 287.1 million in 1983 and 1984 respectively, compared
with KB 838.9 million in 1982. Finally, the private sector's net transactions
with the outside world, which may be taken as a measure of capital outflows,
increased from KB 2522.1 million in 1982 to KB 3349.4 million in 1983, then
declined to K]) 2937.1 million in 1984.
To counter these developments, the Central Bank resorted to its traditional
tools whereby it injects liquidity into the banking system (see Chapter 5 for
details). The pace of these operations started to accelerate in September
1983, and in June 1984 the swap operations ràched KB 515 million -the highest
level ever. Discounts also reached a record level of KB 455 million in July
1984. In 1984, the Central Bank injected liquidity by directly lending KB 188
million to banks with Central Batik bills as collateral. The liquidity
situation worsened, as Implied by the net position of commercial banks with
the Central Bank (see Chapters 5,6), which changed from a positive figure of
K]) 412.7 million to negative figures of KB 198 million arid KD 153.2 million in
1983 and 1984 respectively. By the end of the first quarter of 1985, the net
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position improved to a negative figure of KD 86 million. Yet, interest rates
were lower in 1983 and 1984, on average, than in 1982.
With the appointment of a new governor iii 1983, the Central Bank started being
more restrictive. New measures included: more detailed reporting and
disclosure requirements; closure of the leaks in the monetary flows opened by
the activities of the 150 or so exchange houses (money changers) -many of
which were accepting deposits or extending loans on behalf of foreign
financial institutions; and a more active Involvement of the Bank in the
determination of the level of provisions against loan losses and dividend
distribution. In August 1984, the Central Bank issued a directive to banks and
investment companies instructing them not to issue bonds or manage syndicated
loans for foreign borrowers except those who have business in Kuwait.
The most critical measure was taken In the first half of 1984 when capital
outflows were accelerating, threatening the emergence of a real problem (Moosa
(1985b)). Capital outflows were encouraged by the rising differential between
U.S. and domestic interest rates, as well as stagnation in domestic economic
activity and the stock market. Firstly, the money changers were instructed to
halt all activities other than direct foreign exchange dealing, submit
detailed monthly reports to the Central Bank and report daily all transactions
exceeding KD 25,000. Secondly, in April 1984, the commercial banks were
informed that all foreign exchange purchases from the Central Bank were to be
limited to a daily quota, within which dollars were to be provided at the
cheaper commercial rate only If the purchase request was supported with
documentation such as a letter of credIt. Dollars requested in excess of the
quota would be perceived by the Central Bank to be for speculative purposes,
and would only be available at the more expensive free-market rate.
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The presentation of economic and monetary developments since the end of 1982
is meant to be informative since our study concentrates on the period 1969-82.
It may be useful to mention at the conclusion of this chapter that the unit of
currency used throughout this study is the Kuwaiti Dinar (KB). The
determination of the RD exchange rate is explained in Chapter 5 and detailed
exchange rates against major currencies are found in the statistical appendix.
CHAPTER 2
STRUCTURE AND C1IARkCTERISTICS OF THE KUWAITI ECONDMY
2.1. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to present an overview of the structure of
the Kuwaiti economy. This may seem irrelevant to this ' study which is primarily
concerned with the monetary sector, but this is not true because a model for
optimal monetary policy must incorporate the behaviour of all sectors of the
economy. The model of the monetary sector presented in Chapter 6 traces out
the effect of money and credit on output, prices and the external sector.
Moreover, such concepts as oil and non-oil GDP will frequently be referred to
or employed as explanatory variables; it is the objective of this chapter to
shed some light on these concepts. Finally, since one of the objectives of
monetary policy is, or should be, to ensure that bank credit is distributed
among various sectors in a manner consistent with development priorities, the
pattern of overall and sectoral growth must be evaluated.
While Kuwait is essentially a developing or less developed country, it enjoys
some of the benefits associated with a healthy developed economy. It can be
described as developing or less developed because it depends almost entirely
on the productlon (or rather extraction) and export of a single primary
commodity (oil) for which it is a price-taker; this is a common feature of
LDCs. But, since oil is considered as the single most important primary
commodity in this technological era, and since Kuwait holds substantial oil
reserves, the State has become a capital surplus country boasting a high
standard of living and persistent surplus on the internal and external
balances (see Amuzegar (1983) for the characteristics of oil that make oil
exporting countries different from other raw-material or commodity exporting
LDCs). It is no wonder, then, that Kuwait's economic history revolves around
the history of its oil industry.
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Kuwait's modern economic history goes back to 1946 when the first oil shipment
was exported. Since then, the Kuwaiti economy has passed through several
stages: from being dependent on royalties paid by oil companies which had
concessions to extract oil, via the transitional stages when Kuwait first
gained control over its oil resources, to the complete ownership of these
resources. The present stage was finally reached when Kuwait graduated to
formulating and executing policies, not only regarding development, but also
economic and monetary stabilisation programmes. In three decades during which
natural wealth was transformed into disposable funds, there has been a
remarkably rapid developaient of infrastructure, institutions and welfare
sy8tem. Indeed, the population suddenly found themselves enjoying a standard
of living surpassing even that of the most advanced of developed countries.
Kuwait can now be described as a combination of welfare state and free
enterprise system, and in one sense this is unique for a developing country
(Khouja and Sadler (1979)).
The extent of Kuwait's dependence on oil, can be seen through the following
ratios:
(i) ratio of oil GDP to total GDP;
(ii) ratio of oil revenue to government's total revenue;
(iii) ratio of oil exports to total exports.
Table 2.1 shows the high, low and average values of the three ratios in the
period 1970-1982, and Figure 2.1 illustrates the ups and downs of the three
ratios during the same period. All of the ratios are very high and indicate
considerable dependence on oil. The highs of the ratios were registered in
1974 (fiscal year 1974/75 for the second ratio) following the oil price hike
of 1973/74, whereas the lows were registered in 1982 (fiscal year 1981/82 for
Figure 2.1
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Table 2.1: Measures of Dependence on Oil
Ratio (7.)	 High	 Low	 Average
Oil GDP/Total GDP	 78.5
	
48.3
	
63.7
Oil I.evenue/Total Revenue 	 92.2
	
63.6
	
82.0
Oil Exports/Total Exports	 96.4
	
80.2
	
92.5
the second ratio) when conditions in the oil market turned against producers.
The ratios indicate that for Kuwait, oil has become the main source of
economic growth, government revenue and foreign exchange earnings.
Dependence upon oil -and how to lessen it- has preoccupied the thinking of
economic planners in Kuwait. Fahmi (1980) expresses the issue very clearly by
stating that "Kuwait's immediate and overriding concerns lie in lessening her
potentially crippling dependence on a semi-unique depletable source of incomc.
As things stand, it is a well known fact that without oil not only the current
prosperous economic conditions cannot be maintained, but the whole fabric of
the State could disintegrate." An important incentive for diyersification away
from oil is found in Ainuzegar (1983) who recognises the oil sector's inability
to generate production and consumption linkages with the other sectors of the
economy and, thus, to create employment opportunities. This is due to the fact
that oil technology Is highly capital and skill intensive and has certain
input requirements that are vastly different from the oil exporting countries'
domestic factor supplies.
Achieving less dependence on oil has not been an easy task. The declining
share of oil in total GDP between 1970 and 1982 is not indicative of less
dependence on oil, as much as it is a reflection of depressed oil markets
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in the 1980s. It must be mentioned, however, that advancement in this
direction has been made in two respects: lessening the dependence on crude oil
by diversifying into refined products -which shows an element of
industrialisation- and developing the foreign investment portfolio as a major
source of income.
2.2. Economic and Sectoral Growth
In 1982 Kuwait's gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices* was estimated
at LCD 5727.5 million, up from LCD 1026.3 million in 1970. This indicates a
compound annual growth rate of 15.4 percent in the period 1970-82. The growth
pattern was highly volatile and vulnerable to conditions in the oil market: in
1974 and 1979 nominal growth rates were 140.2 and 58.1 percent respectively,
because of higher oil prices; in 1975, 1981 and 1982 GDP registered nominal
growth rates of -9.5, -9.1 and -15.4 percent respectively, due to lower oil
prices and unfavourable conditions in the oil market (see Figure 2.2).
The volatile pattern of Kuwait's GD? growth is mainly due to fluctuations in
the oil sector which are triggered by exogenous factors. Annual growth rates
of oil GD? exceeded in absolute values those of total GD? in most years. In
the years of prosperity (1974 and 1979) growth rates of oil GD? were 203.3 and
74.7 percent respectively, whereas in. the years of recession (1975, 1981 and
1982) growth rates were -18.6, -18.5, and -32.9 percent respectively.
On the other hand, growth of non-oil sectors has been more smooth; the highest
growth rate of 33.9 percent was registered in 1979. Table 2.2 shows average
annual compound growth rates and the contribution to total GD? of various
sectors.
* GD? and growth rates are reported at current prices due to the
unavailability of a reliable deflator.
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Table 2.2: Contribution to GDP and Average Growth Rates of Various Sectors
Sector	 % of GD?	 Z of GD?	 Growth
(1970)	 (1982)	 Rate(%)
15.4
13.3
18.0
21.8
19.8
12.7
21.2
16.8
15.9
24.4
16.8
Total GD?
Oil
Total Non-oil
Agriculture
Manufacturing Industry
Electricity, Gas and Water
Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transport and Communications
Financial Services
Other
100.0
60.3
39.7
0.3
4.2
0.7
2.7
7.9
2.9
2.0
19.0
100.0
48.3
51.7
1.0
6.5
0.5
4.9
9.1
3.0
5.0
21.7
The table shows that the oil sector had a lower average compound growth rate
than non-oil sectors because of the negative growth rates at times of
unfavourable conditions in the oil market. As a result, the contribution of
oil sector to total GD? declined from 60.3 percent In 1970 to 48.3 percent in
1982. CorrespondIngly, the contribution of non-oil sectors increased from 39.7
to 51.7 perc€nt. Of non-oil sectors, the fastest growing was the financial
sector which registered a growth rate of 24.4 percent, thus increasing its
contribution to GDP from 2 to 5 percent. Figure 2.3 illustrates the changing
contributions of oil and non-oil sectors to GD?.
Needless to say, non-oil sectors have benefitted from growth in the oil
sector. As E1-Mallakh and Atta (1981) point out, the oil sector has positively
influenced the rest of the economy through financial linkages, increased
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Figure 2.3
Contribution of Oil and Non-Oil Sectors to GDP
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aggregate demand and expanded imports. Indeed, other sectors would not have
flourished if it were not for the growth of the oil sector. However, the
relationship between growth of the oil sector and non-oil sectors is long-teri:a
rather than short-term. A drop in oil GDP in one year does not necessarily
Imply or result in a drop in non-oil GD?. For example, in 1975 oil GD?
declined by 18.6 percent, when at the same time non-oil GDP increased by 30.1
percent. Therefore, a simple regression of the growth rate of non-oil GD? on
the growth rate of oil GDP does not produce significant results. The following
equation was estimated for the period 1970-1982 (t-statistics In parentheses).
Yn 15.6 ^ 0.077 Yo
(5.60) (1.74)
R2	0.215	 SE	 9.38	 DW = 1.80
where
Yn growth rate of non-oil GDP
Yo growth rate of oil GD?
Growth of oil GD?, however, remains the main determinant of overall economic
growth as can be seen from the following s'Imple regression:
Y = 4.44 ^ 0.67 Yo
(5.83) (55.34)
R2 =0.996	 SE=0.996	 DW2.36
where I is the growth rate of total GD?.
Activity in the oil sector is not limited to the production of crude oil
and/or changes in its price; this is particularly true for recent years as
government emphasis has been placed on increasing the proportion of refined
products. Oil GDP, therefore, depends on the monetary value of the production
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of: (i) crude oil, (ii) refined products, (iii) liquified petroleum gas, and
(iv) natural gas. The author (Moosa (1983a), (1983f)) has formally shown that
oil GDP can be estimated and accurately predicted from a linear combination of
the monetary value of the four categories. The linear combination can either
be a simple average in the form of an index, or a weighted average such that
weights are estimated by the method of principal components.
Non-oil GDP, on the other hand, depends on government expenditure because:
(i) The government is the largest builder in the country and, therefore, the
major part of output in the construction sector originates from public
works.
(ii) Wholesale and retail trade activity consists almost entirely of imports
financed by oil revenue.
(iii) Government activity accounts for about one third of total consumption
and over half of gross capital formation.
Attempts were made by the Claremont Ecoiiomics Institute (1983) to model oil
and non-oil GDP. In a study of the Kuwaiti economy, the Institute suggested
that "it is inappropriate to model oil GDP using the production function
approach." Instead, a log-log function was estimated in which the dependent
variable was oil GDP and the two explanatory variables were the price and
production of crude oil. The statistical fit turned out to be good with R 2 of
0.98, but the estimated equation was conceptually weak because, as stated
above, oil GDP does not only depend on crude oil but also on refined oil
products, liquif led petroleum gas and natural gas.
An attempt was made by the Institute to use the production function approach
to estimate real non-oil GDP. A labour force series was estimated using
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Central Bank estimates of population and the participation rate in the 1975
census year. Similarly, a capital stock series was estimated using 1972 as a
base year and cumulating the capital stock on the basis of annual investment
data and assuming a 10 percent depreciation rate. The statistical results were
"very disappointing", and that was attributed to "measurement errors in the
labour and capital estimates and to the dominant role played by government
expenditure." A similar attempt was made by Al-Qudsi (1980) who estimated a
classical production function for Kuwait. He found the output elasticity with
respect to capital to be 0.63 and the elasticity with respect to labour to be
0.37.
Another approach was used by the Claremont Economics Institute (1983) to
estimate real growth of non-oil GD?. It was hypothesised to consist of two
parts: a trend which is related to the growth of anticipated real government
expenditure, and deviations from the trend caused by exogenous shocks, namely
the unanticipated co tnponents* of government expenditure and the rate of change
* Tkie terms "anticipated" and "unanticipated" here refer to the decomposition
of exogenous and policy variables into two components in order to Incorporate
the rational expectations hypothesis. Decomposition is done as follows: if X
is an exogenous or policy variable following the autoregressive process
X	 ajXt_j + Ut
where in is the maximum lag, then
Anticipated Component =
	 ajXt..i
Unanticipated Component =	 - E a iXt_j = Ut
- 25 -
of the KD/dollar exchange rate. The equation was estimated using the Alinon
distributed lags procedure and the following results were found:
(i) the trend rate of growth of non-oil GDP is 0.59 times the trend growth
rate in government expenditure;
(ii) the effect of the unanticipated component of govrnrnent expenditure is
significantly positive;
(iii) the unanticipated component of exchange rate changes have strong and
persistent impact on real growth.
Although the statistical results turned out to be good, they were overshadowed
by the lack of theoretical reasoning to justify the specification of the
equation. For example, there was no explanation for the effect of the exchange
rate on the growth of non-oil GDP.
In this study a measure of economic activity or economic growth is frequently
required, posing the following question: what income concept is most
appropriate for this purpose? Is it non-oil GDP only or total GDP (including
oil GDP)? In other words, considering economic activity or economic growth in
an oil-based economy like that of Kuwait, is it more plausible to include or
exclude the oil sector?
It would seem that non-oil GDP is a better measure of economic activity and
real production, since the monetary value of output in the oil sector is
highly influenced by conditions in the international oil market; these affect
activity in non-oil sectors in the long run only. As El-Beblawi and Fabmi
(1981) point out, "the oil sector is not integrated in the domestic economy as
much as it is an extension of the world economy attached geographically and
geopolitically to the national economy." They further add that "growth of the
oil sector reflects changes in the world economy and in particular the balance
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of power between the oil exporting and consuming countries." As Ghulouin (1984)
also points out, "a recession in the rest of the world is reflected initially
in the oil sector only, and does not generally affect the other sectors of the
economy except after a long period."
Interestingly enough, the oil sector -in which more than half of total GDP
originates- employs less than 1 percent of the labour force, whereas the
construction sector, for example, employs about 12 percent of the labour
force. Furthermore, production in the oil sector actually represents capital
depletion; indeed, it is essentially extraction rather than production. These
arguments suggest, therefore, that non-oil GDP Is a better measure of economic
activity, real production and growth. However, total GDP -including the oil
sector- is a better measure of income when talking about wealth, Income per
capita or standard of living.
Mansour (1983) argues that this proposition was valid prior to the
government's full ownership of the oil sector In 1975 because the oil sector
then looked more like "an Isolated external sector." ?ow, he believes, this is
no longer the case and total GDP Is a valid proxy for economic activity for
the following reasons:
(I)	 the oil sector is now more closely integrated with non-oil sectors;
(ii) many industries use oil as a raw material;
(iii) a major portion of crude oil is processed and converted into refined
products;
(iv) non-oil sectors are propelled by government expenditure which Is
financed by oil revenue;
(v)	 oil is the source of wealth.
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Thomas Stauffer (1981) of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies argues
that growth in the oil-exporting countries must consist of two components, one
being pure expansion, reflecting the consumption of oil reserves, and a second
component which is the result of investment, i.e. the transformation of oil
assets into different assets which yield more- enduring income. He defines
success in reducing oil dependency as contingent upon the relative size of
"transformation income" versus the "depletable component" but, he argues, even
non-oil GDP does not truly reflect the transformation income because a large
component of oil revenue is embedded in the non-oil sectors, simply because
non-oil activity is financed by government expenditure. So, to arrive at the
"actual" size of non-oil GDP, the contribution of the oil sector to non-oil
sectors must be deducted. His estimates show that more than two thirds of what
is regarded as Kuwait's non-oil GDP in conventional national income accounting
is derived from the spending of oil income; the remainder represents a measure
of GDP which might be expected to persist if oil revenue were to cease over
night. He concludes that Kuwait's real dependence on current oil revenue is
almost 90 percent rather than the average 63.7 percent derived from
conventional national income accounts.
2.3. Public Finance
The Kuwaiti government is a big spender on social services and economic
participation, e.g. full or partial ownership of companies. The government
aims at using its revenue in such a manner as to enhance the welfare state,
distribute Income, support the private sector, and achieve sustainable
non-inflationary growth.
Revenue accrues to the government from three sources: (i) oil sales, (ii)
foreign investment and (iii) other sources, mainly some minor customs duties
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and fees for some services. There is no Income tax or any other major types of
tax. Oil and gas sales have historically been the major source of government
revenue, but investment income has continuously assumed increasing importance
(see Figure 2.4). This income is obtained by employing the accumulated budget
surplus in real arid financial assets abroad, which, inAmuzegar's (1983) view',
permits oil exporting countries to take advantage of the current known price
of oil, while deferring the absorption of real goods and services*. Other
sources of revenue are of domestic origin, accounting for about 5 percent of
total revenue in. 1982.
On the- expenditure side, there are four outlets:
(I) Current expenditure, which includes payments of wages and salaries to
government employees, purchases of goods and services (consumption) and
transfer payments.
(ii) Investment expenditure, which includes spending on construction and
capital equipment.
(iii) Expenditure on land acquisition, which comprises payments made by the
government to citizens In return for their houses or lands. The
government buys private property at higher prices than the market value
to erect public projects or re-sell them cheap to encourage
modern housing construction. This category of expenditure is a means
of income distribution.
* The following are the advantages of foreign investment cited by Amuzegar
(1983): (1) foreign investment, even when real yield is low, may be superior
to domestic capital formation that has gross returns that fall short of
depreciation costs, particularly where infrastructure is insufficiently
developed, (ii) it avoids some of th incidental costs involved in a rapid
increase in domestic expenditure, and (iii) It helps to insulate the domestic
money supply from the effect of the balance of payments.
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(iv) Foreign expenditure, which mostly takes the form of economic aid to other
countries.
Figure 2.5 roughly demonstrates that there is no one-to-one relationship
between total revenue and total expenditure, this is due to two factors.
Firstly, investment income is not touched but transferred to the accumulated
reserves chich are reinvested. If the sum of oil revenue and other revenue
falls short of total expenditure, the shortfall is financed out of the
reserves. Secondly, dollars earned from oil sales are not automatically and
immediately exchanged for local currency to finance domestic expenditure;
instead, this tends to be done in a rather discretionary manner as the need
arises.
A simple regression of total revenue on total expenditure using rates of
change produces the following results:
TE	 14.72 ^ 0.3 TR
(3.12) (5.58)
R2 =0.757	 SE=l4.80 DW=l.95
R2 is not sufficiently high to suggest a one-to-one relationship, implying
that there are other factors besides revenue that determine expenditure.
Moreover, the significance of the constant term as indicated by its
t-statistic implies that the regression line does not pass through the origin,
which means that the relationship between the two variables is not
proportional. It should also be stated that because of the first factor
mentioned above, total expenditure is more influenced by oil revenue than by
investment income. The correlation coefficient between the grocth rates of
total expenditure and oil revenue is 0.86, whereas that between the former and
Figure 2.5
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investment income is only 0.37. This relationship is shown graphically in
Figure 2.6.
Several attempts have been made to model the revenue and expenditure sides of
public finance in Kuwait. Khouja (1973) made the first attempt when he
estimated a six-equation econometric model of the real sector of the Kuw'aiti
economy; two of the six equations were for public finance. He estimated an
equation of total revenue as a function of the difference between exports arid
net factor income, and an equation of expenditure as a function of total
revenue. Statistical results were good but the model was too simple and
aggregated. Khouja deduced from his model that changes in expenditure are
60 percent less than those in revenue, this he partially attributed to
non-economic oi "philosophical" factors and, also, to the limited absorptive
capacity of the Kuwaiti economy.
Better modelling of public finance is found in Khouja and Sadler's (1979)
annual model of the Kuwaiti economy. The model contains an equation explaining
total government expenditure in terms of G1P, lagged revenue from abroad (oil
revenue + investment income) and a dummy variable, and another equation that
explains government domestic revenue in terms of GNP. The model was estimated
by OLS and 2SLS using data for the period 1962-76. Khouja and Sadler found
that the three explanatory variables in the expenditure equation account for
over 90 percent of the variation In the dependent variable, but they found the
coefficient of GNP to be very small. They attributed this to the proposition
that "a large proportion of GNP does not relate to the local economy" in which
case they would have been better of f using non-oil GDP because, as has been
argued, it Is a better proxy for economic activity. They also found the
dit
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coefficient of lagged revenue to be sigificant, which they attributed to the
actual existence of time lag in the receipt of revenue. The dummy variable was
also significant, and that was taken to confirm the expanding role of the
government since 1971 when GNP and the government's share thereof began to
increase markedly at the expense of the private sector. Moreover, the equation
showed a statistically significant autonomous component of government
expenditure which Is regarded as fixed, irrespective of the level of economic
activity, because this component is used to cover welfare expenditure and
similar items. The equation for domestic revenue revealed that 78 percent of
the variation in the dependent variable can be explained by GNP. The small
coefficient was taken to confirm the coamiunity's limited participation in the
I
cost of government administration and social services. Since domestic revenue
consists mainly of some customs duties and fees for some services, it is more
plausible to make it a function of domestic economic activity as proxied by
non-oil GDP. Therefore, the equation might have produced a better fit if
non-oil GDP had been used instead of GNP.
El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) estimated two equations for government oil and
non-oil revenue. Oil revenue was specified to depend on current and lagged
values of oil GDP, but the lagged value alone turned out to be significant.
Non-oil revenue was simply made a function of non-oil GDP which turned out to
be highly significant (t = 12.6).
Kuwait International Investment Company (1984) presented a quarterly
forecasting model of public finance containing four behavioural equations to
explain oil revenue, other revenue, current expenditure and investment
expenditure. No equations were presented for investment income, expenditure on
land acquisition and foreign expenditure, on the grounds that they tend to be
- 35 -
highly volatile and determined -or influenced- to a large extent by social or
political factors (see Figure 2.7). This may seem inapplicable to investment
income which should, theoretically, depend on yields In foreign financial
markets among other factors, but in the fiscal year 1981/82 investment income
fell by about 22 percent, just when everybody had expected it to rise sharply
because foreign interest rates reached record highs in 1981. The reason for
the drop was the reduction in reserves brought about by the withdrawal of
about 4 billion to finance a loan to Iraq. Some other withdrawals were
necessary to finance support operations for the stock market. Therefore, it
was felt inappropriate to try to model Investment income.
The Claremont Economics Institute (1983) suggested an investment Income
equation of the following form:
Yi R [air1 + a2r2 + (l-a1-a2) r3]
where Yi is investment income, R is invested reserves, a1 and a 2
 are the
proportions of the portfolio in bills and notes respectively and r 1 , r2
 and r3
are yields on bills, notes and tangible assets respectively. Rut given the
fact that the asset composition and geographical distribution of Kuwait's
foreign investment portfolio are unknown, investment income cannot be
estimated from the above equation.
Ghulouin (1984) estimated an expenditure equation as part of a simple money
supply model. He contends that government expenditure in Kuwait is determined
by three sets of factors: economic factors such as inflation, growth and the
need to maintain and expand infrastructure; non-economic factors which largely
depend on political considerations; and the "revenue constraint" which tends
to influence expenditure in the long run only. He points out that changes in
revenue affect expenditure only If they are conceived to be permanent like
Figure 2.7
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those resulting from the 1973/74 oil price hike. Accordingly, he estimates an
equation in which government expenditure Is a function of past expenditure on
"fixed" items of the budget, such as wages and investment expenditure which
tend to grow over time and are less influenced by political considerations,
and a moving average of the balance of trade. 8oth coefficients were found to
be significant.
2.4. Foreign Trade
Kuwait depends heavily, on foreign trade: the major part of government revenue
accrues from the export of oil and gas and owing to the weakness of its
agricultural and industrial sectors, Kuwait depends on the outside world for
food as well as consumer and capital goods. The importance of foreign trade
for the Kuwaiti economy can be seen from the high ratio of imports and exports
to GOP. In 1982, the two 'ratios were 56.5 and 59.2 percent respectively.
As we have said before, oil exports comprise over 90 percent of total exports,
with the rest consisting of re-exported goods and some domestically produced
goods, mainly fertilizers. Re-exports usually consist of consumer durables and
capital goods imported from abroad and then re-exported to neighbouring
countries. The re-export trade evolved mainly out of the fact that Kuwait
developed its harbour facilities and telecommunication systems earlier than
other countries in the region. Kuwait's imports have continuously increased
over time and yet the balance of trade has been in surplus ever since economic
data were recorded because of the fast growth of oil exports.
The following are the results of regressing tradebalance on its various
components using annual data for the ' period 1970-82. The purpose of this
exercise is to elucidate the dominant factor in determining the trade balance.
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The following notation is used, with variables measured as rates of change.
TB trade balance
OX = oil exports
RX = other exports
X	 total exports
IM imports
TB = -3.69 + 1.34 Ox
(-0.93)	 (20.60)
R2	0.975	 SE = 13.29	 DW	 1.53
TB = -44.97 ^ 2.42 RX
(-1.27)	 (2.37)
R2 = 0.339	 SE = 68.01	 DW	 2.20
TB	 -5.73 + 1.41 x
(-1.36)	 (19.46)
R2	0.972	 SE	 14.05	 DW = 1.43
TB = 18.1 ^ 0.38 IM
(0.52)	 (0.31)
R2	0.009	 SE	 83.3	 DW = 2.11
These regression equations show clearly that oil exports have been the major
determinant of the balance of trade, whereas imports have had no significant
effect. Figure 2.8 illustrates the same fact graphically.
Some attempts have been made to model the foreign trade sector. In his first
Figure 2.8
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model, Khouja (1973) estimated an equation for imports whereas exports were
assumed to be exogenous. Imports were made a function of GNP which was found
to be significant. Khouja found extremely high marginal propensity to import,
this he attributed to the inadequacy of domestic output for domestic demand
and also due to the absence of major trade barriers (tariffs and quotas).
Another factor is the need to import capital goods to fulfil the needs of
various productive sectors.
A more sophisticated import function was estimated by Khouja and Sadler (1979)
in which imports were made a function of GNP, change in the GNP deflator and
the ratio of money supply to disposable income lagged one period, all of which
were found to be significant. The ratio of money supply to disposable income
was included to account for the role of the banking system in financing
imports. However, the volume of bank credit to the private sector would have
been a better and more accurate measure of the role of the banking system as
shall be seen later. Moreover, data on the GNP deflator (1962-76) must have
been unreliable private estimates, since the Central Statistical Office did
not begin to construct price indices (consumer and wholesale) until the early
1970s, and even these are not particularly accurate.
In the Claremont model, two equations were estimated for exports and imports,
both in log-log form. Exports were made a function of the quantity of oil
exported and the price of crude oil which gave a very good fit (R 2 = 0.99),
whereas imports were made a function of total GDP, producing R 2 of 0.73.
A more sophisticated import function will be presented later as part of the
structural model of Chapter 6.
The forecasting model developed at the Kuwait International Investment Company
(1984) contains three equations to forecast oil exports, non-oil exports and
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imports. Oil exports were made a function of a linear combination of the
monetary value of the exports of crude oil, refined oil and liquified
petroleum gas, which is more plausible than just using crude oil as in the
Claremont model. Non-oil exports and imports were estimated using
autoregressive processes since they tend to grow over time. This procedure was
felt to be sufficient in a model constructed for the purpose of forecasting
rather than hypothesis testing.
2.5. Other Characteristics of the Kuwaiti Economy
As already stated, Kuwait shares with other LDCs many of their common
characteristics and problems, but the Kuwaiti economy also displays a number
of other characteristics. As has already been shown, it is the extent of
Kuwait's dependence on oil, for which it is a price-taker, that makes it an
LDC. Other major characteristics of Kuwait's economy are as follows (some of
which have already been mentioned or referred to implicitly).
(1) Kuwait is a welfare state with one of the highest standards of living in
the world. World Bank (1983) statistics show that in 1980 Kuwait had a
per capita GNP of 24,l6O compared with l5,98O for Switzerland, l3,73O
for Sweden, ll,59O for the United States, and 8,52O for the United
Kingdom.
(2) Kuwait does not have any capital constraints on development, this is not
the case in LDCs generally. The budget has been in surplus ever since
data were recorded. Indeed, planners have to think as to how to dispose
of the surplus in the best possible manner.
(3) The Kuwaiti economy is extremely open and depends heavily on the rest of
the world for imports, foreign currency earnings and labour force as
Table 2.3 shows. Moreover, there are no restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions or capital transfers. Indeed, economic growth per se depends
on the foreign sector.	 ID
U	 '1
L
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Table 2.3: Measures of Openness
Ratio	 Percent
Imports /GDP	 56.5
Exports/GD?	 59.2
Imports/Domestic Expenditure	 59.6
Revenue from Abroad/Total Revenue 	 94.9
Expatriate Labour Force/Total Labour Force 	 78.1
(1982)
(1982)
(1982)
(1981/82)
(1980 census)
(4) The price elasticity of the demand for imports is very low because there
is very little substitutability between locally produced goods and
imported goods.
(5) Marginal propensity to consume is low and that is attributed to:
(i) fast growth of per capita income, (ii) reaching the stage of
near-saturation in consumption, (iii) government's responsibility for
some consumption expenditure, e.g. medical services and education, and
(iv) the large proportion of expatriate labour with high propensity to
save.
(6) Marginal propensity to invest domestically is low and that is attributed
to: (i) lack of domestic investment opportunities, (ii) yield
differentials in favour of foreign investment and (iii) restrictions on
investment by expatriates.
(7) Marginal propensity to import is very high. Khouja'S (1973) estimates
show that 80 percent of any increase in expenditure on private
consumption and investment is spent on imported goods and services.
(8) The public sector is very large. The government owns the oil sector which
accounts for about 60 percent (or more according to Stauffer (1981)) of
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GDP. The ratio of government expenditure on consumption and investment to
total domestic expenditure was 33.6 in 1982. The public sector employs
about 43 percent of the labour force.
(9) The balance of payments (with the outside world) of the public sector is
determined by exogenous factors (e.g. conditions In the oil market),
whereas tbat of the private sector is determined by endogenous factors
(e.g. preference for local investment vis-a-vis foreign investment).
Because of the heavy dependence on the outside world, the private
sector's balance of payments is always in deficit and this deficit is
covered by the public sector's surplus.
CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF KUWAIT'S MONETARY SECTOR
3.1. Historical Background
The monetary history of Kuwait reflects, to a considerable extent, its
economic history. Monetary evolution has been largely influenced by the rapid
expansion of the Kuwaiti economy, particularly following the remarkable growth
of oil revenue since late 1973. Monetary development has since been associated
with the phenomena of the post-1973 era, namely economic, population and
sectoral growth which created an ever increasing demand for banking services.
While this would suggest that monetary development in Kuwait has been
"demand-following", certainly for the period after 1973, prior to this time it
could, more accurately, be described as a combination of "demand-following"
and "supply-leading", with one phenomenon gradually giving way to the other.
Looking back to the fifties and sixties, before the advent of sustained
growth, "supply-leading" banking services started with the foundation of the
National Bank of Kuwait in 1952, inducing some sort of real investment. As the
growth process continued, particularly in the post-1973 period, the
"supply-leading" impetus steadily gave way, to the "demand-following" response.
The modern monetary history of Kuwait goes back to 1961 when the national
currency, the Kuwaiti Dinar (1(D), caine into circulation to replace the Indian
Rupee (the original legal tender). This was initiated in order to secure the
independence of the monetary sector, and it was the result of the
implementation of Law No. 141/1960 concerning the inauguration oE a Currency
Board solely responsible for issuing currency. Up until this time, the Indian
Rupee was used as the medium of exchange in accordance with an agreement
between the Kuwaiti government and the Reserve Bank of India. In essence,
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the Kuwaiti government obtained Rupees by selling Sterling to the Reserve Bank
of India. In the same way, Kuwaiti banks were able to convert their holdings
of excess Rupees into Sterling. This arrangement remained effective until the
KD became the medium of exchange in 1961, whereupon the Rupees were gradually
withdrawn from the system and presented to the Reserve Bank of India for
conversion into Sterling.
The Currency Board continued to perform its sole function of issuing currency
until 1968. Currency issued was backed by reserves consisting of 50 percent
gold and 50 percent foreign currency convertible into gold. At that time,
commercial banks were founded and supervised in accordance with the Commercial
Law governing the operations of public shareholding companies at large;
however, this contained no specific provisions for banking institutions. It
was increasingly felt that a public body should be set up to be in charge of
supervising and controlling the foundation and operations of banking and
financial institutions. In 1968, therefore, the Central Bank of Kuwait was
founded to replace the Currency Board in accordance with Law 32/68 (Central
Bank Law), this included provisions for issuing currency and the regulation of
the banking industry. The Law stated that issued currency must be backed by
reserves composed of 50 percent gold and 50 percent of other items including;
foreign currency, bonds denominated in foreign currency, bonds or financial
papers issued or guaranteed by the Kuwaiti government and commercial papers
discounted by the Central Bank. The Law entrusted and empowered the Central
Bank to carry out several functions in addition to that of issuing currency.
In 1977, some articles of the Central Bank Law were amended by Decree 130/77.
These amendments were considered to be necessary in the light of
newly-emerging developments arid problems. One of the amendments concerned the
composition of reserves required to back issued currency, whereby no specific
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percentage was assigned to gold, allowing foreign assets to comprise the bulk
of the reserves. Other amendments were felt necessary for the following
reasons:
(1) To reinforce the role played by the Central Bank in strengthening
financial markets. Accordingly, the capital of the Bank was raised from
KD 5 million to KD 30 million.
(2) To strengthen the role played by the Central Bank in regulating the
banking industry and enhancing the effectiveness of the banking system
in serving the national economy.
(3) The need for new articles in view of the emergence of specialised banks and
investment companies.
Over the years, the monetary sector has assumed increasing importance, due
largely to the openness of the economy and the absence of any restrictions on.
foreign exchange transactions and capital transfers. This importance has been
augmented by the effect of monetary developments on all sectors of the
national economy.
3.2. Central Bank of Kuwait
A national central bank is often high on the "shopping list" of a newly
independent country, arising out of the need to replace the currency board
-usually a carryover from the colonial era- by a new monetary authority with
wider powers and responsibilities (Collyns (1983)).
There is a significant difference between the role of a central bank in a
developed country and that in a developing country. This difference, together
with some operational constraints, must be borne in mind when evaluating the
performance of central banks in developing countries. The central bank of a
developing country must not only assume the role of a regulator, but also that
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of a developer of the monetary sector and financial markets. Bhatt (1974)
asserts that the central bank in a developing country must "take the lead in
evolving the credit institutions, instruments, and yield structure that are
essential for the efficient inobilisation of savings and the allocation of
resources consistent with development objectives."
The Central Bank of Kuwait commenced operations in April 1969 and concentrated
its efforts, Initially, on acquiring greater insight into the operations of
commercial banks. This was necessary in order to execute the tasks assigned to
it by Law 32/68 and the amendments of Decree 130/77, which boiled down to
formulating and implementing monetary policy.
El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) point out that the role which the Central Bank of
Kuwait has played since its foundation is reflected in the rapid financial
development that took place in the 1970s. Indicators of financial development
include the opening of more bank branches, the emergence and growth of
specialised banks and investment companies, the general increase and diversity
of banking activities, and increased sophistication of financial markets.
The Central Bank of Kuwait retained the function of issuing currency
previously carried out by the Currency Board; article 14 of the Central Bank
Law states that "the issuing of currency is a privilege reserved for the State
and shall be exercised only by the Central Bank." It also states that "no
authority other than the Central Bank shall issue or place in circulation bank
notes and metal coins, or any note or document payable to bearer on sight and
negotiable as legal tender for the purpose of payment instead of the currency
issued." Article 15 of the Law specifies the functions of the Central Bank.
Apart from issuing currency, the Bank is entrusted to execute the following
tasks:
- 48 -
(1) securing the stability of the Kuwaiti currency and its freedom of
conversion into other foreign currencies;
(2) conducting monetary policy in such a manner as will help to foster economic
and social progress and the growth of national income;
(3) controlling the banking system;
(4) acting as a banker to the government;
(5) rendering financial advice to the government.
The Central Bank tries to accomplish these objectives under two sets of
constraints or "stumbling blocks": the lack of effective monetary tools (e.g
open market operations), and the lack of autonomy and independence.
Independence of central banks has -always been a controversial issue. The
orthodox view is that monetary policy is part of the overall. niacroeconoinic
policy and should, therefore, be determined by a top government authority (the
Council of Ministers in the case of Kuwait). If this is the case, the central
bank should only make suggestions and participate in policy debates. The other
extreme view is that monetary policy -like justice- must not be subject to any
political pressure. Bryant (1980) lists the following possible views about the
desirability or otherwise of political independence of the central bank:
(1)	 The political process in a democratic society generates pressure on the
government to adopt policies inimical to long-run welfare, e.g. policies
that foster excessive monetary expansion and hence inflation. Thus, an
independent central bank should be insulated from political pressure so
that it can pursue the appropriate long-run objectives.
(ii) The insulation of the central bank from political pressure is
undemocratic in the sense that it results in a technocratic minority's
views about the society's goals being imposed on the will of the
majority.
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(iii) A fragmentation of decision making power among government agencies is
inherently desirable as a political end.
The issue of independence revolves around the desirability, or otherwise, of
the central bank's ability to pursue fundamentally different objectives from
those pursued by the rest of the government. Some economists argue, however,
that the central bank should be required to adopt the same objectives pursued
by the government, yet should remain operationally independent on the grounds
that decisions will be superior under conditions of independence. For example,
Thomas Mayer (1976) advocates a compromise solution in which the Federal
Reserve would have its objectives specified by the President, but would -
nevertheless retain substantial independence from partisan politics. Bryant
(1980) criticises Mayer's compromise on the grounds that it is contradictory,
and that Mayer does not make it clear whether the Federal Reserve would or
would not actually pursue separate objectives. Bryant argues that If -
controversy over ultimate objectives is ruled out, it is difficult to
understand why technical implemeitation of policy should be greatly affected
by different administrative relationships.
In practice, central banks' independence from the government varies
considerably even in the developed world (see for example Fair (1979) for a
survey of the degrees of independence of central banks in 16 countries). But
it seems that there is little evidence of central bank autonomy world-wide.
Banalan et al (1983) presented an analysis of the independence of central
banks in 12 industrial countries, and concluded that the Federal Reserve and
the central banks of Germany and Switzerland enjoy more autonomy than the
rest. They argue that only these three banks can be considered as examples of
independent central banks. In their study, they analysed the responses of
monetary policy to four pressures: fiscal deficit, wage increases,
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international reserve influences, and import price increases. They came up
with evidence suggesting that the Federal Reserve may be classified somewhere
in between the German and Swiss cases on the one side and the "dependent"
banks on the other. More recently, there have been indications to the effect
that President Reagan was joining a campaign led by some supply-siders to
bring the Federal Reserve more directly under the Administration's control
(see the 1984 Economic Report of the President and the editorial of Financial
Times, February 7th 1985).
Bryant (1980) argues that it is difficult in practice to make judgements about
the effective independence of the central bank, simply because the authorities
may wish to preserve the "fiction" of a senii-independent central bank even
when the degree of its effective independence is slight. Additionally, the
central bank may disguise differences in ultimate objectives as though they
were merely differences in judgement about the appropriate model, or the
future paths of non-policy exogenous variables. Such differences in
"technical" judgement call attention to the political consequences of
independence much less prominently than do differences in objectives. He
further argues that diversity of objectives and the types and numbers of
monetary policy instruments is correlated with the degree of political
independence of the central bank. He asserts that central banks that pursue
allocative as well as economy-wide objectives, with not only general but also
selective instruments, seem to be less politically independent of their fiscal
authorities and governments. A study by Woolley (1977) has also shown that
greater selectivity in objectives and instruments might lead to reduced
independence, though the causal relationship is not made very clear.
The lack of autonomy and independence of the Central Bank of Kuwait is quite
conspicuous. An economist commenting on the status of the Central Bank of
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Kuwait once said, "its ability to control monetary expansion had always been
circumscribed by the predominance of the Ministry of Finance in setting the
economic pace through its fiscal powers." Another point of view is that "the
Central Bank's backseat position to the Ministry means that the Governor's
relationship with the Finance Minister is crucial to his ability to deal
effectively with the banks, and to win the endorsement of his policies from
the Council of Ministers." It has also been stated that "if a governor does
not have the support of the Finance Minister, he is finished" (see Muehring
'(1985)). This status is in direct contrast with article 13 of the Central Bank
Law which states that "an autonomous public agency having legal status shall
be created, named the Central Bank of Kuwait." In reality, the Central Bank of
Kuwait is only autonomous in the sense that it has an independent budget. From
the decision-making point of view, it is not autonomous because any decision
taken by its board of directors can be vetoed by the Ministry of Finance.
Article 27 of the Law states that "the representative of the Ministry of
Finance to the board of directors may require the postponement of any
resolution passed by the board regarding eredit and monetary policy for
reference to the Finance Minister. If the Finance Minister fails, within seven
days of the postponement, to pass a resolution on the matter, the resolution
as passed shall become effective."
The Central Bank is also required to inform the Minister of Finance of current
and future credit and monetary policy in accordance with article 38. The same
article further states that "if the Minister of Finance is of a different
opinion, he may give general directions to be followed by the Central Bank and
these directions shall be binding on it. If the board of directors of the
Central Bank has any objection to such directions, they may submit their
objections and reasons in writing to the Minister of Finance, who shall in
turn pass them -together with the directions issued by him- to the Council of
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Ministers for a decision which shall be final." Even financially, the Central
Bank of Kuwait is not completely Independent of the Ministry of Finance.
Article 31 of the Law states that "the Ministry of Finance shall transfer to
the Bank whatever funds are needed to implement a certain specified monetary
policy."
The conclusion on this Issue Is that the Central Bank of Kuwait must be given
more freedom in executing policies, to the extent that monetary policy becomes
somewhat distinct from fiscal policy or, at least, monetary policy makers
become distinct from fiscal policy makers. However, independence should not
imply lack of coordination with fiscal policy (see Bryant (1980) PP.327-330
and Okun (1972) for a good discussion of this issue).
Another "stumbling block" for the Central Bank of Kuwait has been the shortage
of indigenous personnel who have the training and experience to conduct the
Bank's business. The Currency Board had carried out largely mechanical
functions which provided few opportunities for staff to develop operational
skills. The constraint on human resources has been particularly severe in
areas requiring technical expertise such as economic research to guide
monetary policy.
Article 31 of the Central Bank Law specifies the tasks that the Bank must
execute in order to perform the function of banker to the government. They
include the following:
(1) keeping the government KJ deposits on which no interest is paid;
(2) carrying out (free of charge) all of the government's banking operations
and services, both inside and outside the country;
(3) advising the government on its 10 deposits with commercial banks in
conformity with monetary policy;
(4) managing some of the government's funds.
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Collyns (1983) argues that the Tole of banker to the government is relatively
limited in Kuwait and similar capital-surplus countries like Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates. He points out that given the substantial budgetary
surplus, the government does not require loans from the. central bank; rather,
the government must determine the allocation of its accumulated financial
resources between central bank deposits and other uses. This, in my view, is
not strictly correct because the disposition of a budget surplus in the
optimum manner is as much a problem as financing a deficit, though this is not
a task to be carried out by the central bank alone.
A full evaluation of the performance of the Central Bank of Kuwait will be
deferred to Chapter 5 which is devoted to studying monetary policy. However,
one point must be mentioned here: the Central Bank of Kuwait, by being not
only a lender of last resort but also a lender of "primary" resort, has indeed
provided the incentive for commercial banks to listen to its advice and follow
its instructions. Kuwaiti commercial banks have always felt free to approach
the Central Bank for help, particularly.since the establishment of the
discount window in 1975.
3.2.1. Structure and Growth of Balance Sheet
An examination of the structure and growth of the Central Bank's balance sheet
is necessary to put the developments in the right perspective and to highlight
the role which the Bank has played.
The Central Bank of Kuwait has experienced remarkable growth: its total assets
grew at a compound annual rate of 28.6 percent between 1969 and 1982. Table
3.1 shows the major items on the Central Bank's balance sheet and Figure 3.1
presents a graphical illustration of the growth of foreign assets and
discounts.
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Table 3.1: Assets and Liabilities of the Central Bank
Percent	 Percent	 Average Compound
(1969)	 (1982)	 Growth Rate (7.)
Assets
Foreign Assets
	 84.1	 85.2	 28.7
Discounts	 0.9*	 13.6	 80.1
Other Assets	 15.9	 1.2	 5.6
Total Assets	 100.0	 100.0	 28.6
Liabilities
Monetary Base	 65.6	 53.8	 26.7
Government Deposits	 9.2	 39.0	 43.8
Capital & Reserves
	
6.5	 1.5	 14.8
Other Liabilities	 18.7	 5.7	 15.3
Foreign Assets
Gold	 47.2	 1.8	 0.2
Reserve Position in the IMP 	 6.9	 9.5	 31.9
Deposits	 31.5	 88.3	 39.3
Others	 14.4	 0.4	 -2.2
Monetary_Base
Issued Currency	 95.9	 33.3	 16.8
Local Banks' Deposits 	 4.1	 22.3	 44.2
Central Bank Bills	 3.6**	 44.4	 230.6
* in 1975.
** in 1979.
(i) Foreign Assets
Foreign assets comprised 85.2 percent of total assets in 1982, with an average
annual growth rate of 28.7 percent during the period 1969-82. A substantial
portion of the Central Bank's foreign assets originates from the government's
(Ministry of Finance) purchases of Kuwaiti Dinars against foreign currency
(dollar), received mainly from oil exports. A further portion of foreign
assets originates from transfers to the Bank by the Ministry to cover
facilities which the Bank provides to commercial banks through the discount
window.
Foreign assets mostly take the form of deposits and certificates of deposit
with foreign banks (88.3 percent in 1982). The second largest item is the
reserve position in the IMP (9.5 percent in 1982). This item is composed of
the portion paid in gold of Kuwait's quota in the Fund, net utilisation of KD
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contribution, IMP withdrawals under special arrangements (such as the IMP's
oil facility created in 1974 to provide short-terni loans to member countries
with balance of payments problems resulting from higher oil prices), and
holdings of SDRs. The reserve position in the IMP increased sharply in 1974
and 1975 due to payments of Kuwait's contribution to the oil facility. After
1976 it started declining mainly due to the drop in the balance of the oil
facility on account of the settlement of new payments, particularly that they
ceased to be given to the IMF in 1977. Instead, new "supplementary financing
facilities" were created. In 1982 there was an increase in the reserve
position due mainly to the increase in SDR holdings.
(ii) Discounts
Discounts (or rather rediscounts) are the second major item on the assets side
of the Central Bank's balance sheet. At the end of 1975, the year in which the
discount window was opened, they comprised less t•han 1 percent of total
assets, but since 1979 they have shown remarkable growth as commercial banks
resorted to the discount window whenever they faced a liquidity shortage. The
growth rate of discounts over the period 1975-82 was 80.1 percent; at the end
of 1982 they formed 13.6 percent of total assets.
The mechanics of the discount and rediscount operations is as follows:
commercial banks buy (discount) coniinercial papers before maturity from
individuals and corporations. When the banks face a liquidity shortage, they
turn to the Central Bank to borrow funds with commercial papers serving as
collateral. Loans extended by the Central Bank to commercial banks under this
arrangement carry interest, and have the same maturity as that of the
commercial papers which remain in the custody of the commercial banks and are
cashed on maturity.
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At the end of 1978 the balance of commercial paper discounts was KD 30.6
million, but it jumped to KD 195.3 million in 1979 and to KD 298.6 million in
1980. That was the direct result of pressure on the commercial banks' KD
liquidity which drove theni to resort to the discount window. As demand
intensified, the Central Bank decided to extend the maturity of discountable
paper from 3 to 12 months. In 1981 and 1982 the balance declined due to the
tangible improvement in lCD liquidity of the commercial banks and in the market
in general, and also the slower pace of credit expansion.
(iii) Monetary Base
Monetary base or reserve money comprises just over a half of the liabilities
of the Central Bank. Up to 1978, monetary base was composed of issued currency
and local banks' balances with the Central Bank. In 1979, Central Bank bills
were introduced as a tool to absorb excess liquidity, and since then they have
formed an important part of commercial banks' reserves and monetary base (see
Figure 3.2).
Issued currency comprised 95.9 percent of the monetary base in 1969 but that
share declined to 33.3 percent In 1982, despite an average annual growth rate
of 16.8 percent. Issued currency is mainly determined by the amount of foreign
currency supplied to the Central Bank in exchange for lCD, i.e. supply follows
demand. Foreign currency comes from the following sources:
(1) The government, which converts some of its dollar receipts from the export
of oil to finance domestic expenditure.
(2) Private corporate sector, which obtains foreign currency from non-oil
exports and re-exports as well as income from foreign investment.
(3) Foreign companies working in Kuwait and requiring KDs to finance their
local operations.. otab1e examples are foreign oil companies operating
in Kuwait prior to the government's full ownership of the oil sector.
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(4) Commercial banks borrowing foreign currency from abroad and entering swap
agreements with the Central Bank.
Moreover, the Central Bank can issue currency to satisfy loans to commercial
banks under the discount arrangement.
Local banks' deposits with the Central Bank are the second component of the
monetary base. These are non-interest bearing, but yet had an average growth
rate of 44.2 percent. This is understandable since the expansion of the
banking system has made it necessary for banks to hold current accounts with
the Central Bank to settle their increasing interbank transactions and
clearing operations. It can also be attributed to pressure from the Central
Bank through moral suasion. It must be pointed out that the introduction of
Central Bank bills in 1979 reduced banks' demand for deposits with the Central
Bank, since the bills represent an interest-bearing substitute. Between 1969
and 1978 the average growth rate of deposits with the Central Bank was 58.2
percent, but between 1979 and 1982 the growth rate declined to 21.5 percent.
The fastest growing component of the monetary base is Central Bank bills, with
a growth rate of 230.6 percent between 1979 and 1982. The first jump occurred
in 1980 when the value of banks' deposits fell due to substitution for by the
interest-bearing bills. This followed the amendment of the liquidity system in
the second half of 1980, whereby banks were required to maintain a certain
ratio of their funds in the form of cash, current accounts or bills. It must
be mentioned here that Central Bank bills are regarded as a component of the
monetary base because they are more or less equivalent to interest-bearing
accounts with the Central Bank, since they can be liquidated before maturity
on presentation to the Bank.
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(iv) Government Deposits
The share of government deposits fn total 1IIbTL.ities of the Central Bank
increased from 9.2 percent in 1969 to 39 percent in 1982, with an average
growth rate of 43.8 percent. There was a sharp increase In 1979 and 1980 due
to the increment in transfers by the Ministry of Finance to cover the Central
Bank's growing discount operations. In 1981 there was a partial drop due to
the decrease in transfers, whereas in 1982 they went up sharply following the
increase in transfers from the Ministry of Finance to cover the supplementary
financing facilities, SDR holdings and Kuwait's contribution in KD to the IMP.
This growth is also attributed to a larger volume of government deposits
against documentary credits, as well as to the proliferation of accounts of
government agencies and ministries.
3.3. Commercial Banks
Article 54 of the Central Bank Law cierines commercial banks as "firms whose
normal basic business is the acceptance of deposits to be used in banking
operations such as discount, sale and purchase of commercial paper, the grant
of loans and advances, the issue and receipt of cheques, the floating of.
public or private loans, trading in foreign currencies and precious metals as
well as any other monetary operations or any activity provided for in the
Commercial Law, or acknowledged in practice to. be included in the business of
banks.••
Kuwait's commercial banking system presently consists of seven commercial
banks. The first Kuwaiti bank, the National Bank of Kuwait, was founded in
1952 and commenced operations in 1953. Prior to that, the only bank operating
in the country was the British Bank of the Middle East which had been granted
a 30-year concession beginning in 1941. In 1971 this bank became the Bank of
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Kuwait and the Middle East. When the Central Bank commenced operations four
commercial banks were already active; three more were founded later (including
the Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East), the last to appear was a branch of
the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait opened in 1978 (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Kuwait's Commercial Banking System
Bank	 Year Founded	 Number of Branches*
National Bank of Kuwait
	
1952	 51
Commercial Bank of Kuwait 	 1960	 34
Gulf Bank
	
1960	 29
A1-Ahli Bank of Kuwait 	 1967	 12
The Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East	 1971	 18
Burgan Bank
	
1975	 9
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait 	 1978	 1
* End of 1984
Kuwait's commercial banking system has the following characteristics:
(1) Heavy government support through actual capital participation and other
backup operations such as lending to banks or opening deposits with them.
(2) 411 of the commercial banks are 100 percent Kuwaiti owned, except the one
branch of the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait which is owned jointly by Kuwaiti
and Bahralni interests on a 50/50 basis. The Head Office of the bank Is
located in Bahraln.
(3) With the exception of the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, all of the commercial
banks are public shareholding companies listed on the Kuwait Stock
Exchange.
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(4) Bank-client relationships play an important role in decision making.
Although this may be true everywhere, it is a particularly important
factor in Kuwait, especially for decisions concerning granting credit.
3.3.1. Structure and Growth of the Consolidated Balance Sheet
The portfolio equilibrium of commercial banks is one in which their balance
sheet is far in excess of their net worth and is financed by the issue of
short term-liabilities (deposits). In the case of Kuwait, the size of the
consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in 1982 was 10 7373 million,
whereas net worth was no more than 10 576.9 million. The extent of
deposit-financing is indicated by the ratio of deposits (private and
government) to the total size of the balance sheet which was 57.4 percent.
Commercial banks can borrow on more favourable terms than they lend, thus they
make profit out of the interest rate differential. The differential results
from their ability to simultaneously satisfy the portfolio preferences of
depositors (liquidity, convenience and security), and borrowers (better terms
than direct borrowing). Banks can do this because of their ability to pooi
risk (of withdrawal and default) and because they make use of specialised
skills. Theoretically, a bank reaches the equilibrium size and composition of
the balance sheet when it equates marginal costs and returns of all assets and
liabilities.
The growth and composition of the consolidated balance sheet of Kuwait's
commercial banks reflects the growth and structural changes in their overall
activities, and hence the process of development of the commercial banking
system. Since 1969 there have been a number of important changes in the
composition of their assets and liabilities and the policies they apply. Owing
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to the limited absorptive capacity of the Kuwaiti economy, the absence of
fully-developed financial markets, and the absence of any restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions and capital transfers, commercial banks (and all
other financial institutions for that matter) tend to invest part of their
resources abroad, particularly in foreign money markets. The bulk of local
operations take the form of providing short-term credit facilities to finance
domestic economic activity. Table 3.3 shows the structure and growth of the
commercial banks' balance sheet.
Table 33: Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks
Percent	 Percent	 Average Compound
(1969)	 (1982)	 Growth Rate (7.)
Assets
Foreign Assets	 69.5	 30.5	 14.9
Claims on the Private Sector 	 25.4	 58,2	 30.5
Reserves	 1.2	 8,5	 42.1
Other Assets	 3.9.	 2.8	 19.2
Total Assets	 100.0	 100.0	 22.4
Liabilities
Demand Deposits
Quasi-Money
Government Deposits
Foreign Liabilities
Capital and Reserves
Other Liabilities
	
11.9	 11.4
	
51.1	 40.7
	
10.2	 5.3
	
14.8	 20.7
	
5.1	 7.8
	
6.9	 14.1
22.0
20.3
16.5
25.7
26.5
29.2
Foreign Assets
Balances with Foreign Banks 	 73.8	 74.4	 15.0
Loans to non-residents	 18.1	 -	 17.0	 14.3
Foreign Investments	 8.1	 8.6	 15.5
Quasi-Money *
Saving Deposits	 29.5	 11.2	 11.5
Time Deposits and CDs	 42.3	 77.7	 28.7
Foreign Currency Deposits
	 28.2	 11.1	 11.9
* A breakdown of quasi-money is only available as from 1971, therefore
percentages in the first column are as of 1971, and growth rates are
calculated for the period 1971-82.
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particularly credit and Central Bank bills (see Figure 3.5). This is not
always the case, however, there have been occasions when the banks increased
their foreign assets proportionately more than their domestic assets as the
yield differential was high enough to justify bearing the international risk.
This has also occurred when domestic economic activity has slackened,
resulting in a weak domestic demand for credit. In 1980, there was a slowdown
in bank credit to some local activities at a time when the Eurodollar interest
rate was reaching record highs. As a result, the growth rate of foreign assets
in 1980 rose to 33.6 percent compared with 15.9 percent in 1979, at a time
when the growth rate of the major component of domestic assets (claims on the
private sector) declined from 35.9 to 26.1 percent. In 1981, the growth rate
of foreign assets declined to 19.4 percent due to exchange and interest rate
instability and a booming domestic stock market. In 1982, foreign assets
remained virtually unchanged as international interest rates declined
gradually and financial markets remained depressed by economic recession.
The composition of foreign assets has changed little, since the growth rates
of the various categories of foreign assets have mirrored the growth rate of
the overall total. Foreign assets can be divided into three broad categories
(see Figure 3.6):
(1) Balances with foreign banks. This item constitutes about three quarters of
foreign assets and take the form of deposits and certificates of deposit,
mostly denominated in foreign currencies and for a term of one year or
less. Part of the balances is denominated in KD and held with offshore
banking units based in Bahrain.
(2) Advances and discounts (loans) to non-residents. This accounts for about
17 percent of foreign assets. The growth rate of this item has been
slightly below that of total foreign assets.
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(3) Foreign Investments. This category comprises 8.6 percent of total foreign
assets and is mainly composed of shares, medium and long-term bonds and
direct equity participation in foreign companies. It is interesting to
note that in 1979, this itemdeclined by 5.8 percent at a time when
advances and discounts to non-residents increased by 94.9 percent. The
same factor, rising interest rates, explains both, i.e. making lending more
attractive and causing share and bond prices to be depressed.
(ii) Claims on the Private Sector
Claims on the private sector constitute the bulk of domestic operations. They
registered an average growth rate of 30.5 percent in the period. 1969-82. In
that period they surpassed foreign assets In Importance, forming 58.2 percent
of total assets in 1982, nearly double the percentage share of foreign assets,
compared with 25.4 percent in 1969. The growth in this item of the balance
sheet is attributed to the rapid growth of the Kuwaiti economy, particularly
since 1974, and the resulting increase in absorptive capacity, as well as the
risk aversion attitude-taken by banks towards investing in foreign markets.
About 90 percent of the claims on the private sector take the form of loans
and credit facilities granted to finance economic activity of the private and
joint sectors (owned jointly by the government and the private sector). The
remainder is distributed between claims on specialised banks (about 9 percent)
and local investment In shares and bonds (about 1 percent).
There has been a significant shift in the distribution of credit facilities
among various economic activities as can be seen from Table 3.4. Personal
loans increased in proportion and helped intensify the extent of speculation
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in domestic stock and real estate markets. Industry and agriculture -the two
sectors that must receive utmost attention in any developing country- got the
smallest portion of bank credit, with a stagnating or declining share. This is
due to their low profitability compared with other activities. The situation
verifies the proposition that depending on market forces for the allocation of
resources in a developing country is not appropriate for the prospects of
economic development. Overall, the credit distribution policy of Kuwait's
commercial banks has not been compatible with, or conducive to, economic
development. It must be pointed out, however, that the pattern of demand has
also been a contributory factor.
Table 3.4: Commercial Banks' Credit Facilities by Sector
Sector	 Percent	 Percent
	
Average Compound
(1972)	 (1982)	 Growth Rate(%)
Trade
Industry
Construction
Agriculture and Fisheries
Financial and Real Estate'
Personal
Total
35.9
5.0
23.1
7.3
12.1
16.6
100.0
24.5
5.0
17.3
1.1
26.4
25.7
100.0
31.2
36.4
32.4
12.9
47.2
42.5
36.3
(iii) Reserves
Commercial banks' reserves registered an average annual compound growth rate
of 42.1 percent in the period 1969-82. Their growth accelerated after 1979
when it became profitable to hold reserves since Central Bank bills, which
became part of the reserves in that year, carry interest higher than the
discount rate. Prior to 1979, reserves consisted of currency held by banks and
balances with the Central Bank.
- 72 -
In 1980, a 3 percent required reserve ratio was imposed by the Central Bank on
commercial banks, creating a distinction between required and excess reserves.
However, the distinction seems insignificant because, even before the
introduction of the required reserve ratio, banks' reserve holdings were
substantial and in excess of subsequent requirements. The behaviour of total
reserves indeed reflects the behaviour of excess reserves as illustrated in
Figure 3.7.
Table 3.5 shows correlation coefficients of currency reserves Rc, balances
with the Central Bank Rb, and Central Bank bills Rk, on the one hand, and
required reserves Rq, excess reserves Re, and foreign interest rate (yield on
foreign assets) rf on the other. The table shows that Rk is most strongly
correlated with Re, whereas Rc is most strongly correlated with Rq, which may
imply that banks tend to hold excess reserves as Central Bank bills and
required reserves as cash. It also shows that Rk is most strongly correlated
with foreign interest rate than Re and Rb, because excess reserves are more
sensitive to changes in foreign interest rates than required reserves.
Table 3.5: Correlation Coefficients of Reserve Assets
Rq	 Re	 rf
Rc	 0.924	 0.718	 -0.251
Rb	 0.487	 0.751	 -0.311
Rk	 0.715	 0.949	 -0.515
100
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(iv) Deposits of the Private Sector
On the liabilities side, deposits of the private sector* (the monetary
liabilities of commercial banks) comprised 52.1 percent of total liabilities
in 1982, down from 63 percent in 1969. Thus, deposits have lost part of their
relative contribution to the resources of commercial banks in favour of
foreign liabilities and interbank deposits. Demand deposits formed about 21.9
percent of total private deposits and 11.4 percent of total liabilities in
1982. The less-liquid deposits add up to quasi-money which is composed of
saving deposits, time deposits, certificates of deposit and foreign currency
deposits. Certificates of deposit were considered part of quasi-money in 1977
when they were developed as a new type of financial instruments in the local
market. It is important to note that only a portion of total certificates of
deposit issued by commercial banks is included in quasi-money, the portion
kept by parties other than the banks themselves.
Quasi-money registered a sharp jump in 1971 (28.8 percent), following the
decline in 1970 as a result of higher domestic interest rates triggered by
higher international rates. Another sharp increase was registered in 1974
(31.2 percent), because of two (supply and demand) factors: (i) higher deposit
rates resulting from the banks' strive to make deposits more attractive to
finance the increased demand for credit (supply factor), and (ii) higher
personal incomes resulting from the government's decision to raise wages and
salaries of its employees following the rise in oil prices (demand factor). In
1976 and 1977 quasi-money grew at a fast pace (37.5 and 32.2 percent
respectively) for two reasons: the increase in the number of immigrants
* For this purpose the private sector is defined as including: individuals,
institutions and companies belonging to the private and joint (with government
participation) sectors, as well as public institutions with independent
budgets (independent of the general government budget).
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following the 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon and the increase in government
expenditure.
In 1980 the growth of quasi-money (31.5 percent) was due to higher interest
rates and the consequent conversion of demand deposits into time and foreign
currency deposits. In 1981 there was a sharp rise in demand deposits (122.3
percent) which was due to intensive activity in the domestic stock and real
estate markets since these activities require the maintenance of demand
deposits to settle transactions. The exact opposite occurred in 1982 when
demand deposits fell by 10 percent due to slower activity in the stock market,
and the collapse of the unofficial (parallel) stock market in the second half
of the year.
(v) Government Deposits
Government* deposits are almost entirely in foreign currencies as government
KD deposits are kept with the Central Bank. This item has declined in
importance as a source of funds for comiiiercial banks as indicated by its share
of total liabilities which declined to 5.3 percent in 1982 from 10.2 percent
in 1969.
(vi) Foreign Liabilities and Capital 	 -
Foreign liabilities have increased in importance as a source of funds. This
partially reflects local banks' expanding operations with foreign banks,
particularly the offshore banking units in Bahrain. Kuwaiti banks resort to
borrowing from foreign markets whenever their liquidity is under strain. This
* For this purpose, government is defined as including: ministries, government
departments and public institutions with attached (as opposed to independent)
budgets.
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is so because banks cannot satisfy all of their borrowing requirements by
resorting to the Central Bank's discount window, since the volume of
obtainable discounts is limited by the availability of discountable commercial
papers of a quality acceptable to the Central Bank.
Lastly, the increase in capital and reserves is attributed to banks'
profitability and the need to finance expanding credit demand. The increase in
capital is achieved through stock dividends and rights issues.
3.4. The Working of the Monetary Sector
In this section the working of the monetary sector, and hence the money supply
process, is studied by combining the activities of the Central Bank and
commercial banks. The first step in this endeavour is to construct
a consolidated balance sheet of the monetary sector.
3.4.1. Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Monetary Sector
It is possible to construct a consolidated balance sheet of the monetary
sector by combining similar items of assets and liabilities of the Central
Bank and commercial banks. Items that appear as assets in the balance sheet of
the Central Bank and as liabilities in the balance sheet of commercial banks
or vice versa (such as deposits of commercial banks with the Central Bank)
should be excluded. Table 3.6 illustrates the composition of the consolidated
balance sheet of the monetary sector.
Monetary liabilities of the monetary sector are represented by the broad
definition of the money supply, this is composed of currency in circulation
(liability of the Central Bank) and private deposits, which in turn consist of
demand deposits and quasi-money (all are liabilities of commercial banks).
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Table 3.6: Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Monetary Sector
Assets	 Liabilities
Met Foreign Assets	 MFA
	
Monetary Liabilities 	 M
Claims on the Private Sector 	 CR
	
Government Deposits	 GD
Other Assets	 OA
	
Other Liabilities	 OL
The balance sheet identity of the monetary sector can be written as follows
NFA + CR + OA M+ GD + OL
therefore
M NFA+ CR + Ok - OL GD
Ok TA - NFA - CR
OL = TL - GD - M
where
TA total assets, TL 	 total liabilities
therefore
OA-OL=GD+M-NFA-CR
=-(MFA+CR-GD-M)=-NOA
where NOA stands for net other assets, mainly reflecting the equity position
of commercial banks. This term appears under the heading 'other net" In the
consolidated balance sheet of the monetary sector (see Table A.12). }Ience
= NFA + CR - NOA - GD
Based on the above equation, Table 3.7 shows that up to 1974, changes in net
foreign assets accounted for the bulk of changes in the money supply. From
1975 onwards the major factor has been changes in claims on the private sector.
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
74.0
61.1
-40.3
320.5
122.0
-34.4
321.1
93.0
103.0
422.0
301.4
299.4
-7.7
4.2
20.0
-207.2
-72.5
17.0
-98.2
65.9
-211.9
353.3
57.0
-307.6
24.3
26.0
78.9
95.6
144.8
427.6
304.2
320.9
559.9
552.1
782.2
838.9
93.9
67.1
48.2
148.6
170.7
329.1
363.0
367.0
339.4
567.8
1010.3
315.0
3.3
-23.6
-10.4
-60.3
-23.6
-81.1
-164.1
-112.8
-111.6
-53.0
-130.3
-515.6
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Table 3.7: Accounting for Changes in the Money Supply (KB million)
AM	 NFA	 ZCR	 N0A	 GD
(+)	 (+)	 (-)	 (-)
3.4.2. Analysis of the Money Supply Process
In an open economy like Kuwait, the money supply originates mainly from
government domestic expenditure financed by oil revenue. The government owns
the oil sector and receives sales proceeds in dollars. To finance domestic
expenditure, the government exchanges some of its dollars at the Central Bank
f or KDs which will subsequently be received by the public (e.g. as wages and
salaries) and a major portion is kept as currency, demand deposits and
quasi-money.
In recent years, the role of local operations of commercial banks, represented
mainly by claims on the private sector (domestic credit), has assumed
increasing importance as a source of the money supply. The effect of claims on
the private sector on the money supply runs through the money creation
multiplier. Credit is used to finance economic activity and that leads to an
increase in currency in circulation. The other portion is kept as deposits
with banks, again leading to an increase in the money supply.
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Owing to the limited absorptive capacity of the domestic economy, the
dependence on imports, and the absence of restrictions on capital movement
between Kuwait and abroad, a major portion of the money supply -that
originates from government expenditure and banking operations- is channelled
outside the country by the private sector in the form of current transfers (to
settle import bills) or capital transfers (investment abroad). Therefore, net
private sector transactions with the outside world, or the private sector's
balance of payments deficit, operates on the negative side as a leakage outlet.
This analysis of the money supply process, which is adopted by the Central
Bank, provides another identity (not a behavioural equation) that accounts for
changes in the money supply; it is one which has greater explanatory value
than that presented earlier. The identity is as follows:
Changes in the Money Supply Net Government Domestic Expenditure
+ Changes in Claims on the Private Sector
- Net Private Sector Transactions Abroad
- Change in Net Other Assets
where
Net Government Domestic Expenditure
Total Government Domestic Expenditure
- Domestic Government Revenue
- Government Purchases from Abroad
Change in net other assets is the same as that of the previous identity,
reflecting mainly changes in shareholders' equity (capital and reserves). It
has a contractionary effect on the money supply because any increase in
shareholders' equity is financed by undistributed profit, which is held back
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
24.3
26.0
78.9
95.6
144.8
427.6
306.8
317.1
559.9
552.1
787.7
833.4
227.8
277.0
288.3
463.7
586.7
821.5
1070.5
1160.3
1324.4
1662.6
2408.5
2514.4
3.3
-23.6
-10.4
-60.3
-23.6
-81.1
-164.1
-164.1
-111.6
-53.0
-130.3
-515.6
93.9
67.7
48.1
148.6
170.7
329.1
363.4
366.6
339.4
567.8
1010.3
315.0
-161.5
-211.7
-308.7
-350.4
-537.2
-838.9
-849.8
-998.0
-1433.3
-1593.9
-2055.6
-2517.2
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rather than injected into the economy in the form of dividends, or by the
funds absorbed by capital increases through issue premiums. Table 3.8 shows
changes in the money supply and the factors affecting it according to the
identity presented above.
This approach to analysing changes in the money supply can be used to explain
the monetary trends in Kuwait, but it is inappropriate for monetary management
unless it is possible to forecast and influence the various components.
Table 3.8: Sources of Changes in the Money Supply (10 million)
Change in	 et Govt.	 Change in Claims	 Private -	 Other
M	 Doiu. Exp.	 on Private Sector Sector Deficit (net)
(1-)	 (+)	 (-)
3.4.3. Monetary Trends in Kuwait
Monetary trends in Kuwait can be monitored through the growth rates of the
money stock defined in its broad sense i.e. the sum of currency in
circulation, demand deposits and quasi-money. As shown in Figure 3.8, there
have been several historical episodes in which monetary growth changed pace
due to changes in the factors affecting the money supply.
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The period 1969-1970 witnessed monetary deceleration. This was due, on one
hand, to stagnantion in domestic government expenditure* resulting from the
decline in oil revenue, arid an increase in the government's foreign
commitments following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, on the other. The second
reason was the rise in capital outflows in response to higher interest rates
in international financial markets.
The period 1971-1976 was a period of rapid monetary growth. Three reasons were
behind this massive acceleration. Firstly, expansionary fiscal policy that
followed the multiple increase in oil prices in 1973/74. Secondly, expansion
in bank credit to the private sector that accompanied the brisk economic
activity at that time. Thirdly, a decline in capital outflows resulting from
apprehension about foreign investment initiated by the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates. This latter tendency was augmented by a
flourishing domestic economy largely stimulated by a major development
programme that had been launched by the government. Rapid monetary expansion
led to intensive speculative activity in domestic stock and real estate
markets. The stock market eventually collapsed in 1977.
The period 1977-1979 was a period of relatively moderate monetary growth. The
growth rate of broad money fell continuously from the peak of 36.9 percent in
1976 to 17.4 percent in 1979. Two main factors explain this: moderate
expansion in government expenditure and a slower pace of credit expansion. The
* Though no detailed data are available on government expenditure over this
period, figures in the closing account of the Ministry of Finance show that
government domestic expenditure declined by an average annual rate of 1.2
percent during the period 1967-1970.
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first is attributable to the adoption by the government of an expenditure
rationalisation objective, whereas the second was the outcome of measures of
monetary policy taken to regulate and control credit following the 1976-77
upheaval.
The period 1980-1981 was a period of renewed accelerating monetary growth
similar in spirit to the 1974-1976 period, in the sense that it came after
another round of oil price increase (1979) and was followed by another stock
market crisis (1982). In 1981 the growth rate of broad money (35.9 percent)
was the highest since 1976 (36.9 percent), whereas the growth rate of narrow
money was the highest ever (81.4 percent). Renewed acceleration of monetary
growth during the period was mainly due to the more rapid pace of government
expenditure, this more than offset the contractionary effect of the private
sector balance of payments deficit.
In 1982 there was a considerable slowdown in monetary growth. In fact, narrow
money declined by 2.9 percent following .the record 81.4 percent surge in 1981,
whereas the growth rate of broad money declined from 35.9 percent to 8.1
percent. The main reason for the slowdown was the policy-initiated stagnation
of domestic government expenditure after oil revenue had started to fall; in
the fiscal year 1981/82, oil revenue was inadequate to cover government
expenditure. Moreover, there was a slowdown in credit expansion, particularly
following the stock market crisis in the second half of 1982 which obliged
banks to be careful in their lending policies. Changes in the equity position
of commercial banks also played an important contractionary role in 1982, as
the value of this item soared to 10 515.6 million due to a tangible increase
in the capital and reserves of commercial banks, up to 10 577 million from 10
411 million in 1981. The private sector's deficit with the outside world
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also increased substantially because of the stock market crisis, arid political
uncertainty resulting from the Iraq-Iran war and the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon. All of these factors triggered massive capital outflows.
Overall, monetary trends in Kuwait have not always been favourable. Monetary
growth in excess of real growth has led to inflationary pressures, intensive
speculation in the stock and real estate markets, and to maldistribution of
resources from the normative development point of view (see Moosa (1985a)).
3.5. Other Financial Institutions
Kuwait's monetary sector is complemented by other financial institutions.
These include three specialised banks, one Islamic bank, twenty eight
investment companies, several insurance companies and a number of foreign
exchange dealers. They are subject to varying degress of Central Bank
supervision, but in general they operate with fewer restraints imposed by the
Central Bank than in the case of commercial banks. Their operations are
closely linked to the monetary sector. Together with commercial banks, these
institutions play an important role indeveloping local financial markets.
3.5.1. Specialised Banks
Article 76 of the Central Bank Law defines specialised banks as "banks whose
main business is to finance specific economic sectors such as the real estate,
the agricultural and industrial sectors and which do not accept demand
deposits." Article 77 outlines the constraints on their activities by stating
that "specialised banks shall be governed by the provisions which regulate the
banking industry in as much as they shall not be in conflict with the nature
of their activities." While commercial banks provide short-term credit
facilities to finance such activities as construction, trade and services,
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specialised banks provide medium and long-term loans to finance the
development of the real estate and industrial sectors in particular.
There are three specialised banks in Kuwait: the Credit and Savings Bank, the
Kuwait Real Estate Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Kuwait. The activities of
the first two are confined to the housing and real estate sector, whereas the
third aims at promoting industrial 4evelopnient. By law, specialised banks are
not allowed to accept demand deposits but they are allowed -within variable
terms- to accept other types of deposit. Moreover, the Real Estate Bank and
the Industrial Bank have been allowed to issue negotiable certificates of
deposit and public bonds.
The Real Estate Bank is a public shareholding company listed on the Kuwait
Stock Exchange. It, therefore, provides loans on a commercial basis and at
such terms as may be prevalent in the market. The Credit and Savings Bank, and
the Industrial Bank are respectively owned by the government and the joint
sector (partial government ownership). They are fully backed by the government
and, therefore, provide soft loans in terms of repayment, maturity, associated
technical aid and interest rate. This is particularly the case with the real
estate loans given by the Credit and Savings Bank, these have a maturity of 45
years at a rate not exceeding 2 percent per annum with interest paid by the
Ministry of Finance rather than the borrower. The Industrial Bank provides
loans for up to 9 years at a rate not exceeding 4 percent.
In the period 1977-1982, the consolidated balance sheet of specialised banks
increased from 10 705.2 million to KB 1776.2 million, registering an average
annual growth rate of 20.3 percent. The most important item on the assets side
is local loans, comprising over a half of total assets in 1982. Deposits with
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commercial banks make up about 21.3 percent, whereas foreign assets (made up
of deposits with foreign banks and foreign loans and investments) form about
15 percent. Other items on the assets side are local investments in stocks and
bonds (2.3 percent), and other assets including cash and balances with the
Central Bank (5.4 percent).
On the liabilities side, capital and reserves comprise about 40 percent of
total liabilities, which means that this item is the major source of funds.
Private deposits are about 26 percent: they include the deposits of commercial
banks as well as saving and time deposits of individuals and institutions.
Other liabilities in order of importance are government deposits and loans,
foreign liabilities (deposits of foreign banks and foreign loans and
investments), and certificates of deposit and bonds.
Kuwait Finance House is a special type of specialised bank. It is an Islamic
bank that does not deal in transactions involving the payment or receipt of
interest. This is in conformity with the teachings of the Islamic religion
that forbids dealing in interest or, more precisely, usury. The bank is
involved in operations that yield profit, not interest, and pays its
depositors profit shares rather than fixed interest.
3.5.2. Investment Companies
When the Central Bank started operations in 1969, there were two investment
companies: Kuwait Investment Company and Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting
and Investment Company, both of which are public shareholding companies.
The Kuwait International Investment Company was founded in 1973, and fourteen
more were created in the 1974-1977 period. By the end of 1982 there were 20
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investment companies with total assets of KB 1986.4 million with about 90
percent of this total belonging to the largest and oldest three companies
mentioned above. Envestiuent companies play an important and complementary role
to commercial and specialised banks in mobilising available financial
resources, and channelling them into various investment fields. They also play
an important role in directing local funds to the Eurobond market,
particularly through the issue of KB bonds.
Despite the "international" image of Kuwait's financial companies, there has
been an increasing tendency to become more local. In 1977, foreign assets
comprised 58.3 percent of total assets, but this percentage declined to 41.7
in 1982. On the other hand, local assets (cash, deposits, loans and local
investments) rose from 32.8 to 46 percent. This shift in the structure of the
balance sheet was due to the flourishing domestic economy and stock market on
the one hand, and increasing apprehension about foreign investment, on the
other. This trend, however, was reversed -as from 1983- following the stock
market crisis of 1982.
On the liabilities side, foreign liabilities are the main sources of funds,
particularly for companies that do not receive much in the way of government
funding. In 1982, the ratio of foreign liabilities to total liabilities was
38.4 percent. The second and third most important sources of funds are
"resources from residents" (28.2 percent) and "capital and reserves" (20.4
percent).
3.6. Financ.ial Markets
The need for developed domestic financial markets has been felt ever since the
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foundation of the Central Bank of Kuwait. The need is prompted by two motives:
(1) the desire to limit capital outflows and thereby channel resources towards
domestic economic development; and
(2) the necessity of financial markets for the Central Bank to conduct
successful open market operations and, thus, enhance monetary policy.
As has been mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of the Central Bank is to
develop financial markets. Indeed, this has been realised to a certain extent
as financial markets have witnessed significant development since 1969.
3.6.1. Interbank Market
Since 1974, commercial banks have started to feel significant strains on their
liquidity. This has been due to an increasing demand for credit at a time when
the banks were required to maintain a certain minimum liquidity ratio, as from
September 1974. These conditions have provided the right atmosphere for the
evolution of the interbank market through which banks facing a shortage of
funds could borrow from other banks having a surplus. The Central Bank
encouraged the development of the interbank market by deciding to consider
interbank deposits as liquid assets, as far as calculating the liquidity ratio
was concerned, and also by exempting interbank funds from the 10 percent
interest rate ceiling; this means that interest rates or' interbank deposits
(interbank rates) were left to be determined by market forces. There are some
institutions that act as brokers in the interbank market, providing daily
interest rate quotations on the bid and offer sides for deposits of various
maturities. The development of this market is reflected in the remarkable
growth of interbank deposits from KD 6.6 million in 1973 to KB 1773.3 million
in 1982.
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3.6.2. Money Market
The money market in Kuwait is still in its infancy, its main problem is the
lack of diversified financial instruments. There are just two types of
instrument and these have only recently been introduced: Central Bank bills
(which can only be acquired by financial institutions), and negotiable
certificates of deposit.
3.6.3. Securities Market
The dominant, and most popular, securities are shares in public shareholding
companies. Trading in shares became active in the 1970s and, in particular,
after 1973 -due to uncertainty abroad and a flourishing domestic economy.
Intensive speculation, fuelled by bank credit as well as other tnalpractices,
resulted in two crises followed by periods of depression in the stock market:
1977 and 1982. The latest was by far the most serious, and its effects spilled
over to other sectors of the economy. This has triggered government
intervention to save the market and introduce various stringent reforms.
10 denominated bonds are another type of security. The primary market for
these securities emerged in 1968, when the first issue of KD denominated bonds
was placed in the market in favour of the World Bank. Since then, an
increasing number of issues has been launched, most of which were in favour of
non-resident borrowers. On the other hand, the secondary market for 10 bonds
remained inactive until 1977 following the establishment of the Arab Company
for Trading Securities, this company acts as a market-maker in K]) bonds. An
international bank (Orion Bank (1984)) has described the Kuwaiti capital
market as the most developed in the Middle East. Al-Baker (1982a), (1982b)
presents a good exposition of the structure and development of the Kuwaiti
capital market.
APPENDIX 3.1
SOURCES AND USES OF THE MONETARY BASE
The balance sheet indeatity of the Central Bank can be written as follows
FA + DC + OA B ± GD ±CL + OL
where
FA foreign assets
DC discounts
OA other assets
B	 monetary base
GD government deposits
CL capital and reserves
OL other liabilities
therefore
B=FA±DC+OA-GD-CL-OL
or in terms of changes
FA ^ DC + OA - GD - CL - OL
The above equation accounts for any change in the monetary base in terms of
changes in the sources of the base
	 FA, LDC,	 OA on the positive side
and LGD, ACL,	 OL on the negative side., It tells us that any change in
foreign assets, discounts, or other assets that is not matched by an
equivalent change in government deposits, capital and reserves, or other
liabilities will lead to a change in the monetary base. Changes in foreign
assets of the Central Bank have been the major source of the monetary base.
The uses of the monetary base are two: currency in circulation C and banks'
reserves R, i.e.
BCR
therefore
C ^
The above equation shows that any change in the monetary base is distributed
between currency in circulation and banks' reserves.
CHAPTER 4
MONETARY AGGREGATES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
4.1-. Definition of Money
This chapter is devoted to conducting empirical work on some of the vital
issues in monetary economics as applied to Kuwait. Most of the findings are to
be used later in the discussion of monetary policy and the specification of
the structural model. In particular, attention will be focused on various
monetary aggregates and their relation to real economic activity. The starting
point is the definition of money.
Economists are not in agreement as to what specific items constitute the
economy t s money stock. The disagreement is further widened by the purpose for
which the definition of money is sought. Essentially, two definitions are
required for two purposes:
(i) the definition that most likely conforms to the theoretical concept of
the money stock from a functional point of view;
(ii) the definition that is required for conducting monetary policy.
Osborne (1984) notes that those who refer to the definition of money as an
empirical matter confuse the definition of a word with the identification of
the things that ought to be designated by the word. He extracts 10 approaches
to the definition of money from the appropriate literature and notes that
three of them emerge from a common root. Among the definitions he discusses is
that of tangible media of exchange, and he argues that intangible balances
function in the same way as tangible tokens which implies that tangibility is
not a criterion of money. Other approaches which he examines place emphasis
upon liquidity, the means of payments, the relation between money and GM?, and
the stability of the demand function. Osborne concludes that although the
majority of the definitions do not tell us what money Is, they do help us
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understand why money matters and also help in understanding the financial
system.
Theoretically, money is any asset that performs the functions of money,
namely: medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. lxi practice,
there is no clear-cut line between assets which perform these functions and
those which do not. In the case of Kuwait, the following assets can be
considered for inclusion in the money stock:
(1) currency in circulation;
(ii) demand deposits;	
S
(iii)saving deposits;
(iv) time deposits;
(v) certificates of deposit;
(vi) foreign currency deposits.
Item (1) is a liability of the Central Bank, whereas items (ii)-(vi) are
liabilities of commercial banks. Following procedures set out by the
International Monetary Fund, the Central 3ank of Kuwait defines the sum of (i)
and (ii) as Ml which is the narrow concept of money, whereas the sum of
(iii)-(vi) is defined as quasi-money. Iarrow money and quasi-money add up to
M2, the broad concept of money which is termed llquidity in the Central
Bank's literature.
Miri (1982) has shown that monetary aggregates in Kuwait range from Ml to M13,
which can be obtained by the gradual addition and aggregation of the items
mentioned earlier, as swell as other items such as government deposits and
liabilities of specialised banks and investment companies. His work, however,
seems of little value as he does not explain the theoretical or empirical
significance of each of his monetary aggregates.
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Quasi-money is distinguished from money Ml on the grounds that the former does
not directly function as a medium of exchange. This distinction rests on the
belief that being a medium of exchange is the most important function of money
and, therefore, the stock of money should be the amount of medium of exchange
in existence. This view, which has been put forward by Newlyn (1964) and
Yeager (1968), raises some problems when applied to Kuwait. At first glance it
seems that Ml is the medium of exchange in Kuwait, but a closer look shows
that the matter is not that simple. Some part of demand deposits does not
function as a medium of exchange but rather as a store of value. This is so
because some people keep their funds in the form of demand deposits rather
than interest-bearing quasi-money, not because they want to use them to settle
transactions, but rather because they do not want to earn interest in
accordance with the teachings of the religion of Islam which forbids usury. On
the other hand, some people make special arrangements with their bankers to
issue cheques against their saving deposits, in which case some part of saving
deposits is a medium of exchange.
Proponents of the Ml definition reject the inclusion of quasi-money on the
grounds that money must be directly and immediately usable as a medium of
exchange. However, the case for M2 has been strengthened by legislative
actions and innovations in the banking industry (e.g. NO1 accounts in the
United States). These factors have blurred the distinction between demand
deposits and quasi-money as they have resulted in increasing the "oioneyness
of quasi-money. Because of this, some economists (for example Friedman and
Schwartz (1970)) have suggested that money should be defined to include assets
which are regarded as a "temporary abode of purchasing power", e.g. to bridge
the gap between receipts and payments of income rather than to transfer
spending power into the future (investment). In real situations this
definition is even less helpful than the definition of the medium of exchange,
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since there is no way of telling the reason for holding or spending funds.
Friedman and Meiselman (1963) also argue that time deposits are such close
substitutes for other monetary items (currency and demand deposits) that it is
preferable to treat them as if they were perfect substitutes, than to exclude
time deposits from the definition of money. Chetty (1969) disputes the
all-or-nothing approach and argues that, in reality, various liquid assets may
not be regarded as perfect substitutes for money nor can they be treated as
completely unrelated to money. In this context, Gurley (1960) used a
definition which assigned weights of one to currency and demand deposits, and
weights of one half to other liquid assets. Such weights can alternatively be
derived by canonical correlation, or the method of principal components to get
a "good" theoretical measure of the money stock in a statistical sense (e.g.
minimum variance), although it is difficult to give economic interpretation to
the weights. Such a measure of the money stock will be derived for the special
case of Kuwait.
Legal, institutional, social and procedural factors can influence the
definition of money. For example, there is a major difference between Ml as
measured in the United Kingdom and as measured in Kuwait. In the U.K. 60
percent of cheques "in transit" between banks is deducted from the sum of
currency and demand deposits to arrive at Ml. This adjustment is made because
cheques are credited to the accounts of recipients before being debited to the
accounts of drawers. In Kuwait, on the other band, this is not the case, as
cheques are not credited to recipients unless they have been cleared.
Therefore, no adjustment is made to the sum of currency in circulation and
demand deposits.
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Two more important points should be mentioned concerning the definition of
money in Kuwait:
(i) The definition of money in narrow and broad senses does not include
deposits of the government or entities under its direct control (i.e.
those with attached budgets), but does include deposits of entities with
independent budgets, e.g. Kuwait Airways Corporation. The justification
for this procedure is that entities with independent budgets usually
perform some sort of economic function and carry out real production. In
their study of the demand for money in Middle Eastern countries
(including Kuwait), Crockett and. Evans (1980) seem to agree with this
practice, although with some caution. However, they perform their tests
using definitions of money that include and exclude government deposits;
this will also be done here. Mackenzie (1979) discusses the issue for
Egypt.
(ii) Foreign currency deposits held by residents with commercial banks are
treated as part of the money stock. This is valid for Kuwait, as there is
no restriction on foreign exchange.transactions; hence, funds in foreign
currency can be freely converted into local currency, and as such they
constitute a source of liquidity no less important than deposits in local
currency. The importance, or otherwise, of including foreign currency
deposits in the definition of M2 in Kuwait will be tested later.
The specific definition of money adopted is important for the purpose of
monetary policy. For example, the money stock as measured by Ml may be
constant while M2 is increasing. If the authorities feel it is appropriate to
adopt an expansionary monetary policy, acceptance of Ml would call for
specific actions to increase the supply of currency and demand deposits, but
acceptance. of M2 would suggest that the desired expansion of the money stock
is already there and no specific action is needed. In general, questions
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regarding the definition of money might only be of academic importance if the
different aggregates behaved similarly, in which case it makes little
difference which monetary aggregate the authorities should control or monitor;
this is not always the case in reality, however. In a recent article, Alan
Walters (1985) points out that from 1870 until 1970 it did not much matter how
one defined the British money supply because all aggregates were highly
correlated. However, from the l97Os, the increased freedom of credit markets
and financial innovation generated a divergence between narrow and broad
aggregates.
The problem is, then, to choose the most appropriate definition of money to
conduct monetary policy. However, neither theoretical considerations, nor
empirical evidence are conclusive as to which definition is most stably
related to income or other real variables that are supposed to be influenced
by changes in the money stock. In choosing a monetary target, the monetary
authorities attempt to determine (1) which monetary aggregate is most highly
correlated with and most stably related to a set of determining variables, and
(ii) which aggregate it can most easily control. These two criteria are not
mutually exclusive because unstable demand for money can reduce the
authorities' ability to control the money supply, depending on the definition
chosen. If, for example, the demand for deposits rises relative to the demand
for currency, the money multiplier will change and that would impair the
authorities' ability to control the monetary aggregate which includes
deposits. Crockett and Evans (1980) point out that in developed countries, the
principle of control (ii) is sometimes adduced in support of Ml which tends to
be more responsive to open market operations and interest rate policies. They
argue, however, that this is only true in developed countries, because policy
instruments in developing countries apply principally to the volume of credit
extended by the banking system, which would make M2 easier to control. The
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problem of control will be considered in more detail when talking about
monetary policy, but for the time being attention will be focused on the
strength and stability of the relation between monetary aggregates and real
macroeconomic variables.
Obviously, the inherent nature of this problem is empirical. This is verified
by the regular and frequent re-evaluation of the definition of money in the
United States. An official U.S. report (Federal Reserve System (1976)) puts
the issue clearly as follows: "In conducting monetary policy, the Federal
Reserve should use as an intermediate target that money total (aggregate) .....
through which it can most reliably affect the behaviour of its ultimate
objectives - the price level, employment, output, and the like. Which total or
totals best satisfy the requirement depends in turn on (1) how accurately the
total can be measured; (2) how precisely, and at what cost, including side
effects, the Fed can control the total; and (3) how closely and reliably
changes in the total are related to the ultimate policy objectives.'
A great deal of research has been done on the subject of the appropriate
definition of money, and the related issue of substitutability between money
and near-money assets. Although the bulk of research has been on the U.S., the
empirical approaches can be applied with some modifications to other
countries. The following approaches have been used:
(1) The Friedman-Meiselman (1963) approach whereby a money substitute should
be included in money, if income is more highly correlated with the sum of
the money substitute and money than with each separately. Studies
employing this technique have generally produced results in favour of
broader definitions of money.
(ii) The cross elasticity approach, whereby substitutability between money and
near money is measured as the percentage change in narrow money per
percent change in the rate of return on competitive assets. In this case,
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the demand for narrow money Ml is specified as
(Ml)' = f(Y,rm,rs)
where
Y	 income
rm = rate of return on money (usually 0)
r3 = rate of return on money substitutes
So, the cross elasticity at the means is calculated as
	
a(Ml)d	 r9
Ec= 3r
9
	(M1)d
such that
3 (Ml) d
<0
3r
(iii) The elasticity of substitution which is measured as the
percentage change in narrow money per percent change in near money
assets*. In this case the demand for near money 8d is included as an
argument in the demand for money function which is specified as follows:
(Ml) d	f(y,rm,Sd)
in which case, the elasticity of substitution at the means is measured
as
* In the case of Kuwait, it is possible to estimate the elasticity of
substitution between quasi-money (QM) and demand deposits (DD) from the
following regression equation for the demand for quasi-money
QMd	 42.4 - 0.23 DDd + 1.1 QMt..1
(1.18) (-2.58)	 (30.32)
	
0.993	 SE = 61.8	 DW = 2.90
The large coefficient of the lagged dependent variable implies that the demand
for quasi-money is dynamically unstable. In this case, the short-run
elasticity of substitution as defined above is -0.07, implying that a 100
percent increase in the demand for demand deposits will lead to a 7 percent
decrease in the demand for quasi-money.
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such that
3(Ml)d	 5d
Es=
8sd	 (M1)d
<0
0s"
The empirical results of these approaches have not always been consistent, but
often contradictory and generally inconclusive. However, such studies provide
more evidence or than against a broader definition of money.
Some economists have examined the inoneynessof financial assets using cross
section data. Conlisk (1970) presented some cross country inflation evidence
on the moneyness of time and saving deposits. He specified an equation in
which inflation was made a function of the growth rates of real income and
money supply. All growth rates were calculated as average compound annual
rates over the period 1950-63 for 58 countries. He fitted the equation for the
whole sample and then for sub-samples according to the degree of development.
His conclusion was that "what evidence there is, indicates that saving and
time deposits are better left out of the definition of money than included
equally with currency and demand deposits."
Results of studies employing cross-section data again proved to be
inconsistent and contradictory. Using Conlisk's model and his definition of
variables, Villanueva and Arya (1972) presented contrasting evidence based on
average values over the period 1955-68. Immediate post-war reconstruction
years were eliminated and the series was extended to more recent years,
thereby retaining the thirteen-year interval. Empirical results were in favour
of a broader definition of money that includes saving and time deposits.
It must be mentioned here, that it has been demonstrated (fpr example Meigs
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(1975)) that the emergence of money substitutes has not made any material
difference to the impact of monetary policy on real variables except reducing
the size of the impact multiplier. The crucial issue, however, is not the size
of the multiplier but rather its stability.
Finally, it is sometimes argued (for example Sayer (1982)) that since the
control of a given statistical definition of money would alter the statistical
relationship, the appropriate statistical definition of the money supply will
itself be affected by monetary policy; thus, it is misleading and even
dangerous to think of monetary policy simply in terms of the control of a
particular monetary aggregate. Rather, the authorities should monitor and
control a variety of monetary aggregates which, collectively, can provide a
more accurate picture of monetary conditions.
4.2. Empirical Evidence for Kuwait
In this section, some tests for the definition of money in Kuwait will be
presented using the Friednian-Meiselinan approach of correlation between
monetary aggregates and non-oil GD?. Testing the stability and predictability
of the demand for various monetary aggregates will be deferred to sections 4.4
and 4.5 respectively.
Five monetary aggregates are considered here, ranging from narrow money Ml to
M2A which is broad money M2 plus government deposits,
Ml	 C+D
M1A Ml ^ S
M13 M1A + T
M2	 MlB+F
M2A M2 + G
where
C currency in circulation
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D = demand deposits
S = saving deposits
T = time deposits (Including CDs)
F = foreign currency deposits.
G government deposits
Moreover, a theoretical monetary aggregate will later be derived by the method
of principal components in order to test Its correlation with non-oil GDP.
According to the Friednian-Meiselman approach, an asset X should be included in
the definition of money if
R(M1 ^ X, Yn) > R(M1, Yn)
and
R(M1 ^ X, Yn) > R(X, Yn)
where R is the correlation coefficient and Yn is non-oil GDP. Table 4.1 shows
correlation coefficients between non-oil GD? and various monetary
aggregates/assets. They were calculated using 32 quarterly observations over
the period 1975-82.
Table 4.1: Correlation Coefficients Between Monetary Assets and Non-Oil GD?
Monetary Aggregate/Asset	 Correlation Coefficient
Ml	 0.369
S	 0.820
M1A	 0.890
T	 0.898
MiS	 0.909
F	 0.791
M2	 0.922
C	 0.761
M2A	 0.921
The table domonstrates the following:
(i) Since R(M1A,Yn) >R(Ml,Yn) and R(M1A,Yn) >R(S,Yn), then M1A is a better
definition than Ml.
(ii) Since R(Ml3,Yn) >R(M1A,Yn) and R(M1B,Yn)>R(T,Yn), then MiS is a better
deflnitlon than M1A.
(iii) Since R(M2,Yn) >R(M1B,Yn) and R(M2,Yn)>R(F,Yn), then M2 is a better
definition than MiS.
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(iv) Since R(N2,Yn) >R(M2A,Yn) and R(M2,Yn)> R(G,Yn), then M2 is a better
definition than M2A.
This simple correlation analysis supports the use of a broad monetary
aggregate (excluding government deposits) for policy purposes on the grounds
that it is more highly correlated with real economic activity as represented
by non-oil GDP.
4.3. Causality Testing
Correlation does not necessarily imply causation, neither does it tell the
direction of causation. Variables may be-functionally (causally) related, but
not necessarily correlated, or they can be correlated but not necessarily
functionally related. The first situation may arise because correlation is a
measure of linear association only, implying strong non-linear functional
relationships cannot be picked up by the correlation , coefficient. The second
situation is more frequent than the first, and arises because of a common
association of the variables under investigation with another variable such as
time. A. causality test will, therefore, be conducted in order to find the
direction of effect between money and income using the procedure suggested by
Granger (1969) and Sims (1972), and found, for example, in Pierce (1977),
Pierce and Haugh (1977), Sargent (1979), Frenkel (1977),(1979), Schwert
(1979), Zeliner (1979), Bhattacharyya (1980), and Batavia and Lash (1982). The
methodology has also been applied to the Kuwaiti economy by the Claremont
Economics Institute (1983), and by Ghulouni (1984).
Granger's criterion for determining causality relies on time-series techniques
and completely ignores the role of economic theory in providing prior 	 -
restrictions. The criterion is simply that after extracting all the
information from the own past values of a variable, if the addition of another
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variable as a regressor would further reduce prediction error variance, then
the latter variable is causal. In other words, a variable is causal if it
explains the residuals of another variable which cannot be explained by the
history of that explained variable. Later, Sims (1972) adapted Granger's
definition of causality to a closed dynamic bivariate model to test the
money-income causality.
Ando (1981) criticises the Granger-Sinis methodology on the grounds that the
residuals do not necessarily possess the properties required to make the
estimated coefficients unbiased. He points out that if the bivariate reduced
form equation in question is part of a large system, there will be a problem
of omitted variables which will be compounded in the residual term, and thus
we cannot say anything about the lack of correlation between the included
independent variable and the excluded variables, nor about the serial
correlation characteristics of omitted variables. Ando concludes that the
Granger-Sims procedure is more likely to produce biased results than not,
unless the investigator has very solid reasons to believe that the set of
variables which he is considering is indeed the correct one, arid that there is
no significant omitted variables in.the equation being analysed. However, Ando
qualifies his objection to the Granger-Sims test of causality by stating that
it can produce reliable results if good approximations are made, in the sense
that data generated by the actual economy do not deviate from the fundamental
assumptions. Tobin (1981) shares Ando's scepticism of non-structural tests,
particularly if applied to two variables. He argues that autoregressions of
simple variables or vectors should not take explanatory pri?rity over
contemporaneous structural interdependence.
Finally, causality testing can be criticised on the grounds that there is no
clear-cut definition of causality. In the Granger sense, causal" means
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containing information that helps better predict a variable. The Cocles
Commission for Research in Economics at the University of Chicago (Koopmans
(1950), Hood and Koopmnans (1953)) defines causality in terms of the validity
of identifying restrictions on the reduced form of a system of equations, this
emphasises the uniqueness of the transmission mechanism of changes in the set
of predetermined variables to those in the endogenous variables. So, whereas
the Granger definition is in terms of prediction error variances, the Cowles
definition is in terms of the parameter estimates. Arnold Zeilner (in Sims
(1977)) presents some interesting comments on different notions of causality.
See also Desai (1981).
Nevertheless, causality testing can be useful, provided that the relationship
under investigation can be justified on the basis of economic theory. Consider
the following two hypotheses for the special case of Kuwait:
(1) whether or not causality runs from money to income (non-oil GDP);
(ii) whether or not there is feedback from income to money.
On a priori economic considerations, we expect money ,
 to influence income via
the nionetarist real expenditure approach, but do not expect feedback from
income to money. The economic rationale for this proposition is as follows.
Government expenditure affects non-oil GDP and the money supply. The effect on
non-oil GOP has already been pointed out (see Chapter 2). The effect on the
money supply is contemporaneous because recipients of funds spent by the
government will demand more currency, demand deposits and quasi-money, to
which the banking system will respond by increasing the money supply. Now that
banks have a higher level of deposits, they can afford to expand credit to the
private sector, thus resulting in higher private real expenditure, the effect
of which will be transmitted to non-oil GDP. But higher level of income,
implying faster economic activity, induces higher demand for credit; if the
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banking system responds with higher supply of credit and monetary expansion
(depending on the availability of excess reserves), a feedback effect will
emerge. However, the supply of credit does not follow demand automatically. It
shall be formally shown that whereas demand for credit depends on economic
activity, supply depends on the flow of deposits and banks' portfolio
decisions. It remains true, however, that causality may run front income to the
money supply under very specific conditions, namely that the government
pursues a policy of stabilising interest rates by controlling the money supply
in an IS-Ui model. Under such conditions, a rise in income will be associated
with an increase in interest rates, forcing the government to increase the
money supply to counteract this effect. Such a model, however, is not strictly
applicable to Kuwait, at least because interest rate is not significantly
responsive to income as shall be seen later.
The test procedure that is used here is the one suggested by Battacharyya
(1980) which is a version of the Granger-Sinis methodology. It goes as follows:
to test causality between two variables K and Y, we first estimate the two
regression equations:
Y a1 + b1X ^ u
K = a2 + b2Y ^ v
and then the empirical residuals u and v. We then proceed as follows:
(1) Reject the null hypothesis that X does not cause Y at the a significance
level if
nR2(u,vt_i) >.X(m)
cjher
a sample size
maximum lag
R(u, vt j) = correlation coefficient between the residuals u and
vt_i
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(ii) Reject the null hypothesis that Y does not cause X at the a significance
level if
nR2(V,Ut_j) > X(m)
The following results wereobtained by regressing non-oil GDP Yn measured at
quarterly rates on broad money M, and vice versa, using 32 quarterly
observations for the period 1975-82.
Yn 187.63 ^ 0.14 M
(7.0)	 (13.1)
R2 ='0.851	 SE=68.7	 DW=2.15
M = -793.72 ^ 5.98 Yn
-	 (-3.3)	 (13.1)
a2 = 0.851	 SE = 445.1 DW 1.82
The test was conducted using a maximum lag of four quarters. The choice was to
some extent arbitrary, but this lag is long enough to capture any cause and
effect relationship between the two variables, and any longer lag would
considerably reduce the sample size. In aay case, trials with longer lags did
not change the results.
HO: M does not cause Yn
For this test n Ea2 (u,vt...j) = 10.3 and since X05(4) = 9.5, the null
hypothesis is rejected, which means that M causes Yn.
HO: Yn does not cause M
For this test a	 R2(v,ut..j)	 5.2 which is less than	 Xj05(4). Therefore,
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the null hypothesis that Yn does not cause M is accepted, confirming that
there is no feedback from income to money. Again, it must be stressed that
there is still a possibility of a small feedback which cannot be captured by
this bivariate causality test. One reason for this may be the fact that the
time series were not "pre-whitned' prior to testing, as suggested by Sims
(1972) who designed a filter to flatten the spectral density of time series
and give them white noise properties (see also Aghevli and Khan (1978) for
applications to LDCs). Another possible reason for the failure to detect any
feedback is the small sample size and errors of measurement in the non-oil GD?
series resulting from interpolation of annual series. However, for the purpose
of specifying the model of the monetary sector, it shall be assumed that
feedback is negligible.
4.4. Stability of the Demand for Money
Stability of the demand for money function has crucial implications for
monetary policy. Indeed, Laidler (1971) describes the importance of a stable
demand for money function for the working of monetary policy as
self-evident". This is so because if the demand for money is a stable
function of some variables (e.g. income), then changes in the supply of money
must result in at least one of those variables changing in order to maintain
equilibrium in the money market. Laidler aláo points out that although the
demand for money function does not provide the whole transmission rnechanisni
whereby changes in the quantity of money might lead to changes in income and
prices, it provides a vital link in that mechanism.
For the time being, it shall be assumed that the transactions motive is the
major source of the demand for money in a rapidly growing economy with little
financial sophistication like that of Kuwait. Therefore, the demand for money
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is mainly determined by the level of economic activity as proxied by non-oil
GDP. In this case, it is fair to test the stability of the demand for money
against non-oil GD?. In essence, this is a test of the stability of the income
elasticity of the demand for money. The technique used here is the Chow (1960)
test of stability (see also Fisher (1970)) over the period 1975-82* which is
arbitrarily divided into two sub-periods, 1975-78 and 1979-82. Aggregates to
be considered are Ml, M1A, M1B, M2 and M2A. The following are the regression.
results:
The period 1975-78'
(M1)d -92.98 ^ 1.45 Yn
(-1.4)	 (7.9)
= 0.816	 SE = 55.28	 DW	 1.79
(M1) d
 -81.14 + 2.07 Yn
(-0.85)	 (7.8)
R2	0.812	 SE	 79.56	 D	 1.76
(M1B) d = -526.42 + 4.76 Yn
(-2.6)	 (8.3)
R2
	0.831	 SE	 171.65	 DW	 2.14
(4)d 
= -413.68 ^ 4.78 Yn
(-1.9)	 (7.9)
R2	0.818	 SE	 180.65	 DW	 1.89
* It was not possible to use a larger sample because of the unavailability of
quarterly figures on non-oil GDP before 1975. This is so because the quarterly
figures were obtained by interpolating annual series depending on the growth
rate of government expenditure -since it is the prime source of activity in
non-oil sectors. Because quarterly expenditure figures are not available for
the period before 1975, it was not possible to obtain quarterly figures for
non-oil GD? by interpolation on this basis.
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(M2A) d = -347.6 ^ 4.82 Ya
(-1.57) (7.85)
R2 	0.814	 SE = 183.65	 DW = 1.92
The period 1979-82
(M1Y	 -479.83 + 2.16 Yn
(-1.21)	 (3.6)
a2	 0.474	 SE = 247.15	 D1	 1.04
(M1A) d 	-218.8 + 2.22 Yn
(-0.54)	 (3.6)
a2 = 0.476	 SE = 253.42 DW = 1.30
(M1B) d = -620.57 + 5.08 Yn
-	 (-0.66)	 (3.5)
a2 = 0.473	 SE = 582.88	 DJ = 1.34
(M2) d = -411.4 + 5.45 Yn
(-.42)	 (3.61)
R2 = 0.483	 SE = 612.75	 DW = 1.39
(M2A) d = -544.2 + 5.92 Yn
(-0.5)	 (3.7)
R2 = 0.494	 SE = 651.1 DW = 1.39
The period 1975-82
(M1) d 	 -205.99 + 1.75
(-2.15)	 (9.64)
a2 = 0.756	 SE = 176.63	 DW	 1.04
- 110 -
(M1A) d = .-68.1 + 2.01 Yn
(-0.69) (10.7)
= 0.792	 SE = 182.44	 DW	 1.21
(M1B) d	-639.65 ^ 5.1 Yn
(-2.83)	 (11.94)
R2 = 0.826 SE 415.58 DW 1.54
()d = -193.72 ^ 5.98 Yn
(-3.28)	 (13.07)
a2	 0.851	 SE = 445.03	 DW 1.82
(M2A) d = -825.8 + 6.29 Yn
(-3.2)	 (12.9)
a2	 0.849	 SE = 471.8	 DW = 1.75
These empirical results reveal inadequacy of the specification, as the R 2 and
Dc.I statistcs verify some missing variables. Moreover, equations estimated over
the period 1975-78 produce higher DJ statistics than those estimated over the
period 1979-82, which may indicate missing variables in the latter. If it is
assumed that one of the missing variables is interest rate, then this surely
implies growing financial sophistication in the period 1979-82 as compared
with the earlier period.
It is still useful to test for the stability of the function using this
specification. A finding in favour of stability will enhance the credibility
of the results, because missing variables often cause instability. Performing
a Chow test requires the sum of squares of empirical residuals of all of these
regressions. The following notation is used:
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residual sum of squares of period 1 (1975-78)
Eez21 residual sum of squares of period 2 (1979-82)
Eet2 residual sum of squares of total period (1975-82).
Strictly speaking, the Chow test of stability is baàically a test of whether
the function has shifted significantly from one sub-period to the other. To
reject the null hypothesis that the function is stable at the a significance
level, the following condition must be satisfied:
F* > Fa(k,n2k)
where
Eet2 - C	 ej2 + Ee2 2 ) 1k
=
and
	
Ei2 +
k number of estimated coefficients including the constant term
(2 in this case),
n number of observations (32 in this case)
Table 4.2 shows the residual sum of squares and the F* value for the four
nonetary aggregates.
Table 4.2: Residual Sums of Squares and F Statistics
e12	 Ee22	 Eet2
Ml	 42783	 855182
M1A	 88620	 899075
M1B	 412476	 4756551
M2	 456864	 5256461
M2A	 472183	 5935037
	
935995	 0.59
	
998505	 0.15
	
5181153	 0.03
	
5941493	 0.56
	
6677857	 0.59
Since F005 (2,28)	 3.34, the demand for all of the monetary aggregates under
investigation was stable over the period 1975-82, despite the missing
variables. The lowest value of F* was found for MlB which means that the
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demand for M1B has been the most stable of all monetary aggregates, and this
Is verified graphically in Figures 4.1-4.5. It must be mentioned, however,
that there are difficulties associated with the Chow procedure, specifically
that it depends on an arbitrary choice of the break point and is not powerful
for small samples.
4.5. Predictability of the Demand for Money
To enhance the predictive power of the demand function, the specification is
improved by incorporating a lagged dependent variable reflecting the process
of adjustment from actual to desired balances. As income changes, reflecting
changes in economic activity, people restructure their portfolios, switching
from less liquid to more liquid assets, or vice versa. They may choose, for
example, to switch from time deposits to demand deposits, or from forelgn
currency deposits to local currency saving deposits, for transactions and
precautionary purposes. This process of adjustment is not instantaneous,
however, since time deposits are tied up for fixed periods and cannot be
liquidated before maturity, at least not without incurring some cost. Keran
and Al-Malik (1979) point out that the lag is especially important when both
money and income are accelerating at a rapid rate, referring to the case of
Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, changes have also been occurring rapidly, so it seems
fair to assume an adjustment lag of one quarter. The rationale for lag
dependent variables in the demand for money functions will be discussed In
detail in Chapter 6 but, for the time being, suffices it to say that an
adjustment lag of one quarter is justif led on the grounds that the average
maturity of deposits at Kuwait's commercial banks is three months. Using a
specification that incorporates a stock adjustment mechanism represented by
lagged dependent variabla, the following demand functions have been estimated
for the five monetary aggregates using 31 quarterly observations.
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(M1) d = -69.99 + 0.55 Yn + 0.73 (M1)t-i
(-1.09)	 (2.74)	 (7.36)
= 0.912	 SE	 106.75	 DW = 1.51
(M1A) d -22.67 + 0.63 Yn ^ 0.72 (M1A)t-1
(-0.35)	 (2.82)	 (7.25)
R2 	0.923	 SE	 111.25	 DJ	 1.56
(M13) d 	-24.63 ^ 0.35 Yn ^ 0.97 (M13)t-1
(-0.37)	 (1.39)	 (20.95)
R2	0.989	 SE	 105.32	 DW 1.51
(M2)'	 -29.42 + 0.50 Yn + 0.95 (M2)t_].
(-0.45)	 (1.96)	 (23.98)
a2	 0.993	 SE	 99.24	 DW	 1.76
(M2A)d = -1059.1 ^ 3.41 Yn + 319 (M2A)t_1
(-5.47)	 (5.64)	 (5.23)
a2	 0.919	 SE = 327.51 DW	 0.99
The measure of predictability that is used here is the ratio of the standard
error of the estimates to the mean value of the dependent variable. Dividing
by the mean is necessary to eliminate the scale factor and make comparison
easy, as presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Measures of Predictability of the Demand for Money
Monetary Aggregate 	 Ratio of Standard Error to the Mean
Ml	 0.1564
M1A	 0.1169
MiB	 0.0540
M2	 0.0443
M2A	 0.0432
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Since lower values of the ratio of standard error to the mean indicate better
predictability, a value of 0.0432 for M2A implies a marginally better
predictability than for M2, which is better by far than any of the other
aggregates. This is illustrated graphically in Figures 4.6-4.10. It may seem
peculiar that the demand for M2 has a better predictability than M1B, even
though the demand for the latter was found to be more stable, but a different
specification is used here, one that contains a lagged dependent variable. The
reason why this same specification was not used to conduct the Chow test is
that this test is not strictly appropriate for equations containing lagged
dependent variables (see Goldfeld (1973)).
In conclusion, if attention is to be focused on a single monetary aggregate,
the broad M2 is the one that should be monitored and ontrolled. Empirical
evidence indicates that it is the most highly correlated with non-oil GDP,
that the demand for it has shown stability and can be accurately predicted.
The inclusion of government deposits in the definition of money does not
result in any significant Improvement.
4.6. A Theoretical Monetary Aggregate
Following Gurley (1960) and Chetty (1969), a monetary aggregate can be derived
as a weighted average of the financial assets that comprise broad money M2.
The correlation of this aggregate with economic activity will be tested
subsequently.
The monetary aggregate Mw is defined as
Mw Ewi Ai
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si.h that
A1.	 C
A2	 D
A3	 S
A4	 T
A5	 F
It is obvious that if w1
 ................1, then Mw will be equivalent
to M2. The weights are to be estimated by the method of principal components.
Since C, D, S, T and F are all measured in the same units (Kuwaiti Dinars), we
can use their actual instead of standardised values.
Th correlation matrix R of C, D, S, Tand F is as follows:
1
0.897
R 0.815
0.990
0.795
	
0.897	 0.815
1	 0.704
	
0.704	 1
	
0.889	 0.774
	
0.653	 0.545
0.990
0.889
0.774
1
0.760
0.795
0.653
0.545
0.760
1
Since R is a symmetric matrix, it follows that
ER1j ERi1 4.497
R2j = ERi2 = 4.143
ZR3j = ERI = 3.838
ER4 J	Rj4 4.413
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R5j ER15 =
Ei :::i2: ERIj = 20.644
According to the method of principal components, the weights are given by
wj ERij/ZRij
Therefore
Wi	 0.990
wz
	 0.912
W3	 =	 0.845
W4	 0.971
w5	 0.82 &
and
E wi2 4.151
which means that the first principal component Mw explains 83 percent of total
variation in C, D, S, T and F.
Having estimated the weights, it is possible to derive a time series for Nw.
Further calculations reveal the following:
(i) The correlation coefficient between Mw and non-oil GDP is 0.919, which is
less than that between M2 and non-oil GDP.
(ii) The "theoretical" demand for Mw was stable over the period 1975-82 as
indicated by the Chow-test (F* = 0.48) and Figure 4.11.
(iii)The "theoretical" demand for Mw had good predictability using a model
that contains non-oil GDP and a lagged dependent variable as explanatory
variables. The ratio of the standard error of the estimate to the mean
value of the dependent variable turned out to be 0.042 (see Figure 4.12).
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The concept of Mw, however, remains of little practical importance as no valid
economic interpretation can be given to the weights. This, indeed, is the
problem with the method of principal components. In any case, it is not
significantly superior to M2 with respect to stability and predictability.
4.7. Velocity of Circulation
The capacity of the monetary sector to finance economic development by
expanding the money supply without causing inflation depends on the behaviour
of the income velocity of circulation of money, defined as the ratio of income
to the money stock. If velocity falls as real per capita income rises,
monetary expansion is more desirable and effective than if it rises or stays
unchanged.
Economists have, in general, argued that velocity is a negative function of
per capita income. One of the reasons to explain this inverse relationship is
the conviction that as the savings to Income ratio rises during development,
it causes the ratio of money to income to rise also, implying falling
velocity. Such studies include Friedman (1960), Selden (1956), Gurley (1967),
Ezekiel and Adekunle (1969), Soligo (1967), the United Nations (1967), and
Melitz and Correa (1970). Friedman and Selden have each shown that velocity in
theUnited States is a negative function of per capita real income. Gurley has
estimated a regression for a cross section of 70 countries for which velocity
was found to be a decreasing function of per capita GNP. Ezekiel and Adekunle
have similarly done a more detailed cross-sectional analysis of the impact of
per capita GDP on velocity In 37 countries, whereas Soligo investigated the
relationship for Pakistan. The United Nation's Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East (ECAFE) investigated the relationship for Ceylon, India,
Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. Lastly, Melitz and Correa
found the same relationship in another cross-sectional study of 51 countries.
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The results of the above-mentioned studies, however, do not provide clear-cut
evidence for the negative correlation between velocity and per capita income.
Chowts (1966) work on the United States produced contradictory results to
those of Friedman and Selden. Ezekiel and Adekurile were not very successful in
estimating statistically significant velocity equations in which per capita
income had a negative sign. Moreover, Melitz and Correa discarded per capita
real GNP from their final regressions because it seemed statistically
insignificant. For Pakistan, Soligo found that there had been no definite
trend in velocity and he did not use per capita income to explain its
behaviour. The United 1ation's study concluded that •'the secular behaviour of
income velocity in these countries shows considerable diversity."
tn this context, Short (1973) questions the justification for concluding that
what is true for the United States, or cross-sections of developed and
underdeveloped economies, is true (over time) for any single underdeveloped
economy. Re argues that "the fact that velocity decreases as one goes in a
cross-section to countries with higher and higher per capita incomes is not,
a priori, inconsistent with the velocity of each country increasing as-its per
capita income rises over time." He further argues that available empirical
evidence for developing economies suggests that velocities have not fallen
uniformly as per capita incomes have risen. This is not necessarily	 -
inconsistent with long-run declining velocity, however.
Short estimated various velocity equations for Malaysia and Singapore using
annual data over the period 1951-66. As explanatory variables he used -in
addition to per capita income- the number of bank offices as a proxy for the
change in monetary habits, interest rate, and rate of change of prices as a
proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money. He found evidence in favour
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of the negative relationship between velocity and per capita income, but he
qualified his results by stating that "the negative impact of per capita real
income upon velocity was overpowered by the change in monetary habits which
the increase in bank offices caused." }ie concluded that since greater use of
the banks' services raises velocity, it is possible that closer observation of
underdeveloped economies, where velocity has paradoxically risen with per
capita income, might reveal institutional changes which have overwhelmed the
inverse relation between per capita income and velocity. Indeed, such a
phenomenon has been noticed in developed countries. For example, Goodhart
(1969) and Breton (1969) have located a shift in velocity in Canada caused by
an institutional change originating from revised banking legislation.
For Kuwait, Mansour (1983) points out that in the short run andat times of
heightened economic activity, income grows faster than the money stock, which
results in higher velocity. Alternatively, when economic activity slackens,
the money stock grows more rapidly than income, which results in lower
velocity. Therefore, velocity is an incr 'easing function of per capita income
in the short run. Figure t,•l3 shows the behaviour of the velocity of
circulation for narrow money Vl and broad money V2.
Empirical evidence in support of Mansour's hypothesis has been found. Analysis
of quarterly data for the period 1977-82 revealed statistically significant
positive correlation between velocity of narrow and broad money stocks on the
one hand, and real per capita GDP on the other, where velocity is defined as
the ratio of non-oil GDP (measured at annual rates) to the money stock. Oil
GDP was excluded from the definition of velocity because the bulk of it is not
traded in local currency, but it is included in the definition of real per
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capita income. Two equations were estimated for. the velocity of narrow money
Vi and broad money V2 in which two explanatory variables were used: real per
capita GD? (Y*/N) where N is population, and interest rate r which is the
end-period 3 month interbank rate. The following results were obtained using
log-log formulations:
log Vi	 -5.25 + 0.85 log (Y*/N) - 0.34 log r
(-5.3)	 (6.9)	 (-4.4)
R2 = 0.720	 SE	 0.121 DW = 2.04
log V2	 -4.35 ^ 0.62 log ( y*/N) - 0.40 log r
(-4.6) (5.2)	 (-5.5)
R2	0.682	 SE = 0.116	 DW	 2.33
Attempts to incorporate other explanatory variables such as the number of bank
branches and the inflation rate did not improve the results. Unfortunately,
there is no proper quantitative measure of attitude towards the use of banking
services in Kuwait (Ghulouni (1984)) which could have been used as a further
explanatory variable in the two equations. It may be that the absence of such
a variable is partly responsible for the relatively low R 2 and the paradoxical
negative sign of the interest rate. Yet another explanation for this negative
sign is that aggregated monetary variables, Ml and M2, were used to calculate
Vi and V2. cJe shall see later (Chapter 6) that only the demand for demand
deposits produces a significant negative response to changes in interest rate.
The demand for currency is not significantly affected by interest rate,
whereas the demand for quasi-money (the bulk of M2) is positively related to
it. Thus, the use of aggregated monetary variables in the demand for money
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equations, together with the existence of time trend, produce a positive sign
in the interest rate coefficient implying a negative sign in the velocity
equations, since velocity is the ratio of income to money.
4.8. Time-Series Analysis of Monetary Growth
Time-series techniques are sometimes useful for analysing the money growth
process. A typical case arises when there is no reliable behavioural model for
the central bank and when a time series forecasting model has a better track
record than a behavioural model, provided that the sole purpose of such a
modelling exercise is forecasting rather than hypothesis testing.
Rutledge (1981) argues that the central bank is subject to so many pressures
that it is difficult to get sufficient observations on its behaviour to make
firm statements about the structure and stability of the factors affecting
monetary growth. Re gives several examples of the sources of pressure on the
central bank, including the proximity of next elections (the political
business cycle), unemployment, trade unIons, interest rates, inflation,
foreign exchange markets, and public opinion in general. However, the central
bank is subject to these pressures only to the extent of its (lack of)
autonomy from the government, because it is the government that is subject
directly to these pressures. If the central bank is autonomous and follows a
monetary rule, then it will not be subject to these pressures.
Rutledge proposes a much simpler hypothesis whereby monetary gorwth is
approximated by an autoregressive process of the form
Mt =Eai Mt_i + et
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where a j denotes parameters and et represents the error term. Applying this
methodology to U.S. quarterly data over the period 1963-78 using a maximum lag
of 7 quarters, he found the coefficients at t-1, t-2, t-5 and t-6 to have
contributed significantly to the process deriving Mt.. lie further presented
several estimates of the money growth process over different historical
periods in order to isolate structural shifts in the process determining
monetary growth; he found that the U.S. money growth has been rather stable in
the post-1963 period.
It is not justifiable to use such methodology to study monetary growth in
ICuwait because although the Central Bank of Kuwait is subject to pressures of
the kinds stated by Rutledge, it is not the only -or the major- determinant of
the money supply. Rather, money supply is determined by the combined actions
of the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, commercial banks, the public, and
the outside world. Indeed, it can be demonstrated that the behaviour of the
Central Bank can be incorporated in an econometric model that explains the
money supply process.
It remains true, however, that time-series models can be used to forecast the
money supply and other macroeconomic variables for that matter. Lilleberg
(1980), for example, used a seasonal ARIMA model to forecast the six-month
Libor (London interbank offered rate). However, he admitted that while
univariate time-series models can quite accurately predict a few steps ahead,
they cannot understandably give us information about the trend changes in the
future, and more complex models utilising the past history of related
variables (e.g. niultivariate ARIMA) are needed. But still, time-series
analysis of economic variables can be useful. Geisst (1980), for example, has
demonstrated that issuers of floating-rate notes can benefit from detecting
seasonal variations in Libor by time-series methods.
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Indeed, the earliest known forecasting service used time-series methods. From
1876 to 1907, an Ohio farmer named Samuel Benner published 16 editions of
"what years to make money on pig-iron, hogs, corn and provisions." He plotted
data series and noticed regularities in their fluctuations which he attributed
to some regular, but unexplained, meterological cycles. Thus, his predictions
were based on a simple univariate analysis of the past regularities in a
particular economic time-series (Benner (1892)).
In Granger's (1981) words, the time-series analyst's basic strategy is to try
to let the data suggest the appropriate specification of a model. Because
time-series analysts are not constrained by any theory, their models are
usually either reduced forms or triangular recursive forms which may be
estimated by OLS. Granger makes a further interesting comparison between
econometricians and time-series analysts; he states that "when a time-series
analyst finds that his model is not forecasting very well, he is inclined to
add further lagged terms, but when an econometrician is unhappy with his
model, he adds further equations."
Ashley and Granger (1979) attempted a synthesis of the two approaches by
subjecting the residuals from equations of an econometric model (the St. Louis
Model) to time-series analysis, both for individual series of residuals and
for pairs of such series. They suggested, on the basis of their results,
respecification involving a more complicated residual temporal structure,
greater use of lagged dependent and independent variables and
re-classification of variables between endogenous and exogenous.
The main argument against time-series models is that they are based on
extrapolating past data into the future without any underlying theoretical
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structure. In his criticism of the work of Burns and Mitchell (1946), Koopmans
(1947) argued that without resorting to theory, the findings cannot be used
for policy decisions or other useful tasks because the underlying structural
relationships are unknown. Vining (1949), in a reply to Koopmans, suggested
that until several methods have been tried and tested, it is an unnecessary
restriction on economic research to insist on one method instead of another.
Evans (1969), who is a practicing econometrician, argues that, if a group of
economists, or other scientists for that matter, wish to develop a method for
prediction without the use of theory, the main issue in such a case would be
whether in fact this method is successful on a true ex-ante basis. If such a
method has a better record than another one based on theory, then for strictly
predictive purposes the former method is to be preferred. The conclusion is,
therefore, that for strictly predictive purposes, a method is to be preferred
if it has a lower mean square error on ex-ante basis, irrespective of whether
or not it is built on economic theory. Indeed, Sims (1980) found a very
powerful forecasting device in estimating large-scale macro models as
unrestricted reduced forms, treating all variables as endogenous without
restrictions based on supposed a prior knowledge.
Howrey et' al (1981) point out that time-series models are irrelevant for
policy considerations. Granger (1981) admits that this is true, but he
emphasises that exactly the same remark can be made about a poorly specified
econometric model. Indeed, he argues that the latter is even more dangerous
because it may appear to have something to say about alternative policies and
yet may, actually, be very misleading. Moreover, Granger criticises the
econometricians' classic assumption that their residuals are either "white
noise" or AR(l), and argues that such autoregressive processes are found only
rarely in empirical research. He also argues against attempting to explain one
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variable only in terms of other variables, ignoring the past values of the
dependent variable. Ando (1981), on the other hand, rejects the "absolutist"
position in some of the propositions put forward by time-series analysts, but
he acknowledges their contribution to applied empirical research and admits
that econometric models are changing for the better because of them.
There are two advantages of time-series models. To begin with, the problem of
assigning ex-ante values for exogenous variables -not an easy task- is not
encountered when preparing forecasts from reduced form equations. In the case
of time-series models, all that is needed to be known is past values of the
dependent variable. Second, they can be very useful as a standard for
evaluating the predictive performance of econometric models. Differences in
exogeniety may impede cross-model comparisons, and that can be overcome by
comparing various econometric models with a common time-series model that
requires no exogenous information. Moreover, with time-series models there is
no need to find empirical proxies for theoretically important concepts such as
expectations, capacity, wealth and permanent income (McNees (1981)).
Perhaps the earliest evaluation of the forecasting capacity of econometric
vis-a-vis time-series models was Christ's (1951) study of predictions
generated by the Klein (1950) model for the year 1948. Christ (1956) also
produced a similar evaluation of the forecasts generated by the
Klein-Goldberger (1955) model for the years 1951 and 1952. These two studies
showed that very simple naive models outperformed the two econometric models.
Some more recent studies (e.g., Cooper (1972), Cooper and Nelson (1975)) also
revealed that simple time-series models outperformed structural econometric
models for most variables. However, Hirsch et al (1974) reached the opposite
conclusion of the superiority of econometric model forecasts, especially over
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a long forecast horizon. In a more recent study, Christ (1975) also found that
the ex-post forecasts of the well-known U.S. econometric forecasting models
outperformed ARIMA models in the period 1956-70. Shapiro and Garman (1981)
conclude that the ability of econometric models to outperform time-series
models represents a change from the early post-war period, they attribute this
to a combination of improved model-building techniques, improved data, and
improved understanding of the economic system itself.
The author has constructed a time-series model to forecast the broad money
supply in Kuwait, having noticed the poor record of the Central Bank's
econometric model whose structure is not made public (Moosa (1982)). The
starting point was attempting to detect seasonal variations in monthly money
supply figures over the period 1977-81; and by examinlng the ratio of actual
to trend values, no seasonal variation was detected but the money supply was
found to follow an exponential growth function. The comparative out-of-sample
predictive power of the model was tested against that of the Central Bank's
model over the six months from October 1981 to March 1982. Forecasts were
obtained by estimating an exponential growth function using the most
up-to-date data, and extrapolating one month into the future, and by repeating
this procedure, forecasts were obtained forthe six months. When compared with
the published ex-ante forecasts of the Central Bank, this simple time-series
model yielded a substantially lower mean square error (714.8 against 5925.7).
McNees (1981) has raised a very important point in this respect, namely the
difference in dimensionality between time-series and structural econometric
models. Re points out that most macroeconometric models consist of a system of
(sometimes hundreds) interdependent relationships. Therefore, each time-series
- 140 -
model is not compared with a single equation from the econometric model but
with the model solution which reflects the interaction among all the variables
in the model. In this context, Kmenta and Ramsey (1981 p.46l) argue that
although, under some circumstances, time-series models outperform structural
econometric models, the former are not valid competitors for the latter
because they do not provide any econouiic knowledge.
While this may seem an endless debate, recent writings have shown a
convergence of views on the propositon that it is useful to combine the
traditional structural econometric models with modern time-series approaches
in building, analysing and using models. Granger (1981) points out that the
eventual objective of both econometricians and time-series analysts is to
produce a good approximation to the true underlying generating process for the
macroeconomy, and so both sides have something to contribute to the discovery
of such a model, assuming that it exists.
4.9. Applications for Kuwait
In this section, a more sophisticated time-series analysis of monetary growth
will be presented. The purpose of this analysis is to test for randomness,
stationarity and seasonality using a time-series for M2 of 96 monthly
observations covering the period 1975-82. Theèe tests are based on the
behaviour of autocorrelation coefficients, i.e. the correlation coefficients
between the money supply and its lagged values. If R1 denotes the
autocorrelation coefficient between Mt and Mt_i, then
Coy
 (Mt. Mtl)
a1
var (Mt) Var (Mt_l)
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and, in general, if Rj denotes the autocorrelation coefficient between Mt and
Mt_i, then
Coy (Mt, Mt_i)
Rj____________
%JVar (Mt) Var (Mt_i)
Using the above formula and a niaxiniutu lag m of 12 months, autocorrelation
coefficients were calculated for the sample of 96 monthly observations. As
shown by Anderson (1942) and others, the autocorrelation coefficients of
random data have a sampling distribution that can be approximated by a normal
curve with mean zero and standard deviation l/f where n is the sample size.
Therefore, the data series is random if
1.96	 1.96
where the value of 1.96 is found from the area under the normal curve. This
also means that for a 1 to be significant, its absolute value must exceed 1.96
times (l/[), which in our case equals 0.20. Therefore, all of the
autocorrelation coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level because they were found to range between 0.985 and 0.999. Figure 4.14
plots the autocorrelation coefficients against the lag length, the two
horizontal lines parallel to the x-axis marking the area out of which the
autocorrelation coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. Obviously,
all of them are highly significant because they are far away from the area and
very close to 1; moreover, their pattern indicates a strong time trend.
A better test of the randomness of data series has been suggested by Box and
Pierce (1970) employing what has come to be known as the Box-Pierce
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Figure 4.14
Autocorrelation Coefficients of Level Data of
Money Supply with AR(12)
- 143 -
Q-statistic, which is defined as follows:
Q a
whereby the null hypothesis of randomness is rejected at the a significance
level if
Q >X( in)
In this case, Q
	
95.8, therefore the data series -as it is- is not random.
To test for seasonality, the time trend must first be eliminated, i.e.
transforming the data into a stationary series by taking first differences.
Autocorrelation coefficients are then calculated for the new series. In this
case, R1 is the autocorrelation coefficient between 	 and	 Nt...l, where
- Mt_2
Autocorrelation coefficients for the new stationary series are plotted in
Figure 4.15, this shows that the only significant autocorrelation coefficient
is that at lag 3, because it lies outside the area. For seasonality to be
present, there must be significant autocorrelation coefficients at more than
two or three time lags such that the longer the lag the smaller the
coefficient. In this case R3, R6, R9 and R12 are all positive such that
R3 > R6 > R9 > R12
Had R6, Rg and R12 been significant, we would have concluded that data have a
seasonal pattern; since they are not, we conclude that seasonal variation is
not present.
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Autocorrelation Coefficients of First Differences
of Money Supply with AR(12)
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Leaving causality and determining factors aside, if monetary growth can be
approximated by the following autoregressive process
Mt aiMt_i ^ aZMt_2 + ......+ a Mt + et
then it is possible to forecast the money supply at period t+l from the
following equation
Mt+i aOMt ^ al1_l ^ a2Mt_2 ^ .... + am_lMt_.i ^ et^1
provided that the aj t s are known. Rutledge estimated the ai's by OLS, this is
not strictly appropriate here, since the basic assumption of independence of
residuals is violated as the independent variables, in this case, depend on
each other. Another estimation technique is the method of "steepest descent",
or what is generally known as the technique of "adaptive filtering" (see for
example Wheelwright and Makridakis (1973), (1977)). According to this method,
we start with arbitrary values for the aj's and adjust them according to the
forecasting error until the minimum value of the mean square error is
obtained. Adjustment is done using the following equation:
aj '	 aj + 2ke t ^
where
1, 2.......	 in	 (in is maximum lag)
t	 in + 1, in + 2 ......., n	 (n is sample size)
ai'	 ' adjusted parameter
ai	 old parameter
k	 adjustment constant
et^1 = error of forecast at t+l
Mt..j^i = observed value at t-i+l
This method is very expensive, however, in terms of computer time and the
reduction in the mean square error becomes successively smaller as more
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iterations are performed. Therefore, the process of adjustment is stopped
after a certain number of iterations and the final set of parameters is then
used for forecasting.
This method can be used to forecast monetary growth in Kuwait, assuming the
following:
(i) equal initial parameters with value 1/rn;
(ii) k	 l/m;
(iii) maximum number of iterations is 100.
Assumption (1) and (ii) are frequently used when applying this method.
Wheelwright and Makridakis (1973 p.67) have suggested other criteria for
fixing the initial aj 's and k.
Initially, an autoregressive order (Alt) of 12 is assumed, i.e. the maximum lag
used is 12. Hence
Mt Lai Mt_i +
i =1
and
Mt+l tEai Mt_j+i ^ et^1
In this case al	 a2	 a12	 0.083, k 0.083
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.16 illustrate how the values of the parameters and the
mean square error change after 100 iterations using AR(l2). The final values
of the parameters listed in Table 4.4 can be used to forecast the money supply
within the sample. Figure 4.17 plots the actual and predicted money supply
using AR(12) over the period 1975-82.
Figure 4.16
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Table 4.4: Results of 100 Iterations Using AR(12)
Parameter	 Initial Value	 Iteration (1)	 Iteration 100
(final value)
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.083
0.091
0.090
0 • 090
0.089
0.089
0.089
0.088
0.088
0.088
0.088
0.088
0.088
0.196
0.156
0.119
0.087
0.065
0.062
0.052
0.053
0.059
0.060
0.064
0.074
Mean Square Error 	 14327.8	 9552.1
It was. found that using an autoregressive process of order 6, i.e. AR(6),
improves the forecasting power of the model. In this case the model is written
as
6
Mt =Eaj Mt_i + et
therefore
6
Mt+1 =i Eai Mt...i^l + et^l
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and a1 a	 •	 a	 0.167, k 0.167. Results of the new model are
presented in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.18. It is obvious that with AR(6), better
results are obtained because the mean square error drops to 4604.7 after 100
iterations, whereas in the case of AR(12) it only drops to 9552.1. Figure 4.19
plots the actual arid predicted money supply using AR(6) over the period
1975-82.
Table 4.5: Results of 100 Iterations Jsing AR(6)
Parameter	 Initial Value	 Iteration (1)	 Iteration 100
(final value)
a1	 0.167	 0.168	 0.242
0.167	 0.168	 0.205
a3	 0.167'	 0.167	 0.161
a4	 0.167	 0.167	 0.127
a5	 0.167	 0.167	 0.113
a6	 0.167	 0.167	 0.156
Mean Square Error	 5301.4	 4604.7
It was also found that A.R(6) produced better out-of-sample forecasting
results. Figure 4.20 shows the actual money supply over the period
January-December 1983 as well as the predicted values using AR(12) and AR(6).
It must be said at this stage that such types of models indicate ignorance of
the true forces that determine monetary growth. This is why the main objective
of this study is to test for the factors that determine the money supply in
the context of an econometric model. However, it is incorrect to conclude that
FiQure 4.18
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trying to analyse and forecast monetary growth by time series methods is
without any practical importance. It has been demonstrated that the
integration of econometric and time-series approaches has led to better
forecasting modei g .	 -
The debate between proponents of both approaches has been fruitful in the
sense that it has resulted in the development of tnultivariate ARINA models
(see Makridakis et al (1983)), and, more recently, the Bayesian vector
autoregression inodels* which were developed by research economists at tha
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (see Litterman (1984) and Todd (1984)).
Therefore, it would certainly be a setback to the development of economic
science if we "black list" a particular technique just because we feel
slightly in favour of another.
* It is claimed that these models forecast well without subjective adjustment,
thus allowing them to answer questions about future events and probabilities,
that subjectively-adjusted models cannot address so convincingly. The
motivation behind the development of these models was the suspicion that
exclusion restrictions derived from imperfect economic theories could be a
barrier to improved forecasting. The main difference between structural models
and Bayesian vector autoregression models is that whereas economic theory is
the main source of prior beliefs in the former, it is often secondary to
statistical theory and observations in the latter. This kind of modelling is
based on earlier work by Sims (1980), (1981), on what are called "unrestricted
vector autoregression models."
CHAPTER 5
MONETARY POLICY
5.1. Introduction
Commercial banks operating without restrictions tend to have procyclical
tendencies, simply because they are profit maximisers. They find it profitable
to expand the money supply by extending credit in inflationary booms, because
loans are interest-earning assets with little risk (of default) under those
circumstances. Conversely, they restrict the money supply by shrinking credit
during deflationary recessions, because they tend to seek liquidity for fear
of a large-scale withdrawal of deposits, and due to scepticism about the
ability of borrowers to repay their debts, even though that involves the
sacrifice of interest income. Such behaviour intensifies the cyclical
downswing (as happened in the Great Depression of the 1930s), and contributes
to excess aggregate demand on the upswing, thus resulting in inflationary
pressures. This phenomena was recognised by Wicksell in his writings on the
cumulative process (sea for example Wicksell (1907) and Laidler (1972)). In
his writings on the subject, Wicksell shifted the emphasis of monetary
economics away from comparative statics of an economy in full equilibrium
situations, and towards the dynamics of the process whereby such an economy
moves from one full equilibrium situation to another.
In Kuwait, similar behaviour of commercial banks has indeed contributed to the
emergence of inflationary pressures, the collapse of the stock market on two
occasions (1977 and 1982), and the recession of the first half of the 1980s.
Therefore, countering banks' procyclical tendencies should be an obvious
objective of monetary policy in Kuwait. Moreover, since Kuwait is still in the
early stages of economic and financial development, monetary policy should
have the additional objective of creating the proper environment for the
allocation of financial resources in a manner consistent with sectoral
development priorities.
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Theoretically, monetary policy is an aspect of overall macroeconomic policy, a
particular form of the State's intervention in the economic process with a set
of subsidiary objectives. In the short run, the objective of monetary policy
is to achieve economic development in an environment of reasonable price
stability. In the longrun, the objective should be the efficient mobilisation
of resources and their effective investment. En general, the functional
responsibility of monetary policy is the creation of conditions that are
conducive to the desired volume of monetary expansion and the means to bring
it about.
It is sometimes argued (for example, Collyns (1983)) that there are
difficulties involved in short-run stabilisation, particularly in small open
economies, that warrant the direction of monetary policy towards establishing
the financial conditions required by the long-run development strategy of the
economy. This is achieved, for example, via the allocation of credit in
accordance with development priorities rather than permitting commercial
banks, and other financial institutions to carry out this task in the manner
that is appropriate from their point of view. One of the problems facing
policy makers when they consider stabilisation policies in small open
economies with a high degree of export specialisation, is the limited size of
the impact multiplier of monetary injections. This is due to the limited size
of sectors producing non-traded goods and services (ths bulk of non-oil GD? in
the case of Kuwait). In such an economy, production (total GDP) and real
income are mainly influenced by the costs of domestic supply and by world
-rather than domestic- demand. Other problems include information and response
lags, together with uncertainty about the link between policy instruments and
domestic output. These problems may, indeed, have been responsible for the
extremely volatile monetary growth in Kuwait as we saw in Chapter 3. They may
also explain why monetary policy is aimed at the regulation of interest rates,.
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credit availability and its allocation, rather than at short-run monetary
control.
5.2. Theoretical Background
Formulating policy in terms of the money stock requires the determination of:
(1)	 the most appropriate definition of money in the economic and
institutional setting of a particular country;
(ii) the relationship between the money stock defined in (i), and real and
price variables;
(iii) the process by which the stock of money is determined;
(iv) the role played by the central bank's policy instruments in that process.
Points (i) and (ii) have already been discussed for the special case of the
Kuwaiti economy. tu this chapter we shall be concerned with (iii) and (iv).
Stabilisation policies via monetary control are based on the nionetarist
proposition that changes in the money supply, relative to its demand, result
in spending adjustments in an effort to re-establish the desired money
holdings, and that will affect aggregate demand and the price level. The
fundamental question arises as to whether or not the monetary authorities can
effectively control the money supply.
The equilibrium money stock is the product of the complex interaction of the
behaviour of various economic decision makers, rather than the result of the
operations of the monetary authorities. In a more technical language, the
money stock is part of the simultaneous solution for all variables in the
financial and real sectors of the economy. Three decisions are particularly
important for the determination of the money stock:
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(i) the decision by monetary authorities concerning the volume of the
monetary base;
(ii) the decision by commercial banks concerning the composition of their
asset portfolios, particularly the volume of credit and excess reserves;
(iii) the decision by the public concerning the allocation of their funds
among currency, demand deposits, quasi-money and other assets.
This process can be simply expressed as the relationship between money stock M
and monetary base B in a multiplier framework which views money as some
multiple m of the base:
M tuB
The money stock in its broad and narrow concepts is larger than the base
because a fractional-reserve banking system has a multiple credit and deposit
creating capacity.
Now the question is: since B represents the monetary liabilities of the
monetary authorities, is it possible to control 14 by controlling B?
Monetarists, in general, argue that it is possible because the multiplier m is
stable and predictable and, therefore, the impact of changes in B on 14 can be
estimated very accurately. Other economists argue that the multiplier is not
stable but rather depends on the behaviour of the public and commercial banks
which is not stable or predictable. Moreover, it is also argued that there is
a strong feedback from changes in the base to the multiplier. This issue is
obviously empirical and some tests are, therefore, required for the case of
Kuwait.
Both Mansour (1983) and Ghuloum (1984) have demonstrated that thra is no
stable relationship between the monetary base and money supply in Kuwait, and
that the money multiplier fluctuates sharply. But, whereas Mansour attributes
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the instability of the multiplier to the behaviour of commercial banks, in
particular, the holding of excess reserves, Ghuloum attributes it to
financial, demographic and social changes, in the sense that the emergence of
new financial assets together with the influx of expatriate labour with high
demand for currency have influenced the public's portfolio composition.
However, neither of them triad to find empirical evidence to support his own
hypothesis.
Analysis of monthly data over the period 1970-82 revealed that the money
multiplier fluctuated between a minimum of 1.10 and a maximum of 2.96 for
narrow money Ml, and between 3.34 and 8.48 for broad money M2. Both
multipliers showed significant fluctuations, particularly in the period
1974-78 in which the coefficients of variation for narrow and broad money
inuftipliers ware 20.0 and 19.8 percent respectively. It is worth noting,
however, that from a policy point of view these fluctuations do not matter as
long as they are predictable.
A more rigorous test of stability is the Chow test which has already bean used
to test the stability of the demand for money. It shall be used in this
situation to test the stability of the relationship between the monetary base
and money stock (narrow and broad). Monthly data for the period 1970-82 are
used to conduct the test, and two sub-samples are obtained by breaking the
total sample at the end of 1975. The following results are obtained by
regressing money stock (Ml and M2) on monetary base.
The period 1970-75
Ml	 54.28 + 1.19 B
(11.4) (25.1)
R2	0.900	 SE = 17.48	 D4 = 0.356
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M2	 228.60 + 3.22 B
	
(15.0)	 (21.4)
	
= 0.867	 SE	 55.89	 D = 0.621
The period 1976-82
Ml	 125.59 + 1.59 3
(2.2)	 (12.1)
a2	 0.640	 SE	 218.08 DW = 0.194
M2	 458.30 + 4.767 B
(3.1)	 (13.9)
0.702	 SE = 569.36	 DW	 0.180
The period 1970-82
Ml	 27.83 + 1.77 B
(1.3)	 (27.5)
R2	0.830	 SE	 164.48	 DW = 0.222
M2	 123.26 + 5.41 B
(2.2)	 (31.3)
= 0.864	 SE = 439.83	 DW = 0.219
The regression results show the following:
(i) The constant terai is significant in five of the six equations implying
that no direct and proportional relationship exists betc!ien the money
stock and monetary base.
(ii)DW statistics have low values, indicating the presence of autocorralation
resulting from missing variables, this in turn implies that specifying
the money supply function as M = M (B) is inadequate.
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Table 5.1: Residual Sums of Squares for the Chow Test
Money	 Residual SS
	
Residual SS
	
Residual SS
	
F*
Concept	 1970-75	 1976-82	 1970-82
Narrow	 21398 -	 3899713	 4166149	 4.8
Broad	 218639	 26582011	 29790959	 8.5
Table 5.1 shows data required for conducting the Chow test. Since
F005 (2,152) = 3.07, the null hypothesis of stability is rejected in both
cases because F* >o.o5 (k,n-2k). This empirical evidence supports the
hypothesis that the relationship between the money stock and monetary base in
Kuwait has not been stable. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the hypothesis
graphically by showing significant shift from one sub-period to the other.
We cannot, however, tell from the result of the Chow test the reason for, or
source of, instability; this requires an analysis of the components of the
multiplier. The following presentation is restricted to the broad money
aggregate M2, but results using Ml have been found to be very similar. Since
M C ^ TD
B=C+R
where C is currency in circulation, D is-total deposits, and R is reserves of
commercial banks, then
M CTD
B C+R
[f c C/TD and r.= R/TD, where c is the public's currency to deposits ratio
and r is banks' reserve to deposits ratio, then
lB
Lc^rJ
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Alternative specifications can be derived for the multiplier formula, first of
all by disaggragatirig total deposits into demand, saving, time and foreign
currency deposits. But, this disaggregation is of little practical importance
in the case of Kuwait where there are no differential reserve requirements
according to the type of deposit and also, from the demand point of view,
saving, time and foreign currency deposits react in a similar manner towards
changes in interest rates. Reserves can also be split into required and excess
reserves such that the reserve ratio is split into required reserve ratio,
which is a policy tool and excess reserve ratio, which is a behavioural
variable. Again, this split is of little importance because the required
reserve ratio (3 percent of total deposits) was introduced in June 1980 and
has not bean changed since then. Moreover, and as will be formally shown, the
introduction of the required reserve ratio has not affected banks' demand for
reserves because they have always held substantial excess reserves. These
points will be elaborated later on in this study; however, the main point to
be emphasised at this stage, is that the reserve to deposits ratio is a
behavioural rather than a policy variable, because banks' behaviour, with
respect to holdings of reserves, has dominated and overwhelmed policy
measures. Goodhart (1975) has asserted that more complicated multiplier
identities sacrifice the one great virtue f the multipler approach, its
simplicity, without obtaining equivalent benefits in the area of its greatest
deficiency, the lack of behavioural content. Ha goes on to say that more
complicated formulations do not illuminate the process whereby people and
institutions adjust their overall portfolios to arrive at some general
equilibrium.
Given the formula
Jc+
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the controversy between monetarists and non-monetarists would concern (i)
which of the variables on the right band side of the equation (i.e. c, r and
B) can be controlled by the monetary authorities and (ii) whether the
functions explaining these variables are stable and predictable. In general,
the money multiplier equation can be used to forecast the effect of a change
in the monetary base on the money stock provided that the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(i) the components of the multiplier c and r are stable;
(ii) the base and multiplier are not affected by each other.
It is sometimes argued that changes in the monetary base tend to affect the
multiplier, with interest rates serving as the channel for transmitting the
influence. For example, increasing the base by injecting liquidity in the
banking systam will lead to changes in interest rates, thus leading to changes
in currency and reserve ratios which consequently result iii changing the value
of the multiplier. In Kuwait, there are legal constraints on the free movement
of most key interest rates, so such effect on the currency ratio does not
always materialise and the ratio tends to be more influenced by income rather
than interest rates. Moreover, the reserve ratio is not influenced as much by
domestic interest rates as by foreign rates. flence, the effect of changes in
the base on the multiplier tends to be minimal. Using monthly data over the
period 1975-82, the following regression equation was fitted:
5.96 - 0.00149	 B
(43.6) (-2.5)
R2	0.062	 SE	 1.31	 DW	 0.327
Where m is the broad money multiplier. The equation shows that changes in the
monetary base bring about changes (in opposite direction) in the multiplier,
but because of the factors mentioned earlier, the effect tends to be very
small as indicated by the low value of the coefficient of LB.
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Changes in the money stock can be brought about by changes in the monetary
base B, changes in the currency ratio c, and changes in the reserve ratio r.
Firstly, higher B would result in larger currency holdings as well as reserves
of commercial banks (since B = C ^ R). The increase in reserves allows banks
to lend more and generate additional deposits. Mathematically, this is
expressed as
3M cl
-	 >0
0B c+r
Secondly, lower currency ratio (ceteris paribus) will increase the money
stock, since it implies a smaller public's share and higher banks' share in
the unchanged base. As long as the required reserve ratio is less than one,
higher reserves will result in an increase in bank lending and deposits.
Hence, the overall effect will be an increase in the money stock, i.e.
3M B(r-l)
<0
3c (c + r)2
because r<l
Thirdly, lower reserve ratio will provide commercial banks with excess
reserves for lending that will be accompanied by the creation of additional
deposits and an increase in the holding of currency outside the banking
system, the result is a higher money stock, i.e.
3M	 B(c+l)
<0
3r	 (c+r)2
Thus, control of the money supply requires accurate prediction of the
multiplier by estimating c and r, and the control of the base.
In LDCs, the currency to deposits ratio tends to have some seasonal patterns,
whereas its secular behaviour depends on such variables as income and interest
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rates as well as the pace of monetisation, growth of the banking habit and
convenience of bank offices. Coats and Khatkhate (1980) argue that the
currency ratio also depends on. changes in the magnitude of illegal
transactions (or tax avoidance), as cash payments are easier to hide than
payments by cheques. The reserve ratio depends on reserve requirements and the
level of excess reserves which is mainly determined by interest rates. Many
empirical studies have been done on the behaviour of these ratios, for example
Bhatt (1961), Narvakar (1963), Khazzooai (1966), Imain (1970), and Bhatia
(1971). These studies revealed substantial variability of the ratios around
the time trend and instability in the short run.
Indeed, empirical evidence for Kuwait suggests substantial instability. Using
quarterly data over the period 1975-82, the coefficient of variation of the
currency ratio was found to be 17.4 percent, whereas it was found to be 65.4
percent for the reserve ratio. This implies average variation around the mean
of 17.4 and 65.4 percent respectively, which is quite high. It was also found
that the public's currency ratio is negatively related to income
C/TD 0.15 - 0.00009 Yn
(31.48) (-10.15)
R2 = 0.744	 SE	 0.009	 DW = 0.68
As Khatkhate et al (1974) have shown, this is so because individuals and
companies tend to become more efficient in their cash management as income
rises.
As for the reserve ratio, Park (1973) has pointed out that in LDCs it depends
very much on the reserve requirements for demand and time deposits, since
commercial banks in LDCs are likely to expand their loans to the maximum level
permitted by their reserves. In Kuwait, this is not the case as banks tend to
hold substantial excess reserves. Therefore, the opportunity cost of holding
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reserves is a very important variable in determining the reserve ratio. If
banks view- foreign assets as the alternative to holding reserves, then the
return on foreign assets is the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves.
If the return on foreign assets is proxied by the 3-month Eurodollar rate f,
then the reserve ratio is a function of this rate. The following equation was
fitted using quarterly data for the period 1977-82
R/TD	 0.094 - 0.0023 f
(3.15) (-0.99)
R2 = 0.044	 SE = 0.043	 D = 1.46
The relationship is obviously insignificant. This may be due to the fact that
reserves are composed of heterogenous assets that react differently to
interest rate variations. Reserves are composed of cash, balances with the
Central Bank (both of • which are non-interest bearing) and Central Bank bills
which are interest-bearing. Banks may, therefore, think of different
opportunity costs for the three assets. Results of correlation analysis which
are presented in Table 5.2 show- that the ratio of cash reserves to deposits
Rc/TD is more strongly correlated with domestic interest rata rI (3-month
interbank rate) and foreign rate rf (3 month Eurodollar rate) than with either
the ratio of balances with the Central Bank to deposits Rb/ID or total reserve
ratio R/TD. Moreover, all of the ratios are more strongly correlated with the
foreign interest rate than with the domestic rate, which implies that banks
view foreign assets more than domestic interbank deposits as the alternative
to holding excess reserves.
Table 5.2: Correlation Between Reserve Ratios and Interest Rates
Ratio	 Correlation with rk	 Correlation with rf
Rc/TD	 -0.684	 -0.697
Rb/TD	 -0.294	 -0.416
R/TD	 0.049	 -0.211
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The analysis of reserve holdings will be considered in more detail at a later
stage. The important point to remember here is that there is some evidence in
support of the influence of changes in the monetary base on the multiplier
(though very small), and the instability of currency and reserve ratios. These
factors explain the instability of the relationship between the monetary base
and the money stock. However, it is possible to predict the value of the
multiplier by predicting the values of currency and reserve ratios through
their response to income and interest rates.
This task can be accomplished by improving the specification of the equations
explaining the currency-deposits ratio and the reserve-deposits ratio. Thus,
the former is specified to be negatively related to the 3-mouth Eurodollar
rate rf, in addition to non-oil CDI', whereas the latter is made a function of
the interest rate differential (3-month Eurodollar rate minus 3-month KD
interbank rate), as well as a seasonal dummy D that reflects the seasonal
increase in reserve holdings in the fourth quarter. If the two equations are
estimated using 24 quarterly observations over the period 1977-82, the
following results emerge:
C/TD	 0.136 - 0.00005 Yn - 0.00083 rf
(27.49) (-5.01)	 (-2.39)
R2	0.755	 SE	 0.0057	 DW	 1.42
R/TD	 0.073 - 0.00578 (rf - k) ^ 0.05595 D
(6.44) (-2.37)	 (3.72)
a2	 0.480	 SE	 0.03193	 DW = 1.30
Both of the estimated equations show that better statistical results are
obtained by improving the specification, although R 2 for the equation
explaining the reserve-deposits ratio is still low, again due to the
haterogeniety of the reserve components. Thus, this equation can still be
C +1
c+r
- 170 -
improved by disaggregating R and estimating a behavioural equation for each
component. However, this will only be feasible when a longer time series on
Central Bank bills, which were introduced in 1979, is available.
It is Important to note that adding a behavioural content to the multiplier
framework, by analysing the components of the identity in terms of behavioural
equations, has been criticised by Goodhart (1975) on the grounds that It leads
back towards specifying the full structure of the system. He argues that if
this Is necessary to understaadwhy the multiplier works as it does, then it
is difficult to see what advantage Is to be gained from using it as an
analytical tool in the first place. On the whola, Goodhart is sceptical about
the multiplier approach, largely because its informational content is
remarkably slight, so simplicity is only achieved t the cost of less
information. In particular, ha points out that the multiplier approach gives
little or no indication of the behavioural process Involved In the
quantitative adjustments, and that most of the accounts of the dynamic process
of adjustment which are derived from this approach are at best misleading and
often wrong. In short, be puts his argument as follows: "Multipliers may
reveal the result of rational choice, but they do not Illuminate the process."
In my view, Goodhart's point is quite valid and is In line with Otani and
Park's (1976) criticIsm of the reduced form approach in monetary economics.
The alternative of full structural specification will be presented in
Chapter 6.
Now, since
and
M
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then the two estimated equations for C/TD and R/TD can be used to forecast the
multiplier m and subsequently the money supply M for any given level of
monetary base B. Figures 5.3-5.6 show the actual and predicted values of the
ratios, the multiplier and the money supply. The forecasting exercise was
carried out within-sample over the period 1977-82.
We now turn to the control of the monetary base. Coats and (hatkhata (1980)
have suggested that short-run variations in the money multiplier have a
somewhat larger role in money's behaviour in LDCs than in developed economies,
but they contend that it contributes very little to monetary changes over
longer periods of time. In the long run, they argue, money's behaviour is
almost always overwhelmingly dominated by changes in the base. This, however,
is not the case In Kuwait as implied by the empirical evidence found by
Ghulouin (1984). He regressed the rate of change of money supply on the rates
of change of monetary base and rates of change of the components of the
multiplier, which in his formulation were: currency to demand deposits ratio,
reserve to demand deposits ratio and quasi-money to demand deposits ratio.
Using quarterly data for the period 1970-82, he found that all of the
explanatory variables were significant but the overall fit was not good (B.2
0.379). What is more important for us here is that he found that the reserve
ratio had a larger coefficient than the monetary base. lie attributed the low
coefficient of the base, as compared with those of the reserve and currency
ratios, to the high demand for currency by the public and high demand for
reserves by banks.
The multiplier remains, however, the determinant of how changes in the base
are transmitted to the money stock. But the effect on the money stock of the
multiplier and the uncontrollable components of the monetary base can be
offset by changes In the controllable components of the base. So, It is
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important for the control of the money stock to identify these components and
the means to control them.
In general, the sources or components of the monetary base include central
bank credit to the government, central bank credit to commercial banks, and
central bank net holding of foreign assets. In Kuwait, the government has not
yet resorted to borrowing from the Central Bank to finance public expenditure.
On the contrary, the government is a net creditor to the Central Bank through
its deposits, which appear as a major item on the liabilities side of the
Central Bank's balance sheet. So, the main components of the monetary base in
Kuwait are:
(i) government deposits;
(ii) discounts;
(iii) net foreign assets.
I
The effect of item (1-) on the base is negative, whereas that of items (ii) and
(iii) is positive. Obviously, item (i) is not under the direct control of the
Central Bank but rather the Ministry of Finance, whereas item (ii) is under
its direct control. Foreign assets are maInly influenced by variations in the
external balance, i.e. fluctuations in exports, imports and capital movements.
Park (1973) argues that LDCs which have a high specialisation of exports are
likely to be more susceptible to externally generated swings in the balance of
payments, and thus, subject to larger fluctuations in their foreign assets
than advanced countries. This is true in the case of Kuwait; the only stable
determinant of the external balance is imports (insignificant determinant of
the trade balance as has been shown), whereas exports and capital flows have
been highly volatile and determined by external forces such as the
international demand for oil, yield differentials between domestic and
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foreign assets, and attitude towards foreign risk. Therefore, the external
balance and consequently foreign assets, have been highly volatile and
difficult to control.
Kuwait follows an exchange rate system of managed floating. Under such a
system, the external balance influences the monetary base through two channels:
(1) transfer of the surplus into the domestic economy by exchanging foreign
currency oil proceeds for local currency at the Central Bank, this
results in an increment in the foreign assets of the Bank;
(ii) intervention by the Central Bank to maintain the exchange rate, which in
the case of surplus on the external balance takes the form of selling
local currency, again leading to an increase in the Bank's foreign assets.
It is sometimes argued that the commitment to a fixed exchange rate precludes
an independent monetary policy. The core of the monetary approach to the
balance of payments is that monetary authorities cannot, simultaneously,
control the money supply and exchange rate. This is because for a given
exchange rate, domestic prices must conform to world prices in order to
maintain the external balance. This means that domestic money supply must
conform to the public's demand at that price level, and efforts to make it
otherwise (e.g. by changing domestic components of the base) will ultimately
lead to changes in the Central Bank's net foreign assets sufficient to swamp
all other factors. Eventually, the monetary authorities must give up their
efforts to control either the money supply or exchange rate.
Keran (1975) has shown that central banks of Western Europe and Japan
experienced limitations on their freedom of action during the 1970-73 period
when fixed exchange rates were prevailing. A fixed exchange rate system
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requires that the central bank purchases all foreign assets presented to it at
a fixed price in domestic currency. During that period, central banks of
Western Europe and Japan were forced to purchase large amounts of
dollar-denominated assets which led to a parallel increase in the monetary
base. Because the volume of dollars Involved was large, It was impossible to
offset the impact and, as a result, domestic money supply in each of the major
industrial countries increased at an unprecedented rate which contributed to
the world-wide inflation of 1973/74.
However, substantial evidence is now available suggesting that monetary
adjustments occur with some lag. Aghavli and Khan (1976) found such evidence
from their policy simulation experiments using a short-run continuous
time-dynamic model (see Wytner (1976), (1979)). The model was estimated for
eight developing countries namely: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, India, South Korea, and the Philippines. Simulation experiments
revealed a significant short-run effect of monetary policy on the behaviour of
income and prices. Additional evidence was found by Cotinolly and Taylor (1976)
and Blajer (1977). If, indeed, the effect of the balance of payments Is felt
after a time lag, then there is some scope for short-run manipulation of the
nioney supply before the balance of payments forces readjustments.
In Kuwait, domestic money supply is independent of the effect of the external
sector in the short run. This, however, is not due to a formal active
sterilisation policy, but due rather to the fact that there is no one-to-one
relationship between government revenue and government expenditure. This is a
hypothesis for which empirical evidence was presented earlier. This means that
government's foreign currency earnings (mainly proceeds of oil and gas sales)
are not transferred to the domestic economy automatically, but In a
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discretionary manner. They are transferred to the State reserves which are
invested abroad, and portions are channelled to the domestic economy -whenever
the need arises- by exchanging foreign currency at the Central Bank for local
currency to finance domestic expenditure. Ghuloum (1984) expresses the idea by
saying that "unlike many other economies where the flow of foreign currency
earnings is a continuous process, the conversion of Kuwait's foreign currency
earnings into local currency is done by the public sector over discrete
intervals. The result is a weak relationship between money supply and the
payments surplus in the short run." Ghulouin has also presented empirical
evidence supporting this hypothesis. aa used the balance of trade as an
explanatory variable in a short-run money supply function. Several
specifications were tried using other explanatory variables such as the change
in domestic credit, government expenditure, a weighted average of deposit
rates and change in discounts. In all of the formulations, the balance of
trade was insignificant, and the most important factor was found to be
government domestic expenditure. Indeed, it is a general proposition that if a
capital-surplus country depends on the sale of a primary product (oil) in
foreign currency (dollar), then the balance of payments does not affect the
money supply in the short run.
If there is a scope for monetary policy as a stabilisation tool in the short
run, how can the money supply be controlled? We have seen that the
determinants of the money supply are the components of both the multiplier and
the monetary base, namely:
(1) public's currency to deposits ratio;
(ii) banks' reserve to deposits ratio;
(iii) Central Bank's net foreign assets;
(iv) Central Bank's discounts to commercial banks;
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(v) Government deposits with the Central Bank;
(vi) Central Bank's other domestic assets.
Item (1) is a behavioural variable beyond the control of the Central Bank.
Item (ii) is partly behavioural (the excess reserve component) and partly a
policy variable (the required reserve component) but the behavioural component
tends to overwhelm the policy component. Item (iii) is not within the control
of the Central Bank as has been shown. Item (iv) is a policy variable, as the
Central Bank can manipulate the volume and price (discount rate) of funds
obtainable through the discount window. Item (v) is determined by the
government's fiscal actions and is not, therefore, within the control of the
Central Bank. Item (vi) is negligible.
Having identified the controllable and uncontrollable components of the money
supply, we now turn to the tools of monetary control. Different countries
employ different tools according to their institutional orgnisation. In the
United States, for example, the Treasury issues various kinds of securities to
finance the budget deficit, so the Federal Reserve's main tool is buying and
selling government securities in the open-market (i.e. open market
operations), which affect commercial banks' holdings of raserves, and,
therefore, the reserve ratio, as well as the net domestic assets component of
the monetary base. In Japan, which has a relatively small government debt, the
dominant tool is lending to commercial banks through the discount window. The
German Bundesbank, on the other hand, uses reserve requirements because of the
absence of a large national debt and the limited indebtedness of commercial
banks to the Central Sank.
In LDCs, the most serious institutional factor that limits the role and scope
of monetary policy is the lack of development of financial and capital
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markets. This shortcoming makes the traditional tools of monetary policy
subject to many technical limitations. Open market operations are particularly
influenced by the lack of financial development because their effectiveness
requires the existence of a sufficiently deep market in high-quality
securities. But the flexibility of this tool has led several LDCs to authorise
their central banks to issue their own securities and use them to conduct open
market operations.
5.3. Monetary Policy in Kuwait
The Kuwaiti Currency Law of 1960, which was in operation before the foundation
of the Central Bank of Kuwait, did not mention commercial banks and their
activities. They were, thus, conducting business at their own discretion until
the Central Bank of Kuwait came into existence.
There is no doubt that the effectiveness of the monetary policy of the Central
Bank of Kuwait has increased since it first commenced operations in 1969. This
is due to a greater understanding of th working of the banking system, and is
also attributable to the legal amendments of 1976 and 1977 which vested the
Bank with wider powers. The process of familiarisation with the banking system
was essential in order to devise and develop the tools necessary to accomplish
the objectives of monetary policy, these were stated in the 1981 Economic
Report of the Central Bank as being:
(1) Protection of the domestic economy in general, and the financial system
in particular, from outside effects, mainly those originating from
fluctuations in interest and exchange rates.
(ii) Support of domestic liquidity which is often subject to pressure
resulting from the conversion of the local currency into foreign
currencies (particularly the U.S. dollar), as a means of benefiting from
an interest rate differential.
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(iii) Maintenance of the local interest rate structure -particularly lending
rates which are subject to a legal ceiling- in the face of strains
resulting from higher interest rates in foreign markets.
(iv) Maintenance of the stability of the KD exchange rate.
(v) Rationalising credit policy of commercial banks in such a way as to
limit any resulting inflationary pressures or speculation.
(vi) Controlling monetary growth such that its rate is compatible with that
of real growth.
Objectives (i)-(iv) are interrelated in the sense that the combination of
(iii) and (iv) causes capital outflows and liquidity strains as shall be
explained in detail later. Objectives (v) and (vi) probably pertain to
short-run stabilisation through the control of money supply, although
objective (vi) sounds more like a long-run monetary rule.
A brief historical survey of the development of monetary policy in Kuwait noi
follows. In the early 1970s i.e. shortly after its foundation, the Central
Bank concentrated on understanding the activities and operations of commercial
banks. That task was carried out by analysing statistical data received from
banks and also by holding regular meetings with them. In a way, the only tool
of monetary policy was moral suasion which was conducted on an informal basis
and without official directives. It worked well then, firstly because of the
simplicity of the banking system and secondly, because the economy had not yet
felt the "shock" of the oil price increase and the consequent phenomena.
Complications began to appear in 1973: excessive aggregate demand, rapid
monetary growth, inflationary pressures and growing speculative activity.
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Moral suasion became inadequate and the Central Bank had to devise new tools.
Indeed, the period 1973-76 was a period of innovation for the Central Bank as
the bulk of tools currently used were devised then. These include the
liquidity system, the discount window and credit controls.
In the period 1977-79, the Central Bank became more powerful following the
major legal amendments of 1976 and 1977. In tcovember 1976, Article 166 of the
Commercial Law was amended by Decree 102/76, in such a way as to empower the
Central Bank to fix the interest rate ceiling subject to the approval of the
Ministry of Finance, after it had previously been fixed at 7 percent. The
Central Bank exercised this prerogative and set a new interest rate structure
in which the ceiling was raised to 10 percent. In late 1977, one of the
amendments of the Central Bank Law allowed the extension of the maturity of
discountable or rediscountable commercial papers from 3 to 12 months. In April
1979, the Central Bank started issuing its bills which were originally
intended to replace commercial banks' time deposits held with it. Later In the
year, a complementary step was taken in the area of credit control whereby the
ratio of overdraft to total credit facilities was reduced. This step was
necessary to relieve strains on banks' liquidity resulting from the inability
to completely control overdrafts. It was implemented in 1980, when the Central
Bank issued a directive instructing ôommarcial banks to shift gradually from
lending through overdrafts to loans of definite terms. The maximum overdraft
to total credit ratio for the initial stage was set at 55 percent. There was
another important development In June 1980, when an amendment to the liquidity
system was enacted whereby banks were required to hold a minimum reserve ratio
(3 percent of total deposits) in the form of cash, deposits with the Central
Bank or Central Bank bills. In 1981. and 1982, the maximum overdraft to total
credit ratio was set at 45 percent and 40 percent respectively.
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This brief historical survey of the development of monetary policy shows
that tools were devised and adapted in the course of time. The following tools
are now at the disposal of the Central Bank of Kuwait.
5.3.1. Lending Policy
In using this tool, the Central Bank performs the traditional function of
lender of last resort and very often lender of primary resort. This activity
influences banks' liquidity and consequently their ability to extend credit.
Lending to banks is carried out mostly through the discount window and
sometimes directly.
Lending policy of the Central Bank can affect the price and quantity of
commercial banks' credit. The price of credit or interest charged oa bank
credit, though subject to a maximum limit, can be affected by the discount
rate which is the interest rate charged to banks for borrowing through the
Central Bank's discount window. There is also another lending rate and that is
interest on loans against Central Bank bills. These lending rates, affect the
whole structure of interest rates. Moreover, the volume of funds that the
Central Bank is willing to provide through discounts or direct lending affects
the reserves of commercial banks and, therefore, their ability to provide
credit.
In reality, the Central Bank is subject to political and social pressure to
provide reserves, which means that it tends to be "accommodative" more often
than not. One source of pressure is the government's commitment to, and
concern over, the health of the banking system. The government has
traditionally striven for a banking system that is always capable of
satisfying the demand for credit by the private sector, and the demand for
currency by depositors. However, there have been occasions when the Central
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Bank has been unable, or unwilling, to fully satisfy commercial banks' needs.
This is verified by the recurring liquidity shortages (see Moosa (1985b)) and
also the rapid growth of two sources of funds for commercial banks: foreign
liabilities and the interbank market.
The system of discounting and rediscounting commercial papers was put into
operation in February 1975, and was intended to assist banks to overcome the
shortage of RD funds which they encountered for the first dine in 1974.
Initially, the discount rate was fixed at 5.5 percent and discounts were
limited to commercial papers maturing within three months from the date of
discount. Later, the Law was amended to extend maturity up to 12 months, and
new discount rates were fixed for each maturity. In April 1979, the discount
rate was raised for all maturities as Table 5.3 shows.
Table 5.3: Discount Rates for Various Maturities
Date Effective	 Maturity Within
3 months	 6 months	 9 months	 12 months
1/2/1975
	
5.50
30/10/1977
	
5.50
	
6.00
	
6.26
	
6.50
3/4/1979
	
6.00
	
6 .. 25
	
6.50
	
6.75
The principal importance of lending policy is its effect on the level of
borrowed reserves and, therefore, the monetary base. In Kuwait, this tool has
not been considered in these terms, and never used for the purpose of
short-run stabilisation through monetary control. It has just been used as a
tool to counter any liquidity shortage and boost banks' ability to grant
credit. Moreover, the discount rate has not been used to affect the price of
credit or th structure of interest rates. As we can see from Table 5.3, it
has only been changed once since 1975.
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5.3.2. Opening Interest-Bearing Accounts with Banks
This tool was used only once in late 1974 when banks faced a KB liquidity
shortage. Provision is made for it in article 40 of the Central Bank Law, but
the Central Bank has, since 1974, looked upon it as a tool of last resort to
be employed only if all other tools fail.
5.3.3. Opening Interest-Bearing Accounts for Banks
This tool works in only one direction. It can be used to absorb surplus
liquidity from the banking system but not the other way round, i.e. not to
provide liquidity when there is a shortage.
It was used for the first time in 1973 following the collapse of the Bratton
Woods System and the resulting uncertainty in the international financial
markets. This, coupled with the absence of short-term assets in the domestic
financial markes, forced banks to approach the Central Bank requesting the
opening of interest-bearing deposit accounts. The Central Bank agreed -in
accordance with article 40 of the Central Bank Law- to open deposit accounts
for a period of not less than one month but not more than three months,
carrying interest at half a percentage point over the rate applicable to
saving deposits of commercial banks. This tool became obsolete in April 1979
when the Central Bank introduced its own bills to replace the deposit accounts.
In effect, this tool -and its successor, the Central Bank bills- actually
equate to payiüg interest on reserves, which is sometimes desirable for its
positive effect on the growth and development of the financial system. An
important factor for financial development is the rate of return earned from
holding financial assets, mainly money and quasi-money in LDCs. Payment of
interest on reserves raises the return that can be offered by banks to
depositors and contributes positively to monetary and financial development,
Demand Deposits	 *
Other Deposit Liabilities
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e.g. by encouraging individuals to usa lass cash and more banking services.
5.3.4. Liquidity Ratios
In April 1974, the Central Bank introduced a liquidity system requiring banks
to maintain 25 percent of the total of deposit liabilities and liabilities to
the Central Bank.in the form of liquid assets, provided that the ratio of KD
liquid assets should not be less than 7.5 percent of total liquid assets.
According to the system, liquid assets include cash, deposits with the Central
Bank, interbank deposits and certificates of deposit maturing within one month.
tn March 1978, the Central Bank introduced a more comprehensive liquidity
system which was to be applied to specialisad as wall as commercial banks (see
Appendix 5.1). The 25 percent liquidity ratio was replaced by different ratios
depending on deposit maturities. Liquidity ratios were sat to range from total
exemption for time deposits of more than one year, to 35 percent for demand
deposits. Table 5.4 illustrates the structure of the liquidity ratios.
Table 5.4: Structure of the Liquidity Ratios (1978 system)
Type of Deposit	 Maturity in months (m)	 Percent
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or demand deposits and other deposit liabilities, the liquidity ruiremeats
can be satisfied by the following assets:
(1)	 cash;
(ii) demand deposits with the Central Bank;
(iii) deniand deposits with other banks;
(iv) time deposits with the Central Bank (before 1979);
(v) Central Bank bills with maturity not exceeding 3 months (after 1979).
Liquid assets which may be held against other types of deposits include the
following:
(i) time deposits with other banks with maturity of not more than one month;
(ii) certificates of deposit issued by other banks and payable within one
month;
(iii) treasury bills payable within three months;
(iv) bankers' acceptances issued by other banks and payable within one month.
The system also requires that KD 1iquidassats should not be less than one
third of total liquid assets.
The main objective of the liquidity system is to ensure that banks would not
default in the case of unexpected mass withdrawal of deposits. Thus, liquidity
requirements constitute a constraint on banks' supply of credit and deposits.
Up to June 1980, there was no required reserve ratio which made the system
limited in usefulness as a controlling device. Usually, liquid asset ratios
are used to reinforce the effect of changes in the reserve ratio, because
without the former, commercial banks can offset changes in the latter by
liquidating some of their liquid assets.
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An important amendment to the system was made in June 1980, requiring banks to
hold a minitnuni reserve ratio (3 percent of total deposit liability) in the
form of cash, deposits with the Central Bank and Central Bank bills. The
amendment gave the Central Bank a new tool whereby it could exert some control
over the liquidity of the banking system by adjusting the ratio upwards or
downwards. Moreover, raising the ratio does not drastically affect the
profitability of commercial banks because they can meet the required reserve
ratio by holding interest-bearing Central Bank bills.
The reserve ratio is usually regarded as the most important instrument of
monetary control in LDCs (Coats (1976)). As we have seen, the reserve ratio
has a profound effect on the size of the multiplier and hence the money
supply. ta Kuwait, reserve requirements have not bean used effectively. Since
its introduction in June 1980, the required reserve ratio has not been changed
from the original 3 percent. Moreover, in the absence of developed financial
markets, banks tend to hold large amounts of excess reserves. Therefore,
changes in the required reserve ratio may be absorbed by excess reserves and
thus result in little or no effect on total reserves, especially if the
required reserve ratio is as low as 3 percent (see Moosa (1985a)). Usually,
this instrument works best if commercial banks are fully loaned up which has
not been the case in Kuwait. We have already seen that since the introduction
of reserve requirements, the behaviour of the reserve ratio has been dominated
by changes in excess, rather than required reserves.
5.3.5. Swap Operations
In May 1978, the Central Bank started to execute swap operations with
commercial banks to help thani increase their 10 funds when they faced a
shortage, or alternatively, to absorb surplus 10 funds from the banking system.
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The mechanics of the swap operation is as follows: the Central Bank.
sells/purchases foreign currency (usually dollars) to/from banks against KD at
the prevailing exchange rate, provided that the transaction is reversed after
an agreed period (not exceeding three months) at a rate which, while fixed by
the Central Bank, is sufficiently attractive for connuercial banks to enter
these operations. This exchange rate is usually less than the forward rate as
dictated by the interest rate differential between the dollar and the KD. The
swap system was initially (June-October 1978) used to absorb excessive ID
liquidity. Later, it was used to inject KD funds into the banking system.
5.3.6. Central Bank Bills
In April 1979, the Central Bank started to issue its bills, originally
intended to replace time deposits of commercial banks. The 1980 amendment to
the liquidity system made the bills very attractive as they provided the means
of holding interest-yielding reserves. Central Bank bills are also attractive
to banks because they can be used as a collateral against Central Bank loans.
Interest charged on these loans is a quarter of a percentage point over the
discount rate.
Two types of Central Bank bills are now issued and offered to banks weekly:
one maturing in 28 days and the other in 91 days. In the beginning, interest
paid was 5.25 percent for the 28-day bills and 5.5 percent for the 91-day
bills. These rates ware raised in December 1979 to 5.75 and 6 percent
respectively.
Central Bank bills are eventually intended to be the vehicle upon which open
market operations are conducted, just like Treasury bills in other money
markets. This, however, will not be effective in influencing bank reserves
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because bills are themselves part of the reserves, and there is also no
minimum required cash reserve ratio. Al-Baker (1983) has suggested that the
listing of 10 denominated bonds and other financial instruments on the Kuwait
Stock Exchange would create a multi-instrument market, that will consequently
open new horizons for monetary policy by utilising open market operations.
Open market operations cannot be effective if they are based on Central Bank
bills.
5.3.7. Directives
From time to time the Central Bank issues directives of direct impact on
banks' lending policies. Two of these directives are the following:
(i) Fixing a tnaxliuuin limit for unsecured credit which any bank may give to
any single person at 10 percent of the bank's own equity. This was put
into operation as of July 1976.
(ii) Fixing a naxitnuni limit for the ratio of overdraft to total credit
facilities.
These arrangements were made primarily to curb speculative activity itt the
stock market which was chiefly financed by unsecured credit and overdrafts.
5.3.8. Interest Rate Policy
Interest rate policy may be defined as any official action designed to
influence the level and structure of money rates of interest through statutory
means, money market intervention or moral suasion to attain given ends of
credit policy, and to help in the niobilisation of savings through financial
media (Chandavarkar (1971)). Official actions may take the form of:
(i) statutory ceilings;
(ii) statutory or voluntary interbank agreements on deposit and loan rates;
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(iii) open market operations and bank rate changes;
(iv) subsidisatioa or regulation of specific rates.
Since 1961, the structure of interest rates in Kuwait has experienced more or
lass all of the above-mentioned forms of official action. In December 1969,
banks agreed informally on interest rates payable on deposits and loans within
the 7 percent ceiling set by the Commercial Law in 1961. This agreement
remained operational until late 1976 when the interest rate structure came
under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank. Given this power, the Central Bank
set a new interest rate structure and raised the ceiling to 10 percent.
Interest rate on foreign currency daposits was left-to be determined by market
forces as reflected In the Euromarket. Two more ceilings were set within the
10 percent general ceiling: 7 percent on secured loans with maturity of not
more than one year given to productive sectors, and 8.5 percent on unsecured
loans with maturity of not more than one year. Domestic interest rates on
deposits and loans fluctuate -within the ceiling- in line with international
interest rates, these have constituted source of pressure on the structure,
particularly because there are no restrictions on converting the RD Into other
currencies. To maintain the structure when there is such pressure, the Central
Bank reacts by injecting liquidity into the system through discounts, swaps
and direct lending.
Interest rate policy in Kuwait is concerned primarily with the role of
interest rate as a loan rate, i.e. the means of regulating the cost and
availability of credit as well as its sactoral distribution. However, it
overlooks other aspects or functions of interest rate, namely:
(I) to act as the instrument for more affective mobilisation of savings (i.e.
as deposit rates) through the offering of realistic rates on savings,
i.e. on saving and time deposits;
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(ii) to act as a social rate of discount to determine the optiniuin allocation
of savings between consumption and investment.
Moreover, interest rate policy in Kuwait has also failed in diverting
resources to productive sectors via the imposition of a lower ceiling on
interest paid on credit granted to these sectors, thus reducing the overall
cost of credit. In the period between 1977 -when the present interest rate
structure was established- and 1982, the percentage of bank credit going to
the agricultural and construction sectors declined from 1.9 and 18.9 percent
to 1.1 and 17.3 percent respectively; whereas that going to the industrial
sector increased only marginally (from 4.6 to 5 percent). These changes were
the outcome of both supply and demand factors. The then availability of
"astronomical" rates of return on investment in the domestic stock market
strongly discouraged investment in productive sectors, and prohibited higher
demand for and supply of credit to those sectors.
An optimum interest rate policy should serve to reconcile the conflicting
requirements of rates that are appropriate to the desired level, composition
of investment and, at the same time, attractive enough to stimulate savings.
This triggers an important question regarding the optimum level of interest
rates. Chandavarkar (1971) has suggested two criteria in this respect:
(i) Interest rate or rate of return in other sectors of the same economy. In
the case of Kuwait, the alternative to investing in the money market is
the stock or real estate market. Rates of return in these two markets
have historically been extremely high (particularly 1978-82), and
especially in the case of the stock market where, at one time, an annual
rate of return of 400 percent was not uncommon. After the collapse of the
parallel stock market in 1982, rates of return reversed in a negative
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direction. In general, rates of return in the real estate and stock
markets could not have been used as a viable criterion for the
appropriate level of interest rates in Kuwait, because they have bean
extremely volatile, reflecting an element of monopoly profit and high
risk. Another non-economic reason is that high interest rates are
regarded as usurious, this makes them unacceptable for religious reasons.
(ii) Interest rates in developed foreign money markets. This is more
appropriate for Kuwait because it has an open economy with freedom of
movement of capital.
Interest rate policy in Kuwait views interest rate as the cost of investment.
Therefore, if real investment is to be encouraged, then interest rate must be
kept low. This, in essence, is the core of the argument put forward by Raj
(1948), but described by Coats and Khatkhate (1980) as self-defeating. They
argue that a policy that aims at lowering Interest rates with the associated
increase in the money supply will eventually trigger inflationiry pressures,
this -in the course of time- will raise nominal interest rates economy-wide.
Ainuzegar (1983) has criticised low-interest-rate policias on the grounds that
they are likely to have only limited success in promoting investment, partly
because a precondition for success is the interest elasticity of real
investment. He goes on to say that in any case it is difficult to discriminate
between desired and undesired projects from th development point of view.
Ainuzegar also argues that a further disadvantage of low interest rates is
that, regardless of capital mobility, investment may be unduly constrained by
the limited availability of savings, and the allocation of investibla funds
may be suboptimal. The failure of interest rate policy in Kuwait has, more or
less, been due to such a policy of cheap money fuelling speculation in the
stock market and raising nominal yields, thus diverting resources away from
productive sectors into speculative activity.
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5.3.9. Exchange Rate Policy
There are three alternative systems of exchange rates that a developing (or
any country) may adopt: (i) pegging to a single currency, (ii) pegging to a
basket of currencies and (iii) free floating.
Since Kuwait started issuing its own national currency, It has adopted (I) and
(ii) above, both of which constitute a system of fixed exchange rates. Such
systems were adopted in order to accomplish the Central Bank's stated
objective of securing the stability of the LCD, and its free convertibility
into other currencies. The accomplishment of this objective was not much of a
problem under the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates and its
amendments under the Smithsonian Agreement. But the collapse of the Bretton
Woods System and the floating of major currencies made the task more difficult
for the Central Bank of Kuwait, which was from then on required to intervene
more actively by buying and selling currencies to secure the stability of the
KD exchange rate.
As has been said before, a system of fixed exchange rates makes the
simultaneous achievement of maintaining the exchange rate and controlling the
money supply impossible in the long run, as the position of external balance
will altar the monetary base, and hence the money supply, until the exchange
rate is abandoned or the money supply Is made compatible with prevailing
rates. Therefore, the major drawback of fixed exchange rates is that the
central bank's ability to neutralise external influence on the money supply is
limited by its capacity to lose foreign reserves, or willingness to accumulate
them.
Because of the above—mentioned reason, a system of genuinely fixed rates in a
world of general floating is not possible, and Kuwait, like most LDCs,
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resorted to pegging. Prior to March 1975 -when the present system was
introduced- Kuwait pegged its currency to sterling as did the rest of the
sterling area. Following the floating of starling and the abolition of the
sterling area, the KD was pegged to the dollar until March 17th 1975.
Pegging to a single currency means that the value of local currency will
change vis-a-vis the rest of the world with changes in the value of the
currency to which it is pegged. The consequence of adopting such a system is
that the domestic economy will be subject to undesired, and largely
unpredictable, inflationary and deflationary impulses transmitted through the
foreign sector. Al-Sabah (1982) discredits the system of pegging the KB to one
currency on the grounds that it imposes fluctuations in xchange rates
(vis-a-vis other currencies) that are not justifiable by dothestic economic
developments. The system is also not desirable for Kuwait from the regional
point of view, unless all countries in the Gulf area -which have always aimed
at promoting trade and economic co-operation amongst themselves- peg to the
same currency. Otherwise, exchange rates between their currencies will be
subject to variations which will be an obstacle to promoting intra-regional
trade. In general, pegging to a single currency creates preference for
bilateral trade, forgoes the benefits of multilateral trade, and causes a less
than full exploitation of comparative advantages (International Monetary Fund
(1984a)).
In order to limit the problems associated with pegging to a single currency,
some countries opt to peg to a weighted basket of currencies that takes into
account the geographical distribution of trade. Whereas pegging to a single
currency aims at stabilising the exchange rate against the currency of the
major trading partner, pegging to a weighted basket of currencies aims at
stabilising the effective exchange rate. Theoretically, it is possible to
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offset the impact of exchange rate changes on the balance of payments
position, if it were possible to arrive at the "ideal" effective exchange rate
that truly reflects trading relationships. Crockett and Nsouli (1977) argue
that an import-weighted index of the exchange rate is the best approximation
for effective exchange rates of developing countries. Other alternatives are
the export-weighted index and the bilateral trade index, the latter is the
average of import-weighted and export-weighted indices.
Since March 1975, Kuwait has adopted an exchange rate policy whereby the 1(13 is
pegged to a basket of currencies whose components are not publicly known. This
secrecy is thought to be important to create some sort of uncertainty that
would curb speculative tendencies of foreign exchange dealers. Using this
system, the Central Bank fixes the KD exchange rates daily against the U.S.
dollar and other major currencies, on the basis of the most up-to-date data
available in the market on the exchange rates of those currencies concerned.
The exchange rates announced by the Central Bank are the basis for calculating
interbank exchange rates. There are two more rates: the "over-the-counter
rate" quoted by banks for the average customer, and the "corporate rate"
quoted for corporate and "big" customers.
Observation of the movement of exchange rates of the KD against major
currencies over a long period, following the establishment of the new system,
shows that the 10/dollar exchange rate is significantly more stable than
either the exchange rates of major currencies against the dollar or th 1(13
exchange rates against major currencies. Figure 5.7 clearly shows that the
KD/dollar rate is more stable than the lCD and the dollar rates against a
basket of currencies. Table 5.5 shows the year-on-year changes in exchange
rates of the 1(13 and four major currencies against the dollar, as well as the

Figure 5.7
Movement of the KD and Dollar Exchange Rates (1977-1983)
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(iii) A 10 percent appreciation of the KID against other currencies is
associated with a 2.4 percent depreciation of the KD against the dollar.
These results darnoiastrata that the dollar accounts for over three quarters of
the basket to which the KD is pegged, implying that when the dollar
appreciates (or depreciates) against other currencies, it also appreciates (or
depreciates) against the KID, though less than proportionately. This finding
contradicts Jebara's (1983) prediction in early 1983 that the KID would
depreciate against the dollar and other major currencies, implying that the KID
can move in the same direction against the dollar and other currencies. This
view was disputed by the author (Moosa (l983d)) on the grounds that it was
neither substantiated by theoretical reasoning nor supported by empirical
evidence. Subsequent events proved Jebara's predictions totally wrong as the
KID depreciated against the dollar by 0.3 percent but appreciated against
sterling, German mark and Swiss franc by 11.4, 9.7 and 2.4 percent
respectively, year-on-year.
The ensuing evidence shows that the current exchange rate policy of Kuwait
does not aim at controlling the effective exchange rate by pegging the KD to
either an import-weighted, export-weighted, or a bilateral basket. It rather
gives a very heavy weight to the dollar, perhaps because the bulk of Kuwait's
foreign exchange earnings come from oil sales which are paid for in dollar,
and from investment in dollar-denominated financial assets. This system,
therefore, is different in its consequences from a system of pegging to the
dollar -which was abandoned in the first place- only to the small extent of
the weights of other currencies in the basket. It also provides the stability
of the KID/dollar rate which reduces foreign exchange risk and thus encourages
capital outflows to take advantage of any interest rate differential between
the KID and the dollar, consequently placing pressure on domestic liquidity.
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The third alternative of floating has not yet been tried. A1-Sabah (1982)
argues against this system for Kuwait on the grounds that the success -or
otherwise- of floating requires an active international market for the
currency concerned. Moreover, a study by the International Monetary Fund
(1984b) has shown that although under floating rates countries have had more
control over the money supply than under fixed rates, the' difference is
somewhat less marked than early supporters of floating rates had anticipated
(see also Mussa (1981) and Emminger (1982) for a discussion of this issue). It
is also felt that such a system is not appropriate for a developing country
because it creates some problems for domestic economic policy.
If the KB ware floated, it would eventually appreciate rapidly against the
dollar and najor currencies as governed by such fundamentals as balance of
payments position and inflation differentials. A.l-akib (1980) argues that for
a capital surplus country such as Kuwait, with considerable financial
resources relative to its size and a continued current account surplus,
appreciation of its currency is not a problem. However, he argues that
appreciation which results from floating of the KB is not desirable for the
following reasons:
(i) At any given price and production of oil, any appreciation of the RD
against the dollar will increase the ratio of government expenditure to
revenue which is politically, and socially, unacceptable in a country
that aims -or should aim- at maintaining an adequate governmental saving
ratio, in view of its extreme dependence on a depletable asset.
(ii) Appreciation of the KB results in income distribution which will not
reach different groups of beneficiaries in the proportions desired.
(iii)It may be at odds with the objective of creating and developing
industrial or service sectors that can earn foreign exchange at some
stage in the future.
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shortages in the banking system, making banks unable to satisfy the demand for
credit (see Moosa (1985b)).
Three factors are responsible for capital outflows:
(i) Interest rate policy of imposing a ceiling on 10 loan and deposit rates,
thus creating a positive differential in favour of the dollar.
(ii) Exchange rate policy that results in the stability of the KD/dollar rate
and, therefore, the minimisation of foreign exchange risk which would
otherwise deter capital outflows.
(iii) The absence of any restrictions on foreign exchange transactions or
capital transfers.
The Central Bank has created the right environment for capital outflows which
usually accelerate in times of depressed domestic economic activity and
political or military upheaval in the region, e.g. the Gulf War. On the other
hand, the Central Bank has persistently tried to rectify the situation by
injecting 10 funds into the banking system via loans, swaps and discounts.
Indeed, this, rather than monetary control, has been the prime objective of
monetary policy in the past few years.
The net position of conitnercial banks with the Central Bank is a good measure
of the liquidity situation. The term "net position" pertains to changes in the
flow of funds between the Central Bank and commercial banks. It is calculated
as the difference between claims of banks on the Central Bank and claims of
the Central Bank on banks, i.e.
Net Position Claims of banks on Central Bank
- Claims of Central Bank on banks
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where
Claims of banks on Central Bank Deposits with Central Bank
+ Central Bank bills.
and
Claims of Central Bank on banks = Swaps
+ Discounts
^ Loans against bills
Net position can be positive or negative; a negative value implies net
injection of KD funds into the banking system, whereas a positive value
implies net absorption. Table 5.6 shows that in the period 1978-82, net
position changed from positive to negative and to positive again (sea also
Figure 5.8). In 1978 the effort of the Central Bank was concentrated on
absorbing excess KD liquidity. In the subsequent three years, the banking
system was suffering from a shortage of KD liquidity. In 1982 the situation
was reversed again.
Table 5.6: Net Position of Commercial Banks with the Central Bank (KD million)
Claims on Central Bank	 Claims on banks	 Net Position
Deposits	 Bills Total	 Swaps Discounts Loans
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
130.4
136.2
129.5
208.4
244.2
13.5
108.0
167.4
488.0
130.4
149.7
237.5
375.8
732.2
-0.5
204.4
301.3
166.6
42.8
30.6
195.3
298.6
282.4
276.7
--	 100.4
--	 -250.0
--	 -362.4
--	 -73.2
--	 412.7
Figure 5.8
Net Position of Commercial Banks with the Central Bank
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Several solutions have been suggested to overcome the recurring liquidity
shortage, but none has been formally adopted. The following are the most
important:
(i) Abolition of the rigid interest rate structure to make domestic rates
competitive with foreign rates. This was felt to be inappropriate
because high rates could retard real domestic investment besides, high
interest rates are looked upon as usurious, and thus unacceptable for
religious reasons. However, this argument is riot valid because high
interest rates already exist despite the interest rate ceiling. Banks,
for example, can circumvent the 10 percent ceiling on interest charged
on loans to the private sector by- charging extras in the form of
commissions and administrative fees. Another way of avoiding the ceiling
-often adopted by hire purchase companies on consumer credit- is
charging interest against the full amount of credit, not against the
remaining balance as the loan is amortized. Yet another method is
deducting the full amount of interest payment in advance. For example,
if a bank agrees to grant a client a loan of KD 1000 to be repaid in
full one year later with interest of 10 percent per annum, the client
will only receive KD 900 after deducting KD 100 for interest payments.
In this case the effective interest rate is 11.1 not 10 percent. So,
usurious and above-ceiling interest rates already exist.
(ii) Exchange controls have also been suggested but are unacceptable in
a country where economic freedom is the prevailing doctrine. They are
also believed to involve some constitutional violations as article 2 of
the Central Bank Law states that the Central Bank should ensure the KD's
free convertibility. Furthermore, exchange controls could undermine the
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status quo of the financial syàtein and its future prospects. However, if
"full" exchange controls are not desirable for these reasons, "partial"
or "selective" exchange controls may be more appropriate. Indeed, the
Central Bank of Kuwait resorted to such measures in April 1984 to curb
excessive and speculative dollar purchases (see Muehring (1985)).
(iii) The third suggested solution is that if capital outflows are
inevitable, then credit rationing must be introduced. This again is
felt undesirable because of its possible long-term effect on real
investment, and thus, economic development. But it is true that the
credit policy of coiniuercial banks has not been conducive to economic
development as much as it..has fuelled speculation and generated
Inflationary pressures. So, some sort of credit rationing, or to be more
precise, selective credit controls may be desirable even if liquidity is
available, as they may be important from the view point of monetary
control.
(iv) Another solution, which has not yet bean formally suggested but mentioned
earlier here, is the introduction of foreign exchange risk that will
deter operations of interest rate arbitrage and cut back capital
outflows. The risk can be introduced, by abandoning the current exchange
rate policy and adopting, instead, a policy of pegging the KD to an
Import-weighted basket of currencies that reflects its underlying
effective exchange rate. Such a policy will also make the KD relatively
stable against the currencies of its trading partners, rather than being
highly stable against the dollar and highly volatile against other
currencies.
Cv) The final solution can be so affective that if it Is applied in its
extreme form,the interest-rate-arbitrage motive for capital outflows
will completely vanish. The extreme form of this measure is imposing a
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100 percent tax on the interest rate differential. Although "tax" is
traditionally a very unpopular word in Kuwait, recent years have
witnessed some tendency to impose taxes, if not for the purpose of
boosting government revenue, then for the purpose of rationalising
consumption of free arid subsidised services and preventing waste of
resources. Perhaps a capital-gains tax on investment in foreign assets
will be just as effective.
5.5. Policy Evaluation and Alternatives
Monetary policy of the Central Bank of Kuwait has failed, particularly as a
short-run stabilisation tool. Its main contributions or achievements have been
two: fostering the development of financial markets and institutions, and
providing KD liquidity to the banking system in times of shortage. The latter
ironically results from the policy itself or, more specifically, from the
combination of interest rate and exchange rate policies. It also failed in
diverting resources to the productive sectors in a manner conducive to
economic development.
The policy's prime or most-significant failure has bean in short-run
stabilisatfon via the control of the money supply. The outcome of this failure
has bean the emergence of inflationary pressures, mounting speculative
activity in the stock and real estate markets, the collapse of the sTtock
market on two occasions (1977 and 1982), and the recession of the 1980 g . There
are three important reasons for the failure of monetary policy in this respect:
(i) Lack of understanding of the relationship between the monetary base and
money supply, in particular the stability of the multiplier and the
behaviour of currency and reserve ratios. This is an issue that was
considered earlier, but further in-depth studies are required especially
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when longer time-series are available. A modal is required to predict
the value of the multiplier via its behavioural ratios along the lines
suggested in this study and by Khatkhate et al (1974).
(ii) Inadequacy and misuse of some policy tools, in particular the discount
rate, required reserve ratio and Central Bank bills.
(iii) The cocmuitment of the Central Bank to the monetary accommodation of
fiscal expansion. This means that the monetary base can only be
influenced through the combined action of the government (Ministry of
Finance) and the Central Bank. This point is crucial, because it means
that for the purpose of short-run monetary control, monetary policy
cannot be viewed in isolation from fiscal policy. Its significance is
augmented by the fact that the government has limited flexibility in
determining domestic expenditure. Some components of expenditure tend to
increase over time (e.g. wages), whereas discretionary components are
influenced by political and social considerations. This means that
freedom of action in stabilisation policy constrained by long-term
development objectives (Ghulouni (1984)).
An important question arises in this context: how does government expenditure
affect the money supply? The answer is that it affects both the domestic and
foreign components of the monetary base. Government expenditure financed by
the exchange of foreign currency for local currency leads immediately to a
rise in foreign assets and government deposits, and since these influence the
monetary base in opposite directions, the immediate effect is negligible. As
funds are spent, government deposits decline and the base rises, leading to an
increase in the money supply. Similarly, imports and capital transfers lead to
increased purchases of foreign currency from the Central Bank and, thus,
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reduce its foreign assets and consequently the monetary base. This is how the
multiplier approach to the determination of the money supply is compatible
with the identity frequently used by the Central Bank, showing that a change
in the money supply is equal to the sum of net govanment domestic
expenditure, net private sector's transactions with the outside world, change
in claims on the private sector and change in the equity position of the
banking system (see Chapter 3).
Apart from discounts, the control of the monetary base requires the control of
foreign assets or government deposits in the Central Bank's balance sheet.
Given that the accumulation of foreign assets by the Central Bank is
inevitable, because the bulk of government domestic expenditure is financed by
oil revenue, the monetary base can be controlled by encouraging or
discouraging the private sector to hold foreign assets. Foreign asset
acquisition by the private sector requires that the private sector exchanges
local currency for foreign currency at the Central Bank, thus reducing Central
Bank's foreign assets and, therefore, the monetary base. Disposition of
foreign assets by the private sector has the opposite effect.
Keran and Al-Malik (1979) do not consider the manipulation of the private
sector's holding of foreign assets a "fine tuning" technique of controlling
the monetary base, because it requires the voluntary co-operation of the
private sector on a continuing basis. However, they argue that the control of
government deposits can be fine-tuned in a way analogous to open-market
operations in the U.S., because the government can unilaterally determine the
level of its deposits at the Central Bank. One approach to control government
deposits is to reduce the "domestic deficit" by a combination of lower
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domestic expenditure and higher domestic revenue, although neither would be
popular in a tax-free welfare state like Kuwait. Another approach involves
partial financing of domestic expenditure by borrowing from the public through
the issuance of government securities. Such a measure will have the additional
advantage of creating a new market instrument which can be used as a vehicle
f or conducting open market operations. Ghuloum (1984) argues that government
securities are superior in this respect to the already-existing Central Bank
bills, in that they can be held and traded by a wider sector of the economy,
unlike Central Bank bills which can only be acquired by financial institutions.
Kuwait's monetary policy also lacks effectiveness in the field of credit
control. The Central Bank of Kuwait has traditionally aimed at enhancing
commercial banks' ability to grant credit by extending loans and discounts or
the belief that a policy of cheap money is conducive to economic development.
But as inflationary pressures intensif led and speculative activity mounted,
the Central Bank decided to fix a maximum limit for unsecured credit and for
the ratio of overdraft to total credit facilities.
Not many people would dispute the proposition that credit policy of Kuwaiti
commercial banks has contributed to excessive mouetar,r growth and monetary
contraction, because it is the extension of bank credit that generates the
multiple expansion of bank deposits. Neither would many disagree with the fact
that the sectoral distribution of bank credit has not been appropriate front
the normative point of view as warranted by economic development. In order to•
rectify the situation, some measures of credit control are required to prevent
the Qccurrence of excessive monetary growth, provided that they do not inhibit
economic development. Such measures may include a general credit ceiling and
selective credit controls.
- 212 -
A general credit ceiling -which in effect is putting direct limits on
commercial banks' credit or its rate of growth- forces banks to hold, as idle
reserves, any deposit inf lows that would otherwise be used to finance credit
beyond the ceiling. As such, the ceiling would be similar in effect to a 100
percent marginal reserve requirement. However, a general credit ceiling may be
criticised on the grounds that it tends to be too blunt, or that it fails to
discriminate between a "good" and a "bad credit. In this case, selective
credit controls are more appropriate. Indeed, selective credit controls have
bean used to supplement credit ceilings in many LDCs.
The case for selective credit controls -which in my view is absolutely valid
for Kuwait- is that the process of financial intermediation does not, by
itself, ensure the socially optimum use of resources. This is due to the
divergence (with respect to loans granted to various sectors) between private
profitability (of commercial banks) and social profitability. Fostering
economic development and achieving diversification of sources of income
requires considerable investment in productive sectors. However, banks and
financial institutions in general usually undertake investment of this sort
only to a limited extent, because the short-run profitability is small owing
to high costs of production, among other factors. Patal (1954) argues that
there is an institutional bias in LDCs in favour of investment in construction
and trade vis-a--vis more productive sectors like industry and agriculture, and
that is why credit policy should be selective in the sense of providing
specific encouragement or discouragement to certain types of investment and
expenditure. Johnson (1974) suggests that one of the reasons why private
profitability of loans to productive sectors differs from social profitability
is the underestimation by commercial banks of the "true" credit worthiness of
the particular user of funds, or the overestimation of the "true" risk
associated with extending loans to those sectors.
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Khatkhate and Villanuava (1978) advocate the use of selective credit controls
in developing countries because, as they put it, economic development means
not a marginal but a total change in economic relationships. They argue that
the relative neglect of selective policies may be justifiable in developed
countries which are mainly concerned with the stability of growth and control
of inflation, but in developing countries, selective policies should
constitute an integral part of the overall economic strategy for development
and diversification of the economic base.
Selective credit controls are also viewed as an adjunct to a wall-balanced
development plan in which planned investment is reconciled with planned
savings. Financial planning requires that real resource requirement of planned
investment must be consistent with the financial flows by which claims on
resources are transferred (Bhatt (1971)). It follows that for attaining given
investment plans, it is necessary for the authorities to use measures to halo
match savings flows with the demand for credit by investors, or else
imbalances will develop in the economy.
Selective credit controls have been subject to some criticism. Firstly Patel
(1954) points out that if investment priorities are not in conformity with the
lending policy of commercial banks, but in conformity with the investment
preference of borrowers, it is sufficient to control banks and this is a
comparatively easy task. But if selective credit controls are intended to
modify the investment decisions of borrowers, as well as to alter the landing
policy of banks, it becomes necessary to check on the actual use made of bank
credit. Patel argues that more often than not, the bias In favour of
"undesirable" investment is on the part of borrowers as wall as lenders and
this situation requires something more than selective credit controls. Silber
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(1973) argues along these lines by stating that it is necessary to know where
the selective credit controls are applied, i.e. on lenders, borrowers, or
credit instruments as the conditions governing effectiveness vary according to
where the controls are imposed.
Secondly, classification of bank loans is bound to be, to some extent,
arbitrary. A loan for conjinercial purposes, for example, cannot be
distinguished easily from a loan to industry for raw material requirements.
Therefore, the monetary authorities would have the burdensome administrative
task of deciding whether particular loans conform to the official
classification.
Thirdly, a large part of total real investment in any economy Is self-financed
or financed through the capital market or through private borrowing. These
would 'be untouched by efforts to modify the pattern of bank credit. Therefore,
the possibility of substitution between bank borrowing and other modes of
finance could reduce the significance of any selective controls over banks.
It seems that these criticisms are trivial in comparison with what selective
credit controls can achieve. So, the next issue concerns their implementation.
In general, selectivity can be introduced in credit policy in four ways: (i)
moral suasion; (ii) directives as regards amounts, interest, maturities,
collateral, ... etc.; (iii) indirectly through inducements to the banking
system in terms of cost and availability of liquid funds, i.e. through the
discount system; and (iv) through reserve requirements.
Selective credit controls may work through the discount mechanism as follows.
The Central Bank may charge preferential rates in discounting or radiscounting
papers originating in certain sectors, to provide an added incentive for
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commercial banks to increase lending or at least to reduce the cost of funds
to these sectors. From time to time, it may also alter, in a discretionary
manner, the list of eligible types of papers in order to push credit into the
desired sectors.
Selective credit controls may also operate through differential reserve
requirements depending on the composition of commercial banks' portfolios.
Banks whose portfolios conform to the requirements of certain prescribed
percentages of loans to the "high-priority" sector, are allowed to maintain
lower cash or liquidity ratios than that required to be maintained by other
banks. Alternatively, very high reserve ratios are imposed and banks are given
the choice between keeping these reserves idle or investing them in certain
assets or sectors. Furthermore, if required reserves are related to deposits,
some preferred assets may simply be deducted before calculating the required
reserves. If, on the other hand, required reserves are related to assets, then
different requirements may be set for different assets.
Another means of directing credit to "high-priority sectors involves the
setting up of specialised credit institutions. Almost all developing countries
have, in recent years, set up specialised institutions to meet the special
needs of agriculture or new industries. Kuwait is no exception as three
specialised banks have been formed to provide loans to finance industry, real
estate, and housing. This, in itself, is indicative of the fact that the
credit needs of the community have not been met adequately by commercial
banks. The government can, in fact, impose its own pattern on credit by
centralising much of the credit activity in official or semi-official
agencies. Alternatively, the government can direct credit policy of commercial
banks through its membership of the boards of directors. The Kuwaiti
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government, or more precisely the Ministry of Finance, is now a major
shareholder of commercial banks following open-market purchases of local
shares which were primarily conducted to support the stock market in the
aftermath of the 1977 and 1982 crises. Representation of the Ministry of
Finance on banks' boards of directors, therefore, is not a problem. This is
another example of how the Ministry of Finance can enhance the effectiveness
of monetary policy in Kuwait.
Finally, the traditional fears of commercial banks concerning medium-term or
long-term loans to productive sectors can be allayed by appropriate government
guarantees, discount facilities, or through joint loans by commercial banks
and state-managed development finance institutions.
In conclusion, selective credit controls are important in the case of Kuwait
in order to accomplish the objective of diversifying the economic structure,
thus ensuring that bank credit is used in accordance with a certain order of
priorities. They are also important in periods of inflation since these are
usually characterised by excessive investment in unproductive luxury
construction, for example. Of course, it would be better to deal with
inflation directly than trying to cure some of its symptoms by selective
credit controls.
So much for selective credit controls, what other specific policy tools can be
potentially effective in Kuwait? Two measures automotically come to the fore:
(i) The Central Bank should be empowered to specify the margin requirement in
transactions involving the sale and purchase of shares. This means that
the Central Bank should be able to fix the minimum percentage down
payment which purchasers of shares must make. The requirement should be
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raised when it s desirable to restrict speculative buying, and lowered
to revive sluggish markets. This measure is particularly important in
Kuwait because speculative activity in the stock market has always
precipitated economic difficulties.
(ii) The Central Bank should be given the power to act in the field of
consumer credit control. A typical measure of consumer credit control is
the introduction of special non-interest bearing deposits as percentage
of any increase in the total amount of credit.
5.6. Discretionary Policy Versus Monetary Rule
The issue of discretion versus rules in conducting monetary policy has bean
the subject matter of an old debate with frequent appearance in the economic
literature. Many economists have suggested theoretical pros and cons of
monetary rules, the following are examples:
Tco extreme views have bean put forward by Sayers (1957), and by Sargent and
Wallace (1975). Sayers argues that the essence of central banking is
discretionary control of the monetary system and working to rule is the
antithesis of central banking. Conversely, Sargent and Wallace proclaim that
"there Is no longer any serious doubt about whether monetary policy should be
conducted according to rules or discretion. Quite appropriately, it is widely
agreed that monetary policy should obey a rule."
Generally speaking, economists who advocate the use of monetary rules base
their argument on the assumption that there are long and unpredictable lags
between the recognition of the need for changing monetary policy, implementing
the change and its ultimate effect on the economy. Coats (1980) argues that
the difficulties arising from these lags are more serious in LDCs than in
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developed countries because in the former economic data are less plentiful,
less accurate and less quickly available. Two more problems in LDCs are cited
by Coats. Firstly, the shortage of highly trained and sophisticated monetary
analysts who can accurately diagnose the prevailing economic situation In
order to move monetary policy in the right direction; any mistake in the
diagnosis will result in actions that are more disruptive than stabilislng.
Secondly, the lack of independence of the Central Bank limits its ability to
take effective discretionary measures.
Bryant (1980) lists the following reasons for the desirability of monetary
rule:
(i) Existing knowledge about macroeconomic behavioural relationships and
about the Impact of policy actions is so meagre that discrationary
decisions are likely to do as much harm as good.
(ii) Announced policy rules may be more conducive to stable and desirable
private-sector behaviour.
(iii) In a democratic society, government officials are exposed to
irresistable political pressure to pursue incorrect policies. Thus,
discretion tends to generate deficient macroeconomic policies.
(iv) Rules reduce the likelihood of human mistakes.
Friedman (1960) has proposed the use of a constant money growth rule whereby
the money supply is allowed to grow at a constant rate year after year with no
attempt to offset cyclical movements in velocity. He advocates the use of such
a rule on the grounds that counter-cyclical measures or "fine-tunIng' s is at
best ineffective and at worst destabilising, and that the demand for money is
sufficiently stable to make such efforts unnecessary. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963a),(l963b) point out that erratic gyrations in the money supply have bean
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the dominant factor in major business contractions and inflation, and that a
constant growth rule would provide protection against such gyrations.
Critics of the simple rule base their view on the technical and political
ability of central bankers to deal with the types of problems cited by
Friedman. Sayers (1957) argues that the proclaimed inherent weaknesses in
central banking can, at any rate in most countries, be kept within. iianageable
bounds. The same view is expressed more forcefully for the United States in
Lamar's (1962) review of Friedman's "Program for Monetary Stability." Lamar
points Out that of the 23 cases of policy errors listed by Friedman, there are
only three cases where the mistake is one that might be repeated and even that
does not seem too likely. Coats (1980) argues that this view is discredited by
the turbulent 1970g.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for the use of a constant growth rule in
developing countries is the tendency of the governments to monetise the budget
deficit, i.e. to finance domestic expenditure by borrowing from the central
bank. The adoption of such a rule thwarts the ability of goverrinients to borrow
from central banks, and would force adjustment in government expenditure when
borrowing from the private sector or abroad is not possible, or desirable.
Since financing government expenditure by selling foreign currency to the
central bank, as in the case of Kuwait, produces a similar outcome, the
adoption of such a rule could be beneficial for Kuwait in the short run.
Ghuloum (1984) has suggested a constant growth rule for government expenditure
on. the grounds that it would impose discipline to prevent and avoid the
monetary axplosions that Kuwait experienced since the mld-70s. In the long
run, a rule of constant monetary growth is not possible for Kuwait because
with an exchange rate system of managed floating, domestic money supply is
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determined by the balance of pay-inents position. Coats (1980) has suggested
that a country choosing to fix its exchange rate vis-a--vis a basket of
currencies, must pick a rule that is compatible with that fixed rate. This
rule must allow or facilitate the adjustment of domestic . prices to world
prices in order to achieve international payments equilibrium.
We cannot reach a clear-cut conclusion on the efficacy, or otherwise, of a
monetary rule for Kuwait without further empirical research on all issues
pertaining to the rules versus discration controversy.
APPENDIX 5.1
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE 1978 LIQUIDITY SYSTEM
ITEM 1
Banks subject to the liquidity regulations shall maintain adequate liquid
assets to enable them to meet their short-term commitments.
ITEM 2
The amount of liquid assets held shall not, at any time, be less than the
equivalent of the total product of multiplication of the creditor deposits by
specific percentages as defined hereinafter. For liquidity purposes, creditor
deposits shall be divided into five categories against which banks shall
maintain liquid assets not less than the following ratios:
1. 35 percent of sight deposits and other deposit liabilities.
2. 30 percent of saving deposits and time deposits, the maturity of which is
within one month from the date of computation of liquidity.
3. 20 percent of time deposits, the maturity of which is more than one month
but does not exceed three months from the date of computation of
liquidity.
4. 10 percent of time deposits, the maturity of which is more than three
months but does not exceed six months from the date of computation of
liquidity.
5. 5 percent of time deposits, the maturity of which is more than six months
but does not exceed one year from the date of computation of liquidity.
ITEM3
The provisions of Item (2) with respect to time deposits shall apply also to
certificates of deposit issued by banks subject to liquidity regulations.
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ITEM 4
The minimum requirement of liquid assets held against category (1) deposits
shall be maintained in the form of one or more of the following assets:
1. Liquid assets in the form of cash and cash items.
2. Balances of sight (demand)deposits with the Central Bank of Kuwait.
3. Balances of current and sight deposits with other banks.
4. Balances of time deposits with the Central Bank of Kuwait.
5. Kuwaiti Dinar bills issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait for a maturity
not exceeding 3 months.
6. Other assets which the Central Bank may define from time to time as
liquid assets under this group of assets.
ITEM 5
Liquid assets held against the other four categories of creditor deposits may
be maintained in any form of liquid assets specified in Item (4) or in the
form of one or more of the following assets:
1. Balances of time deposits with other banks, provided that they are
payable within one month from the date of computation of liquidity.
2. Certificates of deposit issued by other banks, provided that they are
payable within one month from the date of computation of liquidity.
3. Treasury bills, provided that they are payable within three months from
the date of computation of liquidity.
4. Bankers acceptances issued by other banks provided that they are payable
within one month from the date of computation of liquidity.
5. Other assets which the Central Bank may define from time to time as
liquid assets under this group of assets.
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ITEM 6
Liquid assets in Kuwaiti Dinar shall not be less than one third of the total
liquid assets required to be held under Item (2) of these regulations.
Liquid assets in Kuwaiti Dinar, which represent sight and upto 1 month time
deposits with banks, shall be maintained with banks operating in Kuwait.
ITEM 7
Balances of current accounts, sight deposits and time deposits maintained with
other banks, as well as certificates of deposit and bankers acceptances issued
by other banks, shall not be considered among liquid assets unless they
represent genuine claims on other banks and should not be contestable.
ITEM 8
In the event banks subject to these regulations borrow from the Central Bank
of Kuwait against their time deposits with it,or against Kuwaiti Dinar Bills
issued by it, only the net balance of time deposits with the Central Bank and
the net balance of the Kuwaiti Dinar bills issued by it, (e.g. after deduction
of the amounts borrowed), shall be counted as part of the liquid assets held
against category 1 of deposits.
ITEM 9
Central Bank deposits with and loans extended to the banks subject to these
regulations shall be exempt from liquidity requirements.
ITEM 10
Re-investment transactions may be exempt from liquidity requirements, if the
banks so desire. Re-investment transactions are meant to be time deposits
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re-invested with one or more other banks.
Time deposit acquired, and time deposit or deposits re-invested shall be
identical in so far as the total amount, date of maturity and currency are
concerned.
If re-investment transactions are in Kuwaiti Dinar, exemption from liquidity
requirements shall prevail only where the acquired deposit is re-invested in
the form of deposits with one or more local banks.
In the event the deposit required is re-invested in a currency other than that
of the acquired deposit, the bank concerned shall enter into a forward.
arrangement for the purpose of obtaining the currency of the acquired daposit
on maturity.
If the acquired deposit is re-invested In part, the provision of re-investment
transactions shall apply to the part re-invested provided that the
requiranients set in the preceding paragraphs are satisfied.
ITEM 11
Liquidity shall be computed twice per month, i.e. on the fifteenth and on the
last day of the month. The form prepared for the purpose should be submitted
to the Central Bank of Kuwait within a period not exceeding five days from the
date the liquidity is calculated.
ITEM 12
When liquidity is computed in the middle of the mouth, banks may calculate
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the maturities of the creditor deposits classified in Item (2) on the basis
that the time unit is the month and not the day.
ITEM 13
The terms "sight deposits", 'other deposit liabilities", 'savin deposits",
"cash and cash items" and "banks", as well as other terms mentioned in these
regulations, should be understood in the light of regulations and instructions
issued by the Central Bank with respect to the financial position of banks.
CHAPTER 6
A QUARTERLY ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF KUWAIT'S MONETARY SECTOR
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter a model of Kuwait's monetary sector is developed and estimated
econometrically in order to provide an analytical framework for studying the
behaviour of key monetary variables. The model will enable us to quantify the
relationship between money, income and prices in a macroeconomic context.
Econometric modelling of LDCs has become a common practice. Park (1973) points
out that meaningful monetary analyses in LDCs require a structural model
complete with a financial sector in the spirit of the Keynesian
income/expenditure theory. However, a straightforward application of models
originally built for developed countries to LDCs is not appropriate due to
structural and institutional differences. Such differences can also be found
amongst LDCs, for example: a major source of the monetary base in most LDCs is
government debt to the central bank, resulting from the monetisation of the
budget deficit; in the case of Kuwait, however, this item does not exist
because the budget is always in surplus. On the contrary, government deposits
constitute a major items on the liabilities side of the Central Bank's balance
sheet. Thus, while in most LDCs the central bank is a net creditor to the
government, in Kuwait the reverse is true. Differences also exist among
countries which on the surface appear identical such as Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. They are both classified as oil exporting capital surplus countries,
and as such they share the same characteristic mentioned above. However, while
discounts to commercial banks comprise a major part of the domestic assets of
the Central Eank of Kuwait, this item does not exist in the balance sheet of
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, simply because its charter does uot allow
it to lend to commercial banks or to receive interest.
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Hocever, nobody is going to reinvent the wheel A model designed for one
country, irrespective of that country's stage of development, is bound to have
some applications elsewhere. Klein (1965), for example, points out that
substantial parts of the real sector of the Keynesian system could be carried
over to LDCs, although the supply side should be given much greater emphasis.
Park (1973) suggests that models that have been successful in advanced
countries can be applied to LDCs, provided that they are modified to reflect
structural and institutional differences. Furthermore, while he recognises the
difficulty of building a model appropriate to all LDCs, he acknowledges the
fact that a Keynesian income/expenditure model can be used to explain almost
any situation if it incorporates broad characteristics that are common to all
LDCs and make allownces for the elements that differentiate these economies
from those of advanced countries. Accordingly, he presents a model for LDCs
comprising financial and real sectors, but makes no attempt to estimate the
model for any particular country. vie shall make some use of Park's
formulations in our model of Kuwait's monetary sector.
Econometric models designed for LDCs can be classified into three broad
categories: (1) Keynesian models of effective demand (for example, Marw'ab's
(1970) model of India), (ii) Chennery's two-gap models (for example, Chennery
and Strout's (1966) for 48 LDCs), and (iii) real models based on either
Harrod-Domar or on one-sector or two-sector neoclassical growth models (for
example, Behrman and Klein's (1970) model of Brazil). Extensive efforts have
been made to build models for LDCs, despite the problems of limited reliable
data, lack of knowledge of the economic structure of LDCs, and the general
scepticism about the usefulness of model building. These problems, however,
should not discourage efforts to model the economies of LDCs.
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In the case of Kuwait, the data problem has been, and still is, the prime
problem facing model builders. El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) describe the data
problem in studies on inacroecononietric models of developing economies as the
most intractable." For the special case of Kuwait, they point out that
difficulties encountered in finding empirical correlates for the analytic
model forced them to use proxies. They add that the recent origin of data
collection in Kuwait in the form consistent with macroeconomic modelling
necessarily gives limited degrees of freedom. They list four specific problems
encountered in trying to collect a sample of 16 annual observations to
estimate their macro model. These include: reconciliation of series for fiscal
years with those for calendar years; inconsistency existing in the pre and
post 1970 series on national income variables; the absence of continuous
series on labour force (and population); and inconsistency between foreign
trade figures in the GD? accounts and balance of payments accounts. We shall
see later that the first two problems can be avoided by using quarterly data
from the most recent years, though interpolation of GD? series will be
necessary because quarterly data are not available. Fortunately, the dearth of
data in Kuwait is becoming less acute, due to the fact that the economic
authorities (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and the Central Bank)
have realised the importance of accurate and diversified data for policy
making. As a result, there has been a notable improvement indata collection
and presentation. Indeed, El-Mallakh and Atta acknowledge that the
inconsistency in the pre and post 1970 national income series is due to the
improvement in the method of data compilation.
Lack of knowledge of the economic structure of LDCs should not discourage
model building because there is a two-way interaction between model building
and the understanding of economic structure. Whereas some understanding of
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economic structure is a pre-requisite for model building, in particular the
preliminary specification of the model, the latter enhances the former
following the estimation stage and the interpretation of empirical results.
This is particularly true of models built by the academics for pure research
purposes. However, Griliches (1981) argues that the incorporation of economic
theory in econometric models is sometimes a "one-way street" in the sense that
they produce little feedback to the theoreticians. This, Griliches argues, Is
particularly true of "sellable economics" which can be profitably sold to
outsiders.
It must be borne in mind that econometric models are simplified images of the
"true" economy, desinged to highlight certain aggregate relationships for the
purpose of generating useful insights into the possible evolution of the
economy. Moreover, Ando (1981) argues that If we can effectively and
systematically exploit all the information available from sources other than
the time series used to test a particular hypothesis, we would begin to make
more systematic progress in the accumulation of our knowledge about the
functioning of the economy. Such alternative sources include: cross-section
data, data for other countries, time series data for earlier periods, and even
informal insights obtained by observing and talking with critical
decision-making agents in the economy. Ando adds that hypotheses are neither
true nor false, but rather a continuum of approximations to reality and that
our objective must then be to improve the accuracy of the approximation of
hypotheses by accumulating more and more information over time. An initial
lack of understanding of the economic structure should not discourage model
building as applied to LDCs because, as Ando points out, our procedure as
economists normally involves singling out one or two hypotheses at a time and
studying them against a set of data, assuming for this purpose that the
approximation of the remaining hypotheses is good enough. In the meantime,
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Ando argues, we must strive to improve the formulation of defective hypotheses.
Criticism of the methodology has led to general scepticism of model building
both for developing and developed countries, although other approaches
individually have not proved to be more useful for economic analysis. Many
observers, both inside and outside the profession, claim that conventional
macroeconometric modelling is virtually useless for forecasting or policy
analysis and that it would fail in any attempt at cost-benefit analysis.
Christopher Sims, who has been critical of conventional jnacroeconometr1cmodel
building, states in his "Macroeconomics and Reality" (Sims (1980)) that
although large-scale macroeconomic models exist and are by some criteria
successful, a deep vein of scepticism about the value of these models runs
through that part of the economics profession not actively engaged in
constructing or using them. He further asserts that it is rare for empirical
research in macroeconomics to be planned and executed within the framework of
one of the large models. The other view is that macroeconometric models
provide the best of the currently available alternatives for the
above-mentioned purposes.
Macroecononietric models have been criticised on the grounds that the
conditions for valid aggregation of well defined macroeconomic relationships
are not met, and hence stable relationships among economic aggregates will not
exist. This, in fact, is the basis for Lucas' (1976) famous critique of
econometric policy analysis. Lucas argues that behavioural equations In any
econometric model reflect optimal responses of economic agents to a given
government policy rule. This implies that the equations must change when the
government abandons one rule in favour of another, or, alternatively, the
structure of any model formulated before the policy change will not reflect
the structure of the economy after the change. Thus, the very structure of
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behavioural equations is unstable and cannot be used for the purpose of
economic policy analysis. Lang (1983) cites an example of a case to which the
Lucas critique applies: the Federal Reserve's October 1979 switch from
attempting to control the money supply through short-term interest rates to
the direct control of bank reserves.
Ando (1981) describes the Lucas critique as "a proposition on the
near-impossibility of estimating structural equations in macroeconoinetric
models in the face of changing government policy rules." Whilst he agrees that
the argument is true and acknowledges the importance of the problem pointed
out by Lucas, he argues that it is not quantitatively serious because the
structure of behavioural equations is only very slightly affected by changes
in government policy rules. Therefore, the assumption that equations are
unaffected is nearly correct, and for most purposes econometric models using
such an assumption would be good enough. Furthermore, Ando suggests a
practical method to deal with the problem highlighted by Lucas: when major
government policy changes occur, we should identify the "small" number of -
behavioural equations that are likely to be affected, and isolate them from
the other equations on which the impact of the policy changes would be
minimal. Ando adds that "in this way we can bring Lucas' dilemma from the
level of some higher teleological principle where Lucas placed it, and make it
another difficult empirical problem like many others that we encounter in
econometric research."
Another objection to Lucas' critique comes from Tobin (1981) who stresses that
"it is not so devastating that macroeconometric model builders should
immediately close shop." He points out that the public's perception of policy
rules is not so precise as to exclude considerable room for discretionary
policy moves that the public would see neither as surprises nor as signals of
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a systematic change in the rule. He adds that behavioural "rules of thumb",
though not permanent, may persist long enough for the horizons of
macroeconomic policy makers. Furthermore, Tobin does not assign special
significance to changes in policy rules but considers them to be the same as
demographic, technological, institutional, international, and cultural
changes, which, he thinks, are all bound to alter structural behavioural
equations. This, however, does not warrant abandoning macroeconometric models,
but rather having them revised or replaced over time, because the structure of
any empirical model reflects the historical experience and environment of the
period for which it is estimated.
Finally, some economists (e.g. Lang (1983)) argue that the Lucas critique does
not apply to changes in the values of variables used as policy instruments,
but rather -and only to- changes in the policy instruments used. The Lucas
critique is still being debated and econometricians are testing the
sensitivity of their models to policy changes.
Another criticism of econometric models is based on measurement errors in
aggregate data; this, as we shall see later, particularly applies to the
measurement of the general price level inKuwait. Morgenstern's (1961)
comments indicate that potential measurement errors in aggregate data may be
sufficiently large as to defeat the purposes of econometric modelling. Again,
measurement errors constitute a problem that has been recognised by
theoretical econometricians, but has not been assigned sufficient weight as to
warrant the abandoning of econometric model building altogether. This may be
justif led on the grounds that the behaviour of decision makers in the economy
is based on published data, irrespective of whether or not the data suffer
from measurement errors. Therefore, equations estimated using published data
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reflect to a large extent the actual behaviour of economic agents.
Others, such as Cooper (1972), have argued that macroeconometric models do not
perform as well in forecasting as simpler univariate time-series models, or
judgemental procedures, which implies that as far as forecasting is concerned
an econometric model is more complicated than necessary or at least not cost
effective. The issue of econometric versus time-series forecasting was
discussed in detail in Chapter 4, but we may add here Kinenta and Ramsey's
(1981) suggestion regarding the distinction between the objective of
forecasting and that of hypothesis testing. They argue that the distinction is
false, because one tends to have more confidence in forecasts derived from
models utilising economic theory and correct statistical methodology. They
argue, therefore, that it is naive to claim that the elaborate structural
specification and detailed Identification analysis of macro models is of
little use if all one wishes to do is merely to obtain good forecasts.
Some economists have been so pessimistic as to claim that the estimation of
structural equations is impossible, because some procedures do not conform to
reality. To cite some examples: the exclusion assumptions needed for
Identification, classification of variables iito exogenous and endogenous, and
the complete exclusion of some variables and hence some equations from the
system. Liu (1960) pointed out that most zero restrictions are probably
inappropriate and economic equations should have insufficient zero
restrictions and are, therefore, technically under-identified. This implies
that a unique structure cannot be associated with an observable reduced form,
i.e. we cannot separate correlation and causation. These ideas were largely
ignored until their recent revival by Sims, Sargent and others (Sims (1977),
(1980)). In his 1980 paper, Sims defends Liu's position by casting doubt on
- 234 -
"the style in which model builders construct claims for a connection between
econometric models and reality, i.e. the style in which identification is
achieved for these models." In this respect he defines identification as
follows: a model is identified if distinct points in the model's parameter
space imply observationally distinct patterns of behaviour for the model's
variables. He repeatedly describes this style as "incredible identification"
because it is based on false assumptions. Ironically, Sims eventually admits
that macroeconomic models are useful tools in forecasting and policy analysis.
He reconciles his seemingly two contradictory statements by stating that for
forecasting and policy analysis, structural identification is not ordinarily
needed, and that false restrictions may not hurt and even help a model to
function in these capacities. On the other hand, Desai (1981) describes Liu's
ideas as being too unorthodox and argues that if they were correct, they would
have impeded the progress of econometrics at the time of its most rapid growth.
Franklin Fisher (1961) was able to show that the properties of estimators are
only slightly disturbed when we make close approximations. Simon and Ando
(1961) have analysed the dynamic behaviour of nearly, but not exactly,
decomposable systems and were able to show that, within a certain time
interval, the nearly decomposab1 system behaved like the corresponding
perfectly decomposable system. While for another, longer time interval, they
could define an aggregate system in terms of aggregate variables, each of
which would represent a non-decomposable subsystem.
Furthermore, Fisher (1961) has justified the estimation of partial economic
models without explicit reference to the total macroeconomic system of which
they are part of, when omitted variables have small coefficients and when the
endogenous variables have negligible directand indirect effects on the
assumed exogenous variables. This approach assists the attempt made in this
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chapter to estimate a model of Kuwait's monetary sector without a full
specification of the real sector. Against this, Coats and Khatkhate (1980)
argue that the formulation of monetary policy must place the monetary sector
In its proper context as an integral part of the entire economy, because
economies are interrelated systems. They describe the use. of a stttgle
equation, or a subset of equations from a complete model, as "inappropriate or
hazardous." But what is desired is not always feasible, this is especially
true in the context of macroeconoinetric modelling of LDCs, due to limitatiotis
of reliable data and the lack of understanding of economic structure.
Moreover, and as we shall see later, the state of the art of modelling the
Kuwait! economy has reached a stage where the next logical step is a
disaggregated model of the monetary sector, because the real sector has
received so much attention. In any case, the model presented here will not
describe an isolated monetary sector, but will seek to trace out the effects
of the monetary sector on real output, imports and domestic price level. It
will be demonstrated that such a subsystem satisfies the purpose of
determining the money supply, and quantifying Its effect on the real sector.
Finally, it is noteworthy that one advantage of econometric modelling is that
the procedure can be fully documented, and alternative models can be tested
against one another,. in the hope of finding better models. Judgeinental
procedures do not lend themselves to such a process. However, a mixed
econometric and judgemental approach is superior to either approach by itself.
Econometric models should constitute only a component of the modeller's total
knowledge about the economy, and the modeller should be aware of the model's
deficiencies (see Howrey et al (1981)).
6.2. Previous Econometric Work on Kuwait
The purpose of this section is to show why a disaggregated model of Kuwait's
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monetary sector is the next logical step in the development of econometric
work on. the Kuwaiti economy. Some studies that will be mentioned below have
been referred to in more than one part of this thesis. Therefore, I shallonly
mention points that have not been dealt with previously and elaborate on
issues already discussed. Appendix 6.1 lists selected empirical results from
these studies.
Econometric work on the Kuwaiti economy is not an old practice. It goes back
only as far as the early seventies with the pioneering work of Khouja (1973).
He estimated the structural and reduced form specifications of six equations
describing the real sector of the Kuwaiti economy, on the basis of the
Keynesian income/expenditure approach. He subsequently used the model to
calculate the multiplier effect of changes in the only exogenous variable, the
difference between exports and net factor payments, on the six endogenous
variables of the model, namely: consumption, investment, imports, government
expenditure, government revenue and GNP. The model was later upgraded by
Khouja and Sadler (1979) to a version that contains four definitional
equations and seven behavioural equations with more sophisticated
specifications. This version takes account of the monetary sector by including
an equation that explains changes in the money supply in terms of government
expenditure and the 3-month Eurodollar interest rate. The model also shows
some interaction between the monetary and real sectors by incorporating the
ratio of the money supply to disposable income as an explanatory variable in
the private investment equation. However, this variable was found to be of
relatively low statistical significance (t 1.73).
The pace of econometric research has accelerated since the beginning of the
l980s due to improved technical skills in the profession, and the availability
of better-quality data with longer time-series and higher frequencies (e.g.
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quarterly and monthly for monetary variables). The most important
contributions in this field were made by Moosa (1982),(l983a),
(l983b),(1983e), El-Mallakh and Atta (1981), El-Beblawi and Fahmi (1981), the
Claremont Economics Institute (1983), Ghuloum (1984) and Kuwait International
Investment Company (1984). Moreover, the Ministry of Planning is believed to
have its own econometric model which is used to forecast manpower needs,
whereas the Central Bank has its own econometric model of the monetary sector
which is used to forecast the money stock on a monthly basis. It is also
believed that some econometric work is being done at the Kuwait Institute for
Scientific Research.
The author (Moosa (1982)) developed a simple time-series model that identifies
trends of monetary growth and uses them for foreasting as illustrated in
Chapter 4. This work came in response to the poor forecasting performance of
the Central Bank's model which proved to be inadequate for forecasting the
money supply.
In another study by the author (Moosa (1983a)), the method of principal
components was used to estimate the portion of GDP originating in the oil
sector. The study was motivated by the long time lag between the publication
of oil production and prices, and the publication of GDP figures. The method
was used to estimate an equation that explains oil GOP (dependent variable) in
terms of one principal component (explanatory variable) derived from the
monetary value of the production of crude oil, refined oil, liquified
petroleum gas, and natural gas. The model worked very well on ex-post basis,
and can now be used to arrive at preliminary estimates of oil GDP based on
actual or estimated oil statistics.
Two more models were estimated by the author. The first one (Moosa (l983b))
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aimed at forecasting the KD exchange rate against eight major currencies. The
model rests on the relationship between the KD/dollar rate and the components
of the basket of currencies by which this rate is determined. The principal
equation explains the determination of the KD/dollar exchange rate E1 by the
dollar rates of "some" other currencies as follows:
E1 =
	
+	 bjEj
where E j stands for the exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar of the currencies
(other than the dollar) that comprise the basket. The intercept term b1 is a
measure of the dollar's weight in the basket, since E1 is measured as KD per
dollar. The Ej 's are measured as the number of currency units Xj per dollar.
Once E1 is determined, other exchange rates are calculated as cross rates Cj
such that
Cj = E1/Ej
where i = 2,3 .......,8. Since its development, this model has proved to have a
good track record on ex-ante basis.
The other model (Moosa (1983e)) was designed to estimate the demand for money
function in L(uwait, using a single equation approach. Quarterly data for the
period 1977-81 were used to estimate functions of various specifications with
three different estimation techniques: OLS, GLS and IV. The explanatory
variable that proved to be most imporl.ant in determining the demand for money,
was the level of economic activity as proxied by government domestic
expenditure.
Another estimation of the demand for money function in Kuwait was done by
Crockett and Evans (1980) of the International Monetary Fund. They used data
available at the Fund and staff estimates to fit two equations in log-log
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form, one for real narrow money and the other for real broad money, with real
non-oil GDP employed as the only explanatory variable in both cases. The
regressions showed good fit, with R2 0.928 for narrow money and R2 = 0.984
for broad money. Moreover, a Chow-test indicated the stability of the function.
El-Beblawi and Fahiul (1981) estimated a single-equation econometric model to
explain stock prices in terms of the money supply and Eurodollar interest
rate. They found that the money supply is an important factor in determining
stock prices, whether a narrow or broad definition of money is used. An
earlier attempt to model stock prices was made by Khouja and Said (1973) on
the basis of company performance using cross-section data.
E1-Mallakh and Atta (1981) estimated a block recursive model of the Kuwaiti
economy. The model consists of fifteen behavioural equations and twenty five
identities including, for the first time, an equation to explain the price
level which was incorrectly treated as exogenous by Khouja and Sadler (1979).
The model also includes an equation to explain the money supply, defined to
exclude foreign currency deposits, but the specification of this equation
evidently lacks the theory to back it up. Equations were grouped under three
blocks, and those in the first and third blocks turned out to be recursive,
and were thus estimated by OLS. It is of significance to this study to mention
that the third block in El-Mallakh and Atta's model contains the three
monetary variables: money supply, government deposits with the Central Bank
and foreign assets of the Central Bank, as well as the price level and G1P.
Because of the properties of block recursiveness and within-block equation
recursiveness, all of the equations were estimated by OLS except the three
that explain the value of oil exports, quantity of oil exports and government
oil revenue. However, the authors did not specify which estimation method was
used to estimate these three equations, apart from stating that "one should
find a procedure other than OLS.'
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The model was estimated using annual data over the period 1962-77, and
empirical results were generally satisfactory in terms of goodness of fit and
significance of individual coefficients. However, the model has two
shortcomings:
(i) Some coefficients turned out to be less than twice their standard errors,
i.e. having t-statistics of less than 2, and yet were left in the
specification. This may be justified on the grounds that the model's
objective is forecasting rather than hypothesis testing, but this
dichotomy of objective has been rejected by Kinenta and Ramsey (1981).
Alternatively, it is sensible to leave insignificant coefficients in the
specification on the grounds that they are theoretically plausible and
that insignificance is due to some statistical problems (see for example
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976 P p . 377-382). No such explanation is offered
by the authors, however.
(ii) Some equations suffer from severe autocorrelation but no attempt was made
at correction. For example, the DW for the equation explaining non-oil
exports is 3.8fl
Nevertheless, considering the model as a whole, it is in many respects
superior to that of Khouja and Sadler.
So far we have not described a disaggregated model that primarily deals with
the financial or monetary sector. Such a model was estimated by the Claremont
Economics Institute (1983), in a project sponsored by the Kuwait Foundation
for the Advancement of Science and six major financial institutions. The model
was based on the rational expectations approach, whereby exogenous and policy
variables of the model were decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated or
shock components. These variables include the following: growth rate of real
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government expenditure, rate of change of the KD/dollar exchange rate, U.S.
inflation rate (as a proxy for world inflation), U.S. Treasury bill rate (as a
proxy for foreign interest rates) and the price of crude oil. All equations
were then estimated in the reduced form with heavy use of the Alinon
distributed lag scheme. The statistical results were not always satisfactory
both in terms of goodness of fit and significance of individual coefficients.
The Claremont model was by all means a good intellectual exercise, but it
revealed lack of understanding of the Kuwaiti economy. Methodology was an
outright duplication of that used by the Claremont Economics Institute to
estimate their U.S. model, which brings about the problem of direct
application of models designed for advanced countries. The following are the
most important pitfalls in that piece of work:
(1) Using the straight-line method to interpolate quarterly growth rates of
non-oil GDP from annual rates. This method is inappropriate in this case
because non-oil GDP exhibits some seasonal variation.
(2) Using the U.S. inflation rate as a. proxy for world or imported inflation.
This again is inappropriate because Japan, and not the U.S., is the major
exporter to Kuwait. A better proxy would be a trade-weighted average of
inflation rates (or even better, rates of change of the unit values of
export) of the top four exporters, i.e. Japan, the U.S., the U.K., and
Germany. This, indeed, is what will be used to measure the price of
imports in this study.
(3) Using the housing component of the consumer price index as a proxy for
real estate prices which is extremely inappropriate.
(4) The model exhibits some econometric loopholes. The study does not specify
the structural form of equations, neither is there any discussion of the
estimation technique. The model, as presented, looks more like a
collection of unrelated equations than an interdependent system.
Moreover, there is no discussion of the identification of equations.
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some causality testing whereby he found causality running from credit
expansion to the money supply. He postulated that the money supply (narrow and
broad) depended on credit expansion, government expenditure, interest rate,
discounts and balance of payments. Empirical results revealed that interest
rate was insignificant, this he attributed to the administrative method of
setting the rate. However, he used a weighted average of interest paid on
various deposits, which are administered rather than market-determined rates
such as the interbank rate which might have given him better results. He also
found that the effect of the external sector -as represented by the surplus in
the balance of payments- on the money supply to be insignificant in the short
run, this he attributed to the discretion of the government in using foreign
reserves to finance domestic expenditure. The most important variables in
determining the money suppiy in the short run were found to be government
domestic expenditure and domestic credit expansion.
In early 1984, Kuwait International Investment Company presented a quarterly
forecasting model for the real sector o the Kuwaiti economy. The model (which
was estimated by OLS) contains 8 equatIons for the oil sector describing the
production and export of various oil products. It also includes equations
explatning oil and non-oil GDP, public finance and foreign trade. .1ork on this
model was motivated by the inadequacy of the specification of equations
describing oil and non-oil GD? in the Claremont model.
The previous discussion gives rise to the following question: what kind of
model will constitute the next logical step in the development of econometric
work on the Kuwaiti economy? In my view it is a simultaneous equations model
of th€ monetary sector showing the interaction with, but without a full
specification of, the real sector. It is realised that this may not be
appropriate for proper analyses of the role of money in the Kuwaiti economy,
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because a full understanding of the Issue requires a complete structural
model. However, this may not be feasible, given the constraints of data, lack
of understanding, and the state of the art. Moreover, the emphasis on the
monetary sector in this model is not intended to mean that money can explain
everything, but is largely a result of the fact that the real sector has
received relatively more attention, particularly in the work of Khouja and
Sadler (1979), El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) and in the work that is being
carried out at the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research. It is hoped that
the following step will be the construction of a complete macroeconometric
model which combines both the monetary sector as will be modelled here, and
the real sector as modelled by Khouja and Sadler, to arrive at something
resembling a general model for LDCs as suggested by Park (1973).
6.3. Some Preliminary Remarks
Before proceeding with the model, it is important to make some preliminary
remarks that should be borne in mind when we evaluate the empirical results.
The first note concerns the approach to econometric research. The choice here
falls on a procedure somewhere between the rigid orthodox approach, whereby a
model is formulated and adhered to irrespective of the statistical results,
and the other extreme where emphasis Is placed entirely on the quality of the
statistical results. The procedure starts with formulations based on a priori
economic considerations, and modifies them in the light of statistical
evidence -by adding or deleting variables and equations- to arrive at the best
possible results in terms of theoretical plausibility and statistical
significance. On the basis of exploratory regressions outside the context of a
full model, insignificant variables and those that do not have the correct
sign are rejected, and variables are included only if their inclusion can be
justified theoretically. Exploratory work, or what may be sometimes termed
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"fishing for the correct specification", is quite common amongst modern large
scale macroeconometric model builders. In the Hocrey et al (1981) survey of
the practices of model builders*, one of the respondents pointed out that with
the advent of inexpensive and easily accessible computer programs and data
banks, "fishing" for statistical significance has become increasingly
prevalent, lie added that "if prior knowledge is absent and there is no way to
specify the explanatory variables, exploration of the likelihood surface may
be unavoidable." Theil (1971 P. 156) acknowleges the practice of
experimentation with potential explanatory variables, but he points out that
the standard linear model supposes that experimentation does not take place
because it assumes that explanatory variables are fixed and given.
Furthermore, one of the conclusions of the Howrey et al survey is that
economic theory is used in a fairly general way in equation specification but
dynamics of adjustment, imperfections in markets, legal practices, and
periodic political intervention have made it necessary to go beyond strict
text-book reasoning. Sims (1980) points out that econometricians may start
with a model specification that is fully built on the basis of economic
theory, but end up estimating another specification that lacks theoretical
reasoning. In particular, he asserts that reduced form equations "are not
products of distinct exercises in economic theory", and yet econometricians
are frequently forced to estimate the reduced form to achieve normalisation of
a simultaneous equations model which is not identif led. In this model,
economic theory will be used to find reasoning for the inclusion or otherwise
of lagged variables, but the length of the lag will be treated as a purely
* Respondents to this survey included some well-established model builders
such as Gerry Adams, Keith Carlson, Gregory Chow, Otto Eckstein, Gary
Fromm and Albert Hirsch.
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empirical issue to be determined by exploratory regressions. Goldfeld (1981)
argues for such a procedure by stating that "model dynamics and lag structures
are generally treated as empirical matters with theory providing only limited
guidance." Brainard and Tobin (1968) put forward the same idea by stating that
economic theory imposes some a priori constraints on specification of models,
but has almost nothing to say on mechanisms of adjustment. They further point
out that the burden on empirical testing and estimation is very heavy, but it
is precisely in the estimation of lag structures and autoregressive effects,
that statistical and econometric techniques encounter greatest difficulties.
Unfortunately, the wrong sign or insignificance of some estimated parameters
may be due to data deficiency, and their exclusion may render specification
errors, i.e. the problem of omitted variables. In this model, the price level
variable in particular suffers from measurement errors. The cost of living
index or the consumer price index, which is prepared by the Central
Statistical Office of the Ministry of Planning, is the best available measure
of the general price level in Kuwait. But this index is distorted by at least
two factors: sampling errors, and heavy government subsidies of some essential
consumer goods. El—Mallakh and Atta (1981) have argued that this index cannot
be regarded as a good measure of the movement of domestic prices in Kuwait
because of some serious shortcomings. They cite the Central Bank's criticism
of the index in its 1976 Economic Report which was as follows:
"It should be emphasised, however, that the dependence on the cost of living
index for evaluation of actual changes in domestic prices involves a lot of
reservations for several reasons, the main being that: (1) the item of
housing, which represents around 18 percent of total overall weight of the
index, does not include rents, and (2) the method of calculation of the prices
of a number of commodities included in the various groups is not totally
reliable. For these reasons, the cost of living index underestimates domestic
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prices." Crockett and Evans (1980) describe the consumer price index in Middle
Eastern countries as imperfect for at least two reasons: (1) the consumption
baskets used often reflect the purchasing patterns of only a particular income
segment, and (ii) the items that comprise the basket are often subsidised by
the go'lernment, this is particularly valid for oil-rich countries like Kuwait.
Finally, how can any one construct a consumer price index when, because of
bargaining, actual prices paid for goods and services are often less than half
of the tag prices?
Measurement errors may also arise from interpolating annual series to get
quarterly series, as is the case with oil and non-oil GDP. But this is
something that we have to live with as the alternative is either to work with
annual data, for which we do not have long series, or drop income from our
specifications, which is implausible. The problem of omitted variables that
results from measurement errors (or data deficiency in general) can only be
tackled in the future, when better-quality data will be available.
One important point to make here, is that the prime objective of this model is
analysis or hypothesis testing, rather than forecasting. This means that we
assign more importance to the individual structural parameters (standard
errors and t-statistics) than to the overall fit (R 2 ). For the same reason, we
assign more importance to the unbiasednss of the parameters than to their
efficiency. On this issue, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976 P. 315) point out that
a model's evaluation must depend on the purpose for which it is built. A. model
designed for forecasting should have as small a standard error of forecast as
possible; while a model designed to test a specific hypothesis or measure some
elasticity should have high t-statistics. We have already seen that such a
dichotomy of objectives is rejected by some economists. Kmenta and Ramsey
(1981) instead advocate a dichotomy between scientific and business-oriented
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models. They define scientific macro models as those which are basically
designed for testing hypotheses and for understanding the operation of
economic systems. In this case, forecasts are important only as statistics for
testing the hypotheses forming the models' structure, which means that any
judgemental manipulation of the estimates by the model builder is "completely
destructive." On the other hand, builders of business-oriented models have
time constraints, and forecasts and policy evaluation statements should be due
at certain dates. In this case, the underlying theory used is assumed to hold
and the objective is to get as good a fit as possible, in order to make quick
and reasonably accurate forecasts which may necessitate judgemental
manipulation by the modeller. This distinction is indeed relevant to
Griliches' (1981) argument about the interaction between economic theory and
econometric models. Using his terminology, it can be argued that there is a
"one-way street" between theory and business-oriented models, but there is
feedback to theory from scientific models. Using this distinction, the present
model can be described as a "scientific model" because its main objective is
to enhance knowledge about, and understanding of, Kuwait's monetary sector.
The hypothesis-testing versus forecasting distinction of one econometric model
from another may still be important. It has been argued (for example Christ
(1966)) that if the objective is forecasting the dependent variable, then
inulticollinearity represents no problem, provided that the relationship
between explanatory variables is not expected to change in the period of
forecast. Moreover, the distinction is important for the issue of whether or
not variables with insignificant coefficients should be excluded.
Multicollinearity is another econometric problem that is relevant to this
study, particularly with monetary variables that tend to grow secularly. This
problem results in distorting the influence of each explanatory variable. For
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example: on a priori considerations, one might assume that the ability of
commercial banks to supply credit depends on the flow of deposits, private and
government. However, when private and government deposits are considered as
two separate explanatory variables in the supply of credit function, the
result is an insignificant coefficient on government deposits, even though a
simple regression of credit on government deposits produces a significant
coefficient. The choice, then, is either to drop government deposits from the
specification of the function or add them to private deposits to form a
composite explanatory variable. In this study, the problem of
multicollinearity warranted the restriction of the number of explanatory
variables in each equation, and put constraints on model specification.
One more issue concetns the model size. The present model contains 11
behavioural equations, and the question arises as to whether or not this model
is "small" and consequently needs further disaggregation. Interest in model
size rests on the presumed relationship between size and accuracy. On this
issue, Howxey et al (1981) concluded that "the evidence on the relationship
between model accuracy and size is somewhat thin and inconclusive." What is
important is model management because if that is not done properly, it will
lead to very serious errors even in large and complex models. In his response
to the Howrey et al (1981) survey, Gregory Chow argued that model size should
be considered in the light of balancing the costs of having too large a model
(in terms of specification errors, difficulties in statistical analysis, and
costs of obtaining additional information on an extended list of exogenous
variables) and the costs of omitting essential relationships. In the same
survey, Gary Fromm replied by stating that model size is a function of data
availability, the process being modelled, the uses to which the model is to be
applied, the richness of the theory, and the resources available for model
construction.
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The first factor (i.e. data availability) is the most limiting one as regards
larger models for Kuwait. For example, in the present model, three deivand
functions are specified: currency, demand deposits and quasi-money. It can be
argued that the model may become more accurate if quasi-money is also
disaggregated into its four components: saving deposits, time deposits,
certificates of deposit and foreign currency deposits. This, however, is not
possible because although disaggregated data are available on the individual
components, no data are available on their yields, and so I felt it was better
to leave the function in aggregated form such that the demand for quasi-money
as one item is a function of the 3-month Eurodollar rate. The choice of this
rate is justified on the grounds that a significant part of quasi-money is
foreign-currency (mostly dollar) deposits which actually yield the
Euro-deposit rate. It is also justified on the assumption that this rate is
correlated with interest rates on other components of quasi-money. This issue
will be elaborated later.
The process being modelled is also important in this respect. For example, a
supply function will be specified for all deposits without disaggregation
because there are no differential reserve requirements by type of deposit. The
same is again true of the demand for reserves which will not be disaggregated
into required and excess reserves, simply because the required reserve ratio
is so low (3 percent) that excess reserves tend to overwhelm required reserves
as pointed out earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 3). Therefore, we believe
that the model has the "required balance."
Moreover, Kelejian and Vavrichek (1981) did not find strong correlation
between model size and predictive performance. They ranked some major models
of the U.S. economy (including Chase, DRI and Wharton) according to size and
predictive power, and found an average rank correlation coefficient of -0.3
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between model size and short-term forecast accuracy for the six variables
considered. They also found an average rank correlation coefficient of 0.07
between model size and medium-term forecast accuracy.
Indeed, Franco Modigliani (1981) argues that there is no a priori reason to
believe, nor any systematic empirical evidence to suggest, that the size is
per se a major determinant of forecasting accuracy, at least beyond some
minimum size and complexity. He also argues that for a given accuracy, one
would generally prefer a smaller to a bigger model for reasons such as cost of
estimation and maintenance, and ease of understanding the working of the
model. Modigliani lists the following reasons why models have grown to be
large and more disaggregated:
(1)	 Interest of the user in forecasting subaggregates of subsectors of the
economy. Disaggregation is thus induced by user's demand, rather than by
the view that a less aggregated model will yield a better forecast of
the broad aggregates.
(ii) A certain level of disaggregationis sometimes useful to account for the
behaviour of the economy, not as a matter of principle, but in terms of
the particular way the economy is modelled.
(iii) Disaggregation sometimes seems the most suitable way of examining the
effect of unusual disturbances or innovations and of new types of
economic policies.
(iv) Rapid advancement of computer technology provides temptation for
enlarging models.
Desai (1981) attributes the growth of model size to the teodericy of
econometriciaias to endogenise as many of the variables on which they have
information. He argues that what one generation of model builders treats as
exogenous gets endogenised by the next generation. So, perhaps some economist
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will in the future improve the present model by more disaggregation and
endogenisation; as time passes more information will become available through
the revision of old data and the compilation of new series.
After all, model size is not as a crucial issue as its appropriateness.
Griliches (1981) argues that this should be the issue, and that the debat of
large versus small models is misleading because much of the objection to large
models is motivated by a lack of understanding of the internal mechanisms of
large models.
6.4. The Basic Model and Hypotheses
The model developed here is a disaggregated supply-demand model designed to
explain how the equilibriunr stock of money is determined, and then how the
monetary sector affects real output and the price level. The logic of the
model runs as follows:
(1) In equilibrium, the supply of monetary base is equal to the sum of the
demand for currency by the public and the demand for reserves by banks.
(2) The demand for reserves is determined by foreign interest rate
(opportunity cost) and the requirements to meet cash withdrawals.
Reserves in turn determine the ability of banks to supply deposits.
(3) Domestic market interest rate is determined by the foreign rate and the
liquidity position of the banking system.
(4) Interest rate and income determine the demand for demand deposits and
quasi-money, which when added up produce the demand for total deposits.
In equilibrium this is equal to the supply of total deposits.
(5) Total deposits influence output and prices which in turn determine the
demand for currency.
(6) The sum of currency and total deposits is the equilibrium stock of money.
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I shall now illustrate the hypotheses that form the basis of the model
specification.
6.4.1. The Effect of Money on Prices and Output
The relationship between money and output or income Is based on tha hypothesis
that in the short run, any excess supply of money which leads to a rise in
aggregate demand will be reflected to some extent at least in a rise In real
output, rather than wholly in the rate of inflation (Coats and Khatkhate
(1980)). The effect runs either directly according to the monetarist doctrine,
Indirectly through interest rate as the Keynesians believe, or through the
unanticipated or shock component of changes in the money supply as per the
rational expectations approach. Park (1973) points out that in LDCs, the
effects of changes in the stock of money are transmitted to the real sector in
part by portfolio substitution but primarily by credit rationing. He adds that
money has a larger and quicker effect on Income in LDCs than in advanced
countries, partly because the transmission process is direct and subject to a
shorter time lag.
Ghulouin (1984) seems to prefer the direct (monetarist) aproach in the case of
Kuwait, and discredits the Keynesian approach on the grounds that the interest
rate effect Is blurred by a combination of external and institutional
determinants of domestic interest rates. Furthermore, he points out that any
excess of the money supply over money demand will be reflected in part in an
increase in the demand for foreign assets, and in part in an increase in
aggregate demand, which means both higher income and higher Imports. Both
higher demand for foreign assets and imports have a contractionary effect on.
the money supply, and this coupled with higher demand for money (resulting
from higher income) will restore equilibrium.
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ioreover, it has been found that money tends to lead income (for example
Friedman and Schwartz (1963a)), and that is generally taken to mean a causal
relation running from money to income and not the other way round. Coats
(1980) argues that this is not always true for small,countries with fixed
exchange rates and whose money supplies are determined totally by the balance
of payments. For these countries, he argues, the correlation between money and
income may imply the influence of income on money. He explains this on the
grounds that in such countries, domestic output must be consistent with the
balance of payments and, therefore, variations in income will tend to generate
offsetting and equilibriating changes in domestic money supply, as the central
bank buys and sells foreign currency to defend the exchange rate. In Kuwait,
this is not the case because the money supply is not influenced by the balance
of payments in the short run, though it is the most important factor in the
long run, due to the discretionary manner whereby the government transfers
funds from foreign reserves to finance domestic expenditure. This hypothesis
is supported by the empirical evidence that Ghuloum (1984) found.
Furthermore, empirical evidence seems to support the unidirectional effect of
money on income. Sims (1972) found that the hypothesis agrees with the
post-war U.S. data; he concluded on the basis of his findings, that the
practice of making causal interpretations of distributed lag regressions of
income on money is not invalidated by the existence of "feedbaciC from income
to money. In Chapter 4, a test of causality between money and income in Kuwait
using the approach suggested by Bhattacharyya (1980), revealed that money
causes income, whereas no evidence was found to support the hypothesis of
causality in the opposite direction.
Empirical work on the relationship between money and economic activity has
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been inconclusive, both about the length of lag and the division of effects of
a monetary disturbance into price and output effect. Studies employing
reduced-form regressions of inflation rates on distributed lags of monetary
growth, found that the pattern of the individual lag. coefficients and
estimated mean of the lag distribution change significantly across time and
countries. When government fiscal variables are Included as explanatory
variables, the results are similar. This dynamic instability has generated
various interpretations such as:
(I)	 It implies that the government should abandon attempts to "fine tune"
the economy, since there is no conclusive evidence on the strength and
timing of monetary and fiscal stimuli.
(ii) It is indicative of the endogeniety of policy variables, and hence
simple reduced-form models should be abandoned in favour of large scale
structural models.
(iii) The rational expectations literature associated with Robert Lucas and
Thomas Sargent (for a comprehensive survey see Lucas and Sargent (1981))
suggests 'that the dynamic adjustment of an economy to a change in a
policy variable depends on whether it is anticipated or not. If it is,
it will be reflected more in prices, otherwise it will be reflected more
in output. Therefore, the argument goes, unless there is such a split,
dynamic instability will emerge. Rutledge (1981) attributes the
instability of 'the parameters. of dynamic adjustment of prices and output
to monetary policy to the variability of the accuracy of public's
anticipation. As we shall see later, this assumption was used by the
Claremont Economics Institute to estimate inflation and output equations
for the Kuwaiti economy.
Eduard Bomhoff (1983) has presented some Interesting conclusions in his study
of the effect of money on output and prices in six European countries:
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Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark. He concluded
that the links between the published figures of the money supply and economic
activity are not as tight in these countries as it is in the U.S., for the
following reasons:
(i) Income velocity of circulation is much less well-behaved in Europe.
(ii) Raw figures of the money supply contain a lot of transient noise, i.e.
purely temporary disturbances that "contaminate" the data and are void
of useful information. To overcome this problem, he recommends replacing
end-of-period numbers by period averages, which will improve the quality
of data.
(iii) Raw data are also contaminated by temporary movements in the money
supply that are largely irrelevant for nominal national income. In
order to avoid this, he suggests that we must distinguish between
changes in the money stock that are caused by temporary actions on the
part of the banks and the public (with the multiplier framework in mind),
which we may wish to disregard for macroeconomic analysis, and changes
that cannot be classified straight away as temporary and should,
therefore, not be erased out of the published data. By eliminating
temporary swings in the money supply, we get a series of "corrected"
money supply that explains prices and output better*.
Bomhoff's overall conclusion is that "money matters and corrected money
matters even more." He also concludes that the time delay between changes in
* Boinhoff suggests that we can correct the money supply series by making use
of the likelihood that interest rates such as those on savings deposits, where
the cost of changing interest rates is high for financial institutions, will
be adjusted approximately in step with rates that are determined continuously
by the market-place, if market rates are deemed to have changed permanently.
Otherwise, the financial institutions will tend to hold back if, in their
judgement, market rates respond to temporary factors that will be shortly
reversed.
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monetary growth and their consequences for economic growth varies between
countries and periods but estimated at 3-9 months.
The relationship between prices and output on the one hand, and monetary and
fiscal stimuli on the other, can be expressed as follows:
P	 P (M, G)
Y = Y (M, G)
where
P price level
Y real output
M money supply
G government expenditure
The above formulation shows that the effect is contemporaneous. But,
especially when we consider quarter to quarter changes, this is not the case
because firms are heterogeneous with respect to the time taken to adjust their
prices and output. Therefore, the general price level and aggregate output
will be distributed over time In a dynamic pattern which could be approximated
by some convenient lag distribution. Thus, we may rewrite the price and output
equations as follows:
P a + 
Eaij Mt_i +
	
a2i k-i ^ u1
Y b0 +
	
Mt_i +
	
Ct_i +
where m,n,r,s indicate length of longest lag, u1 and u2 are disturbance terms.
Rutledge (1981) argues that there is no reason to impose any prior
restrictions on the shape of the lag distributions. Instead, he prefers to
estimate the lag parameters using the Almon distributed lags procedure (Almon
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(1965)). He postulates that the precise shape of the lag distribution between
prices and policy variables (M and G) depends on: (i) the distribution of the
pricing period across industries in terms of length, i.e. the homogeniety or
heterogeniety of pricing periods, (ii) the timing of monetary and fiscal
"shocks" within the pricing period, and (iii) the distribution of
price-setting dates over time. Variations in these factors can make it
difficult to obtain stable estimates of the parameters of various lags, and
can make estimates rather difficult to interpret.
One important question that arises is the following: if real output is
affected by both monetary and fiscal actions, which one of them has the more
stable and effective impact on output? Monetarists, in general, emphasise the
role of monetary policy (see Brunner (1968) for a general reference on the
monetarist view). Rutledge (1981) agrees by stating that in simple-reduced
form regressions employing distributed lags, dynamic multipliers of monetary
growth are individually significant, whereas those of government spending are
"generally" significant but their pattern, average length of lag and the sign
of the coefficient sum are unstable. In general, the monetarist view regarding
macroeconomic policy holds that only the money supply (and hence monetary
policy) has any long-run impact on GIP, and. that government expenditure has
almost no long-run impact while, perhaps, it has some immediate impact. On the
other hand, the following criticims are made of monetary policy (see Eshaq
(1971)): (i) monetary policy is relatively ineffective in regulating or
controlling aggregate demand as compared with direct controls and fiscal
measures, especially when the measures are directed at stimulating demand in a
recession, (ii) the impact of monetary measures is uncertain due to the
complex relationship between the money supply and aggregate demand, i.e. it is
more difficult to predict the effect of monetary measures on demand than is
the effect of fiscal measures, and (ill) monetary measures are blunt, thus
go	 0.56
g	 0.45
g	 0.01
g3 =-0.43
g4 =-0.54
0.05
(2.57)
(3.43)
(0.08)
(-3.18)
(-2.47)
(0.17)
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they cannot be applied as selectively as fiscal measures and direct controls
to influence the patterns of production, investment and consumption. Take, for
instance, the U.S. experience over the first half of 1985, when real growth
was running at a much slower pace than in 1984; here, although monetary
expansion was effective in stimulating domestic demand, it did not give a
significant boost to domestic output because much of the increased expenditure
was on Imported goods -given the strength of the dollar and the high marginal
propensity to import in the U.S. economy. This will not be as much of a
problem with fiscal stimulus because the government can be more discrete in
spending on domestically-produced rather than foreign goods. However, it must
be made clear that this property of fiscal policy is only valid for the first
round effect because recipients of funds spent by the fiscal authority will
also have the option of spending them on imported goods.
To test the effectiveness of monetary versus fiscal policy, Andersen and
Carison (1970) estimated a modified version of the St. Louis model, originally
built by Andersen and Jordan (1968). One of the equations of the model relates
changes in income /.Y (in current dollars) to changes in the money supply LM
and government expenditure AG, I.e.
4	 4
a +Ztnj I Mt_j +gj	Gt....iiO	 I0
When this equation was. estimated using quarterly data, the following
distributed lags coefficients were found (t - statistics in parenthesis).
	
= 1.22	 (2.73)
	
1.80	 (7.34)
	
1.62	 (4.25)
	
in3 = 0.87	 (3.65)
	
0.06	 (0.12)
Emi	 5.57	 (8.06)
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These results confirm the monetarist hypothesis. An increase in G will
initially have a positive inpact on Y, but after 2 or 3 quarters it will have
a negative impact with a total (long-run) impact that is close to zero (0.05).
M, on the other hand, has a large long-run impact (5.57). The St. Louis model,
however, has been criticised on th grounds that simple unrestricted reduced
form equations cannot capture the whole effect of policy changes. In essence,
it has been criticised on the same lines as Ando and Modigliani's (1965)
criticism of Friedman and Meiselman (1963). Batten and Thornton (1983) present
a full evaluation of the St. Louis model and refer to major studies which have
cast doubt on its findings.
The importance of government expenditure .is supported by the findings of
ICmenta and Smith (1973). They conducted some simulations based on a
reduced-form equation for GNP and came up with the following results:
(1) The impact effect of l billion increase in government expenditure is to
increase GNP by l.l427 billion. The impact effect of a ft billion
increase in the money supply is to increase GNP by 3.649 billion.
(2) Total long-run multiplier for government expenditure is 1.8406, for the
money supply 1.227, and for time trend 0.6363.
These results are quite different from those of the St. Louis model and
support the view that both G and M are effective as policy instruments.
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate graphically the difference in the distributed
lag coefficients of changes In government expenditure and the money supply as
generated by tha St. Louis and ICinenta and Smith's models. Research undertaken
in recent years has verified that macroeconomic models used by policy makers
must, at a minimum, include some representation of the instruments of both
monetary and fiscal policy. Bryant (1980) asserts that whatever the views of
monetarists and Keynesians may have been in earlier stages of their debate,
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the extreme views that "money and monetary policy do not matter" and "fiscal
policy does not matter" need no longer be taken seriously today. Differences
now concern the relative magnitudes and timing patterns of the impacts of the
two types of action, not whether one or the other can be ignored.
Many empirical studies on the effect of money on prices and output in
developing countries rest ' upon the quantity theory. If the money supply rises
by more than demand, then expenditure on goods and services will rise with a
consequent rise in output and prices. If output is at, or near, the full
capacity level, we get a direct relationship between money and prices.
Meiselman (1975) tested such a simple model using pooled data for 16 Latin
American countries in the period 1950-69 by estimating the following e4uation:
ao ^ ai (.M/M) + a2 (Y/Y)
where Y stands for real income and all variables are averages of all countries
in tbe sample. His empirical results suggest that for a given growth rate of
real income, changes in the money supply cause price changes.
Vogel (1974) pooled cross-section and time-series data for some Latin American
countries to estimate an equation of the form:
= b0 ^ b1(M/M) ^ b2(.M/M)t...i ^ b3(Y/Y) + b4[(P/P)t_i -
The significance of lagged monetary growth is that it indicates the existence
of lagged response of prices to changes in the money supply, whereas the last
term introduces a measure of inflationary expectations. Vogel's empirical
results were mixed, but he concluded that the most important result of his
study was that a purely inonetarist model with no structuralist variables
reveals little heterogeniety among Latin American countries, in spite of their
extreme diversity.
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It must be mentioned, however, that structuralists do not deny that an
inflationary process requires an expansion In the money supply. They maintain
that monetary growth is largely endogenous, and is a response to more
fundamental underlying causes of inflation. Chakraborti (1978) estimated a
structuralist model of inflation in India using annual data for the period
1950 - 76. His equation explained inflation rate in terms of lagged rate of
change ,of agricultural output relative to non-agricultural output and lagged
monetary growth. All explanatory variables turned out to be significant, but
lagged monetary growth was the major determinant of inflation (as indicated by
its t - statistic). A very important implication of these studies is that the
effect of money on prices is not necessarily contemporaneous. This statement
Is even more valid if we use quarterly rather than annual data.
For Kuwait, the Claremont Economics Institute (1983) has estimated the
following two equations for prices (consumer price index) and real output
(non-oil GDP):
3	 3
P/P	 aj Gat_i ^ bi	 Gut_i ^ e Pm
1=0	 1=0
7	 3	 3
Yii/Yn = c 1
 Gat_i ^ d j Gt_j ^ Ei Eut_j
1=0	 1=0	 1=0
where
Ga growth rate of anticipated government expenditure
Gu = growth rate of unanticipated government expenditure
Pm = growth rate of import prices
Eu = rate of change of the unanticipated component of the exchange
rate.
Some arguments that can be put forward against these specifications have
already been mentioned in evaluating the Claremont model. Here we shall only
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be concerned with the output and price equations which can be criticised on
the following grounds:
(1) The inclusion of both anticipated and unanticipated components of
government expenditure in the price and output equations is inconsistent
with the previous discussion of the effect of the two components on
prices and output.
(ii) The omission of the monetary stimulus variable from the equations is
inconsistent with the discussion so far. We have seen that theory and
empirical evidence suggest that money does matter.
(iii) No theoretical argument was presented to explain why and how
unanticipated changes in the exchange rate affect real output.
(iv) Import prices suffer from measurement errors because they are based on
the U.S. inflation rate. This is not valid, considering that Kuwait's
imports from the U.S. are no more than 20 percent of its total imports
from the four major exporters (Japan, the U.S, Britain and Germany).
(v) The last criticism is econometric and concerns the estimation method.
The two equations were estimated by the Almon distributed lags scheme
with the imposition of end-point constraints which have no basis in
either economic or econometric theory according to Schmidt and Wand
(1973). It is argued that the popularity of this procedure is due to the
resulting "plausible" shapes of the lag distributions (Dhryines (1971)),
but when it is used there is no way of knowing the actual length of the
lag distribution. In fact, we may even get the impression of there being
a distributed lag when there is none; furthermore, it is difficult to
capture any "long-tailed" distribution by means of a single polynomial
(Maddala (1977)).
El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) had estimated a price equation for Kuwait in an
attempt to investigate the effects of absorptive-capacity constraints on
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prices. They estimated an equation that explained the consumer price index in
terms of the money supply and import prices. Empirical results revealed that
import prices are more important in determining domestic price level. This is
so because Kuwait depends almost entirely on imports for the supply of goods
and services. As El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) put it, imported inflation is the
supply-side determinant of domestic inflation, whereas demand-pull factors of
domestic origin are generated and fuelled by fiscal and monetary stimuli.
El-Mallakh and Atta argue that real estate speculation, mainly generated by
government expenditure on land acquisition and bank credit, and structural
bottlenecks, have not allowed imports and the domestic non-oil capacity to
expand at a rate consistent with the rate of growth of aggregate demand.
Amuzegar (1983) expresses the same idea for oil-exporting countries in
general, attributing inflation to excess demand resulting from the fact that
domestic output expansion did not match higher national income, and so,
additional demand has to be met through imports which have inelastic supply
due to port congestion and other distribution inadequacies. He points out that
in the absence of financial constraints, imports act as a safety valve against
domestic inflation; but, because of delays in expanding infrastructure and
related services, imports often fail to service this function, Implying that
inflationary pressures develop from fiscal and monetary stimuli. Specifically,
Amuzegar attributes inflation in oil-exporting countries to highly
expansionary policies (fiscal and monetary) and Import prices. He explains in
terms of these factors the historical experience of OPEC countries In the
period between late 1973, when oil prices were first increased, and the early
1980s (see also Moosa (1980)).
The discussion so far enables us to specify a price equation of the form
P	 P(G, M, Pm)
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The function implies a contemporaneous effect of all explanatory variables on
the price level. But whereas this may be true for import prices, it is not
necessarily true for government expenditure and money, particularly if we are
talking about a period of one quarter. Firstly, when there is an increase in
aggregate demand it can be satisfied by an immediate drawdown of inventories;
as this process accelerates, however, pressure mounts on prices since
inventories cannot be replenished immediately because of the time lag required
by imports to perform this function. Secondly, there must be a time lag
between the decision by the government to incur expenditure on land
acquisition, and the use of the proceeds by individuals for real estate
speculation. Thirdly, to use Rutledge's (1981) argument, not all firms change
their prices at the same time.
It is important to stress once more the point made by Goldfeld (1981), that
the length of lag is an empirical issue and, therefore, exploratory
regressions may be used to find out the most appropriate lag length. Judged by
their standard errors, it was found that for real government expenditure,
significant lags exist at three and four quarters and for money supply they
only exist at two quarters. There is no contemporaneous effect from the money
supply to the price level, which is consistent with Barro's (1978) finding
that an increase in the money supply in the U.S. has no impact at all on the
price level during the initial quarter.
Following Crouch (1967), currency will be excluded from the money supply for
this particular purpose because it is felt that the relationship between
economic activity and currency runs purely from the former to the latter,
since currency is entirely demand determined, i.e. causality runs from
economic activity to currency. This means that our explanatory variable
becomes total deposits TD. Therefore, the price equation may be specified as
P	 P ( Gt_3, Gt_4,	 t-2' Pm)
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where the government expenditure variables are measured in real terms, i.e.
deflated by P (actually 0.01 P).
Scepticism may arise about this specification because.of price rigidity. If
prices are sticky downwards, then a decline in explanatory variables will not
affect the price level but rather the inflation rate, and hence the dependent
variable should be the inflation rate or absolute change in the price level.
This, however, is not the case in Kuwait because prices are not sticky
downwards. Consumer prices in Kuwait contain substantial profit margins, and
so sellers can afford to give discounts in periods of deficient demand or if
import prices go down. It must be mentioned here that in most cases, prices of
consumer goods are actually determined by bargaining between buyers and
sellers, and it is natural that the seller is more willing to give way in
periods of deficient demand and lower import prices. Rents of housing units
also do come down -as was evident in the recession year of 1984- due to excess
supply of housing units. Therefore, the price level may come down, and there
are such cases in our sample.
We now turn to the output equation. The output variable used here is non-oil
GDP, i.e. oil GDP is excluded. This issue was discussed in Chapter 2, but we
may add that oil GDP is excluded because as Crockett and Evans (1980) have
pointed out, it is determined by the production and price of oil, both of
which are determined by external factors and thus neither affect, nor are
affected by, fiscal or monetary actions. Moreover, since the oil sector
affects production in other sectors in the long run only, the output equation
may be specified as
= Y (G, M, T)
where	 is real non-oil GD? and T is the trend value of output determined
in the long run by such factors as the growth of factors of production and oil
GDP. Figure 6.3 shows the behaviour of Yn* and T over the period 1977-82.
Figure 6.3
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We have already seen that data problems prohibit the estimation of a
conventional production function for Kuwait. We have, therefore, no
alternative but to resort to the naive specification of making T a function
of time T. e may now express tbe deviation of
	 from its trend value as a
function of government expenditure and the money supply
Yt1-YTYd=F(GM)
where
f(T)
This concept of trend output T is more or less equivalent to what Rutledge
(1981) calls "full-information output." He defines this as the output to be
produced by an economy if there were no mistakes in forecasting past and
present government policies, the stock of available resources and technology.
Deviation of actual output from full-information output, Rutledge argues, is
due to "policy and resource shocks."
Exploratory regressions revealed that tiere is a contemporaneous effect from
real government expenditure to real output, and a one-quarter lag in the
response of real output to the money supply. This is not surprising because
government expenditure is itself part of non-oil GDP and its effect must,
therefore, be contemporaneous. Alternatively, it takes time for any monetary
stimulus to work its way on output whether directly, through real expenditure,
or indirectly, through interest rates. Therefore, the final specification of
the real output equation is as follows
Yd	 f ( G/ Gt_1, TDtl/TDt_2)
therefore
= Yd ^
Yn =
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The fiscal and monetary variables in the output equation reflect
contemporaneous and lagged growth rates of real government expenditure and
supply of deposits because
GJGt_i = 1 +
and
TDt_i/TDt_2 = 1 ^ TDt....itTDt_2
6.4.2. Demand for Money
The demand for money has perhaps been the most comprehensively studied of
economic relationships and one of the most important elements of modern
macroeconomics. The concept refers to the functional relationship between the
quantity of money demanded and its determining factors. It is a key function
of inacroeconometric models of the national economy or the monetary sector for
advanced countries and LDCs.
The importance assigned to the demand for money stems from its implications
for stabilisation policies. Economic stability depends in part on the
relationship between the supply and demand for money, and a policy that aims
at maintaining stable prices and preventing monetary disturbances to real
output should keep the money supply adjusted to its demand. The relative
stability of the demand for money is also important for the rules versus
discretion controversy. In short, the relationship between the nominal stock
of money on the one hand and prices, income, and the balance of payments on
the other is determined by the demand for money. Gordon (1984) argues that the
relationship plays such an important role in macroeconomic theory that it is
difficult to imagine living without it.
It must be emphasised, however, that recent writings on the demand for money
(Laidler (1980), (1981), Judd and Scadding (1982), Dotsey (1984), and Hetzel
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(1984a), (1984b)) have cast doubt on the existence of a stable demand for
money function. Laidler (1969) had earlier argued for the eistence of a
stable function, but in a 1981 article he asserted that the 1970s produced a
good deal of evidence to suggest that the relationship shifted in an
upredictable way in a number of countries. The shift is believed to have been
brought about by a number of reasons including the regime of flexible exchange
rates after 1973, and innovations in financial markets whereby new and highly
liquid Interest-bearing assets (e.g. NOW accounts) were introduced to compete
with the traditional monetary liabilities of commercial banks. Furthermore,
Laidler (1980) attributes the instability of the demand for money function in
the 1970s to the very attempt by governments to follow inonetarist policies. He
argues that instability in the demand for money resulted from attempts to
control the money supply, a similar situation to that which emerged in the
late 196Os, with the unemployment inflation trade-off vanishing as soon as
policy makers attempted to exploit It. This hypothesis is in line with
Coodhart's (1980) postulation that any statistical regularity will tend to
collapse once pressure is put upon it for control purposes. Desai (1981)
concludes that the demand for money is either unstable, or if a stable
equation can be extracted from data by a suitable econometric technique, it
exhibits a variable -but significant- Interest elasticity with the velocity of
circulation not constant but a function of income, prices and monetary growth.
In a more recent paper, Dotsey (1984) attributed the instability of the demand
for money functions during the inid-1970s to the shift resulting from the
adoption of more sophisticated methods of cash management by firms, allowing
them to perform a given level of transactions while holding lower average
money balances. He argues that the adoption of the new methods was motivated
by the improvement of computer technology, the lowering of computer costs, and
the rise in interest rates. Therefore, the failure to include a measure of the
effects of cash management in the demand function will render it unstable.
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Hetzel (1984a) found that the public's demand for Ml is not stable in an
absolute sense. In particular, he showed a modest leftward shift in the Ml
demand function in the mid l970s and a rightward shift in the early 1980g.
However, he contends that the magnitude of the shift estimated for the mid
1970s is smaller than what is generally estimated by Judd and Scadding (1982).
In another paper, Hetzel (1984b) has shown that as from the second half of
1982, the rate of inflation in the U.S. was below the rate that would have
been predicted on the basis of the historical relationship between the rate of
growth of Ml and the rate of inflation, and he took that as evidence of a
rightward shift in the public's Ml demand function. He presented Ihree
alternative explanations for this rlghtward shift: (i) the Friedman-Schwartz
hypothesis (Schwartz (1983)), whereby it is conjectured that the public's Ml
demand function has come to resemble permanently its demand function for M2,
as formerly defined to include savings as well as transactions balances, (Ii)
the initial balance hypothesis suggested by Cook and Rowe (1984), whereby it
is conjectured that consumers in the process of establishing new "other
checkable deposit" accounts, make a one-time transfer of funds from their
saving accounts in order to satisfy their minimum balance requirements, and
(iii) the rise in the interest elasticity of the demand for real Ml balances
in combInation with the significant drop in the level of market rates of
interest relative to the own rate on other checkable deposits (Brayton et al
(1983)). Accordingly, Hetzel suggests that the post-1982 Ml demand function
exhibited, relative to its pre-1981 behaviour, a lower trend rate of decline
in the demand for Ml and higher interest rate and income elasticities of
demand for Ml. He further suggests that the characteristics of the post-1982
Ml demand function lie in between those of the pre-1981 Ml function and those
of the former M2 function.
In another. development, Robert Gordon (1984) states at the outset of his
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recent paper on the demand for money that slightly over a decade ago the
demand for money was one of the least controversial topics in macroeconomics,
both in its underlying theory and in the stability and plausiblity of
empirical coefficient estimates, but now, he argues, there is a cloud of
uncertainty hanging over the entire subject of short-term demand for money. He
argues that the Federal Reserve's shift of emphasis from interest rate
stabilisation to monetary aggregate targeting implies that the coefficients in
the conventional equations of the demand for money actually represent a
shifting mixture of demand and supply responses. Furthermore, he argues that
it can be a misleading practice to estimate money demand equations over
varying sample periods with the intention of studying changes in the income
and interest rate elasticities of the demand for money, because the
coefficient shifts may tell us more about changes in policy rules than about
the characteristics of the underlying money demand function. Thus, the
coefficients in the standard equation can be interpreted as parameters of
money demand only if the central bank has followed a regime of interest rate
stabilisation. On the other hand, instability in the coefficients of standard
equations may tell us more about shifts in central bank regimes than about
shifts in money demand behaviour.
By and large, it can be argued that the above-mentioned reasons for the
instability of the demand for money function are not valid for Kuwait.
Therefore, conventional analysis of the demand for money can be used to
specify a function for Kuwait.
The standard demand for money function includes a scale variable (income or
iealth), and an opportunity cost variable (yield on other financial or real
assets), as well as a stock adjustment or expectations framework which is
represented by a lagged dependent variable. Formulations based on different
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theories of the demand for money fall into two broad classes: transactions
theories, which emphasise the function of money of a medium of exchange, and
asset theories, which view the demand for money as part of the broader issue
of portfolio selection. The first set of theories, in which money was
considered as inventory held for transactions purposes, evolved in the work of
Bauinol (1952), Tobin (1956) and later, Miller and Orr (1966). Theories of
portfolio selection or asset theories of the demand for money are found in the
work of Friedman (1956) and Tobin (1958). As we shall see later, viewing money
as an inventory held for transactions or as an asset in a diversified
portfolio is relevant to determining explanatory variables in the demand for
money function. We shall now discuss potential explanatory variables.
There have been extensive discussions of the appropiiate scale variable i.e.
whether it is current income, permanent income or wealth. Laidler's (1969)
extensive survey led to the conclusion that the evidence favours wealth.
However, Stephen Goldfeld (1973) later estimated various functions using
quarterly data, and concluded that "the use of an income variable in the
demand for money equation seems eminently sensible." But he also stated that
"a variable reflecting the change in wealth slightly improves the explanatory
power of the equation but slightly worsens its predictive ability." In
general, the relevant scale variable and the choice between income and wealth
depends on whether money is viewed as a medium of exchange or an asset in a
diversified portfolio.
The opportunity cost variable in the demand for money function is intended to
measure the yield on money against other assets. En financially developed
economies, the opportunity cost variable is an interest rate, though there is
no general agreement on which particular interest rate should be used. Choice
of a representative interest rate is warranted by colliriearity in interest
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rates, but no matter what interest rate was used it turned out to be
significantly negative (Moosa (1976) p.42). Friedman's (1959) work remains the
exception as he found no statistical association between the demand for money
and interest rate; this was because he used a broad definition of money which
does not allow the substitution that occurs in response to interest rate
changes to take place. Friedman subsequently defended himself by saying that
zero interest elasticity only held in the long run, and that the elasticity
was low in the short run.
Moreover, in the modern quantity theory (Friedman (1956)), money serves as an
alternative for physical goods, hence the expected rate of inflation can serve
as opportunity cost variable. However, empirical evidence in favour of this
variable was mostly found in cases of countries experiencing hyperinflation.
In countries where inflation is mild, there has been little evidence. Harry
Johnson (1972 p.127), who wrote on the demand for money in the Chicago
tradition, described the absence of solid evidence on the effect of inflation
on the demand for money in the U.S. as "something of a puzzle", but he
attributed it to the relatively mild inflation. Goldfeld (1973) tried three
alternative measures of price expectations and concluded that the results were
a "mixed bag."
The most controversial issue in empirical work on the demand for money is
whether or not it is appropriate to use lagged dependent variables. Most
empirical studies have employed lagged dependent variables to analyse both
demand adjustment and expectations lags with respect to explanatory variables.
However, there is a consensus that the length of such lags can be. estimated
only empirically. The partial adjustment mechanism assumes that there is a
desired level of money holdings M* that depends on income Y and interest rate r
f (Y,r)
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Portfolio adjustment costs are assumed to prevent a full and immediate
adjustment of actual to desired money balances. Now if
a0 + a1Y + a2r
and
M - Mt_i k(M* - Mt_l)
where M is the actual money balance and k is the coefficient of adjustment.
Then
M - Mt_i k(a0 + a1Y + a2r - Mt_i)
or
M = (ka0) + ka1Y + ka2r ^ (1-k) Mt.....l
Axido (1981) presents an exhaustive list of reasons why there are delays in
adjustment. (i) Many decisions are dependent on expected rather than current
values of the relevant variables, and expectations may respond to changes in
relevant variables slowly. (ii) The availability of information to decision
makers may be delayed. (iii) Under uncertainty, economic agents may feel that
they will have to take time to interpret any signal given to them. (iv) It may
be difficult, physically and organisationally, to make rapid changes. (v)
There may be many long-term contractual commitments that would not allow rapid
changes (e.g. fixed deposits).
Scepticism has risen about the theoretical foundation of the partial
adjustment mechanism as applied to money holdings. Goldfeld (1973) argues that
the mechanism is satisfactory for capital stock accumulation, but the analogy
between money holdings and capital equipment is far from perfect for the
following reasons: (i) the exact nature of the costs involved is much less
clear in adjusting financial portfolios than in the case of adjusting stocks
of machinery and plant, (ii) the lags that result statistically for money
adjustment appear too long to be explained on the grounds of adjustment cost,
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and (iii) even if the analogy is possible, it does not necessarily imply the
simple fortnulation above (see also Gould (1968)). Although Ando (1981)
recognises reasons for stock adjustment of money holdings, he admits that the
specification of the dynamic adjustment process in niacroeconometric models is
of ten not well formulated. In this context, he believes that the intention of
most econometricians is to model complex processes as close to reality as
possible, while at the same time keeping the formulation simple enough so that
it can be integrated with the steady state characteristics and still remains
estimatable. Another problem with th& partial adjustment mechanism in this
context has been identified by Breen (1971). The problem, he argues, is that
the approach may lead to "corner" solutions for an individual in the sense
that he may not respond at all unless some critical condition is met, e.g.
interest rate changes by more than a certain amount. This suggests the need to
pay considerable attention to the details of aggregation over individuals to
obtain a macro equation.
Goldfeld (1973) suggests a remedy to this "unsatisfactory state of affairs"
concerning partial adjustment, by conceiving the adjustment as a slow response
to expected values of income and interest rates, which in effect amounts to
using expectations lags. Indeed, he believes that both types of lags may exist
in combination, and this belief is shared by Friedman (1959) who had earlier
suggested that quarterly data might be expected to reflect not only time lags
in the adjustment of income expectations to current experience, but also lags
in the adjustment of actual to desired money balances.
The expectations lag is generated by assuming an adaptation or a learning
process. In each period, expectations are revised with due consideration to
the size of error committed in the expectation of the previous period. If we
are talking about income, then the expectation process can be expressed as
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follows:
yei + k (Y - Yel)
Where ye is expected income and k is the average speed of change in
expectation. If the demand for money depends linearly on income, and if we
Ignore the disturbance term we get
M = b0 ^ b1Y
then
b0 I
ye__ 
—M
b1	 b1
and
b0
-
b1	 b1
By substituting ye and ye _1 in the expectations equation we get
b0 1	 b0 1
	 r b0 1
--+—M ----+
—Mt_i ^ k Y+ ---Mt_i I
b1 b1	b1 b1
	 L b1 b1 J
therefore
M = kb0 ^ kb1 Y + (1-k) Mt_i
This means that the consideration of either adjustment or expectations lag
enables us to introduce the lagged money variable into a short-run demand for
money function. Indeed, whether we postulate an adjustment or expectations
lag, the basic equation remains the same following the Koyck transformation
(Koyck (1954)) except that the error term is different in each case.
It must be mentioned here that this type of formulation has been criticised by
proponents of the rational expectations hypothesis. In particular, they
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criticise the adaptive expectations principle that past errors modify current
expectations, and argue instead that once an error is observed it does not
affect future expectations since it is random and contains no new information
(see Holden et al (1985) p.19 on major differences between adaptive and
rational expectations). The founder of the rational expectations hypothesis,
John Muth (1961), believes that expectations are just as rational as other
aspects of individual behaviour. Accordingly, he questions the accuracy of
estimated parameters from observable data if expectations are not much
different from the prediction of the model itself as rationality would imply.
However, Muth admits that using lagged dependent variables and exponentially
weighted moving averages as a proxy for expectations makes the equations
identifiable, the parameter estimates easy to compute, and produce good
results. Moreover, Shiller (1978) has criticised the rational expectations
hypothesis, particularly the assumption that agents are assumed to know the
correct model of the economy and solve it appropriately (see also Lawson
(1981)). On balance, we believe that it is reasonable to use adaptive
expectations in the case of Kuwait.
Another view on lagged dependent variables in the demand for money function is
presented by Wong (1977). He notes that there may be a lag in the adjustment
of actual money balance to money demand, and thus the lagged dependent
variable can be taken to reflect disequilibrium in the money market due to
lagged response of supply to demand and the existence of credit rationing. We
can only assume that the demand for money at time t is contemporaneously equal
to the observed money balance at time t if the banking system is willing, and
efficient enough, to adjust the money supply to money demand within the same
period.
To conclude on this issue, Laidler (1971) notes that there are time lags in
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puts it, if a deficiency in money holdings is niatched by too many building
society deposits, one would expect the restoration of equilibrium to be a good
deal cheaper and more rapid than If the matching disequilibrium were too big a
house. The absence of adjustment lags is indeed inconsistent with the
existence of substitution between money and real assets. Likewise, it is often
argued that expectations lags can be ignored in LDCs where uncertainties and
risks tend to be high. For example, Adekunle (1968) found income expectations
lag to be negligible for a group of LDCs. But Wong (1977) argues in favour of
the existence of expectations lags on the grounds that if the majority of
entrepreneurs and households in LDCs are risk averters, and since these tend
to be conservative in adjusting their portfolios, the expectations lags will
be correspondingly longer.
In the case of Kuwait, the demand for money has been stable as supported by
the evidence found in Chapter 4. The stability of the function may be due to
the fact that a short time period Is considered, but more importantly It is
due to the absence of factors that have ,
 caused instability of the function in
the U.S. e.g. financial innovation and cash management techniques.
There have been some attempts to estimate the demand for money function in
Kuwait but not within the framework of a full macroeconomnetric model.
Available empirical evidence -as well as theoretical considerations- suggest
that the appropriate scale variable is non-oil GDP, although this variable is
more appropriate for transactions demand. For asset demand it is better to use
a measure of expected income, permanent income or wealth. For the interest
rate variable there are two candidates: the interbank rate rk as a proxy for
interest rate on KD deposits, and the Eurodollar rate rf as a proxy for
interest rate on foreign assets, and it is indeed the interest rate on dollar
deposits with local banks which comprise a large portion of quasi-money.
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Interest rates on saving and time deposits are subject to a ceiling and there
are no regular time series for them. However, below the ceiling they are
correlated with the interbank rate as this is with the Eurodollar rate.
Since there has been no solid evidence to support the inclusion of
inflationary expectations as a proxy for the return on real assets, and hence
the opportunity cost of holding money, this variable is discarded,
particularly because the consumer price index suffers from measurement errors.
Finally, a variable representing financial or banking development along the
lines suggested by Aghevli (1973) will not be employed, because Ghulouin (1984)
has shown that there are pitfalls in applying a strict quantitative measure to
such a broad concept as financial or banking development. This proposition can
be verified by trying to measure the concept by the ratio of demand deposits
to narrow money which reflects the use of cheques vis-a-vis cash to settle
transactions. The ratio remained more or less unchanged in the 19 years
between 1963 and 1982 (0.6973 and 0.7095 respectively) despite the expansion
and diversification of the financial system. Chuloum attributes this
phenomenon to the inflation-induced increase in the value of cash
transactions, and the influx of expatriate labour in the l970s from countries
heavily dependent on cash transactions. Moreover, the effect of this factor
tends to diminish at later stages of financial development.
In the light of the previous discussion, we may specify the demand for money
in Kuwait to depend on income Y, interest rate rk (or f) and a lagged
dependent variable.
Md
	f (Y, r, Mt_l)
Trying to estimate this function using the broad money aggregate M2 will lead
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into trouble, similar to that experienced by Friedman, because a positive
interest rate coefficient will be obtained since the bulk of M2 is
interest-bearing deposits.
Aggregated demand for money functions do not always work well, particularly
with respect to the interest rate effect, owing to the heterogeniety of the
components of money. Crouch (1967) correctly argues that one cannot treat the
components of money as homogeneous and assume that they all react to various
determinants in the same manner. Even if all components react to the same
variables in the same manner, the size of reaction is not necessarily the
same. Goldfeld (1973) expresses the same idea by saying that aggregation may
badly muddy interest rate effects. His findings suggest that the simple
specification used for Ml will not work for time deposits and neither should
it be used implicitly for estimating a similar equation for M2. He concludes
that for both theoretical and empirical reasons, aggregation to the level of
M2 "seems to be a distinctly inferior procedure." Alternatively, he argues for
disaggregation on the grounds that it permits greater flexibility in the
choice of variables and specification of adjustment patterns. In his Mobel
lecture, James Tobin (1982) asserts that the traditional aggregation of
various financial assets into a single asset with a common interest rate does
not permit the analysis of some important policies, institutional structures,
and events. Therefore, he calls for asset disaggregation on the grounds that
it is essential for analysing monetary policy. Indeed, currency is of
practical significance in the analysis of monetary policy, since, as we have
seen, currency is a component of the monetary base which can be used to trace
out the money supply process. Therefore, M2 will be disaggregated into
currency, demand deposits and quasi-money (saving deposits, time deposits,
certificates of deposit and foreign currency deposits), and specify three
separate demand functions.
- 286 -
Demand for currency is simply a function of current income (non-oil GDP).
As income rises, so does the quantity of currency required to finance the
higher level of transactions as shown graphically by the scatter diagram in
Figure 6.4. Demand comes from the corporate sector topay for wages (for
example manual construction workers), and from the household sector to buy
goods and services. Exploratory regressions revealed that the demand for
currency is not sensitive to interest rate, and this is confirmed by the
scatter diagram in Figure 6.5 which shows a positive rather thah the expected
negative response. Therefore, the function can be expressed as
= C (Yn)
On the other hand, it has been observed that there is considerable
substitutability between demand deposits and quasi-money, particularly at
times of extreme activity (or lack of it) in the stock market as shown in
Figure 6.6. It is felt that the demand for demand deposits and quasi-money is
more of an asset demand, making it more responsive to wealth, expected income,
or permanent income than to current income. Expected or permanent income Yp
can be reasonably proxied by an 8-quarter moving sum of total GDP (i.e. oil
and non-oil GD?). Such formulations are not unfamiliar in ecorionietric
research. For example, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976) have used a two-quarter
moving sum of past inflation rates as a proxy for expected inflation and a
two-quarter moving sum of the wage rate as a proxy for expected wages. Thus
(p) =EY0 ^
Using such a formulation for income is consistent with Gordon's (1984)
proposition that the usual restriction in money demand equations of including
only the current value of an explanatory variable and no lagged values is
unjustified. In addition, the demand for demand deposits is made a function of
domestic interest rate rI and a lagged dependent variable. Lastly, a dummy
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variable Dl is used to account for the increase in demand during the stock
market boom in the last quarter of 1981 and the first half of 1982. Therefore,
the function may be expressed as
DDd	 D (Yp,rk, DDt_i, Dl)
Likewise, the demand for quasi-money QMd is made a function of income Yp,
foreign interest rate f, lagged dependent variable arid a dummy variable D2
for the stock market collapse in the second half of 1982. The use of rf (3
month Eurodollar rate) is justified on the grounds that a major component of
quasi-money (foreign currency deposits) actually earns this rate. Moreover, we
shall see later that f determines rI• Therefore, the demand for quasi-money
can be expressed as
QW	 Q (Yp, f, QMt. 1, D2)
There is an important issue concerning these specifications. The variables are
expressed in nominal terms, and this is a practice that has been adopted by
several writers although the most common specification is in real terms.
Goldfeld (1973) argues that real-term specification is the one suggested by
economic theory, particularly in the Baumol-Tobin types of formulation.
Similarly, Gordon (1984) points out that a universal feature of every theory
of the long-run demand for money is hotnogeniety of degree one with respect to
the price level, which implies that the demand for money is demand for real
balances. Sometimes, real specification is used in transactions demand but not
in speculative demand, but Evans (1969) argues against this practice on the
grounds that if nominal values are used in the absence of money illusion, the
deaiand for money function would imply that changes in the price level would
induce people to hold a different amount of money as an asset, even though the
same amount of real income was being used to purchase the same amount of goods
and services. He concludes that with the assumption of no money illusion, real
values should be used.
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The author agrees with the proposition that rationality implies demand for
real rather than nominal balances, but in a country where money illusion is
present (see Appendix 6.3), the assumption that demand is for nominal balances
is acceptable. Moreover, there are other arguments in favour of using nominal
balances. Smith (1963) has argued that for stabilisation goals, variables in
current prices are more relevant. Wong (1977) has argued that it is reasonable
to relate nominal money balance to nominal income, but he warns against the
inclusion of both nominal income and price level not only because that may
cause the problem of multicollinearity but also because the effect of changes
itt prices could be distorted by nominal income as the latter contains a price
component. White (1978) has suggested that the stock adjustment transformation
should be applied to nominal rather than real balances. In this respect,
Gordon (1984) points out that the absence of adjustment costs in response to a
price surprise suggests that it is costly to adjust nominal rather than real
balances, accordingly, he rewrites his specification of the adjustment
mechanism in nominal form (p.4ll). Similarly, Goldfeld (1976) shifted to the
nominal adjustment hypothesis following his reexamination of the "Goldfeld
puzzle", appearing in his classic 1973 paper: too little money and too much
velocity. Lastly, Hetzel (l984b) argues that entering the nominal stock of
money and prick level as a ratio in the real balance specifications constrains
the functional form very considerably. Instead; he suggests a less
constraining functional form by making the price level the dependent variable
and the nominal money stock an explanatory variable, and that in effect is an
inverse function of the demand for nominal balances.
Perhaps the principal motive for using nominal values in this study is the
unavailability of a proper deflator, and this is a problem frequently
encountered in empirical work on LDCs. Wong (1977) argues that the deflator
for money should be the GNP deflator as far as the real transactions demand
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for money is concerned, but he adds that GNP deflators are not often published
in developing countries. So, the choice is between the incorrect procedure of
deflating by the consumer price index -which is not only inappropriate but
also suffers from measurement errors- and using nominal values. The choice
falls on nominal values. A question immediately arises as to why output was
deflated by the consumer price index? It would seem that there was no choice,
because if nominal output was used, it would not be possible to know if
changes in the money supply affect real output or merely the price level.
6.4.3. Demand for Reserves
Banks' holdings of reserves consist of required reserves to satisfy the
reserve requirements, and excess reserves which are held for transactions,
precautionary and speculative reasons. Transactions demand is motivated by the
need to satisfy the public's demand for currency. These transactions are
assumed to occur in the same way each day and, thus, result in a constant need
for liquidity.
The precautionary motive is a response to deposit flow uncertainty because
under uncertainty, banks do not know whether or not deposits in any one period
will exceed cash withdrawals and whether or not they can satisfy the demand
for credit. Finally, the speculative motive depends on Interest rate because
banks' portfolio behaviour is not fundamentally different from that of other
wealth holders, i.e. they are likely to hold larger quantities of excess
reserves during periods of low interest rates.
tn Kuwait, the required reserve ratio (3 percent of total deposits) was
introduced In the second half of 1980. However, the ratio is so low that it
has not had a significant effect on the level of banks' total reserves. Even
before the imposition of the required reserve ratio, the level of reserves had
been substantially over and above the requirement.
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Theoretical considerations and institutional factors suggest a demand for
reserves function of the following form
Rd	 R (C, TD, r, rf, rd, Dk, Dr, D3)
where
C = currency
TD = total deposits
r = required reserve ratio
rf = foreign interest rate
rd discount rate
Dk = dummy variable to account for the introduction of Central Bank
bills as part of reserves
Dr dummy variable to account for the Imposition of the required
reserve ratio
D3 seasonal dummy to reflect • window dressing" in the fourth
quarter
Total deposits and the required reserve ratio are Included in the function
because they determine the level of required reserves. But since the level of
excess reserves has always overwhelmed the level of required reserves, changes
in the required reserves cannot explain variations in total reserves and,
therefore, these two variables have little explanatory power. Moreover, the
required reserve ratio has not been changed since it was first introduced, and
so it cannot be treated as a variable. For exactly the same reason,
exploratory regressions revealed that Dr is insignificant, i.e. the imposition
of the reserve ratio did not result in a structural shift in the demand for
reserves function. Foreign interest rate f is included in the function
because it represents the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves. This is
justif led on the grounds that in the absence of exchange controls, banks tend
to invest a major portion of their funds in foreign assets. The discount rate
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is included because it represents the cost (to banks) of borrowed reserves.
However, the discount rate has only been changed once (in April 1979) and,
therefore, it cannot be treated as a variable. Finally, exploratory
regressions revealed that Dk is insignificant, i.e. the acceptance of Central
Bank bills as part of the reserves in 1979 did not result in a structural
shift of the function.
Attempts to incorporate variables to represent precautionary demand for
reserves failed to improve the results, because banks in Kuwait tend to rely
on the Central Bank for that purpose. When there is an unexpected rise in the
demand for credit, or unexpected fall in the flow of deposits, banks resort to
the Central Bank for funds which the latter provides through the discount
window, currency swaps and direct lending. En Kuwait, the Central Bank is
committed to meet banks' needs in order to "preserve a sound banking system."
Indeed, this has occurred whenever there has been a liquidity crisis (see
Chapter 5). Thus, the demand for reserves function reduces to
Rd	 R (C, rf, D3)
Figure 6.7 plots the behaviour of the ratio of actual reserve holdings to
their trend value. It is obvious that the ratio exhibits seasonal variation as
it tends to shoot up in the fourth quarter. This is explained by the banks'
behaviour in holding larger reserves in the fourth quarter for the purpose of
"window dressing" at the end of the financial year, which is equivalent to the
calendar year. This behaviour justifies the inclusion of the dummy variable D3.
6.4.4. Interest Rate
To the author's knowledge, the Claremont model is the only model of the
Kuwaiti economy that includes a separate equation for domestic short-term
interest rate (3-month interbank rate). Two versions of this equation have
Figure 6.7
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been estimated: the first expresses the rate as a function of interest rate on
3-month U.S. Treasury bills, a three-quarter moving average of the absolute
change in this rate as a proxy for foreign risk, and the price of oil as a
proxy for wealth. The second expresses the rate as a function of U.S. Treasury
bill rate and a distributed lag of goveroinent expenditure and exchange rate
changes. Empirical results for both versions were poor in terms of statistical
significance, and the second version lacks the theoretical justification for
including the exchange rate as an explanatory variable. What is more important
is that both versions exclude a very important explanatory variable, namely
the liquidity position of the banking system.
The interbank rate is the interest rate on KD interbank deposits. Thus, it
depends on the liquidity position of the banking system which is strongly
influenced by foreign interest rates (proxied by the 3-month Eurodollar rate),
because higher foreign rates induce capital outflows leading to liquidity
strains and, consequently, higher interbank rates. Therefore, the interbank
(local) rate should be positively correlated with the Eurodollar (foreign)
rate as shown graphically in FIgure 6.8. Another indicator of the liquidity
position is the net position NP of local banks with the Central Bank which is
defined as follows:
NP=Rk+Rb-(SW+DC+LN)
where
Rk Central Bank bills held by local banks
Rb Local banks' balances with the Central Bank
SW Currency swaps
DC Discounts
LN = Loans against Central Bank bills
Figure 6.8
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SW, DC, and LN are policy variables through which the Central Bank injects
liquidity into the banking system. If NP has a negative value, it indicates
movement of funds from the Central Bank to the banking system which
accelerates during periods of liquidity strains. Therefore, ldwer values of NP
indicate liquidity strains and should be associated with higher interbank
rates. Thus, the interest rate equation may be specified as:
rk	 r (rf, NP)
Exploratory regressions revealed that better results are obtained by using a
two-quarter moving average of net position rather than its current value.
Therefore, NP will subsequently be redefined to refer to a two-quarter moving
average of the net position, not its absolute value.
6.4.5. Supply of Total Deposits
Deposit expansion may result from an increase in government expenditure, credit
expansion and, in the long run, a surplus in the balance of payments. This
proposition is valid for Kuwait both theoretically and empirically, but the
important thing to note is that in all cases deposit expansion can take place
only if some additional reserves appear from outside the banking system. For
if an individual bank wishes to replenish its reserves by selling some of its
assets to the public, it does so at the expense of the deposits and reserves
of another bank.
Yet, no previous attempt to estimate the money supply function for Kuwait took
explicit account of this fact by including reserves as a separate explanatory
variable. Khouja and Sadler (1979) specified a function in which changes in
the money supply were made a function of government expenditure and the
3-month Eurodollar interest rate. Goodness of fit turned out to be poor (R2 =
0.458 for OLS estimates). El-Mallakh and Atta (1981) specified a function in.
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which the money supply (excluding foreign currency deposits) was a function of
credit to the private sector, government deposits with the Central Bank,
foreign assets of the Central Bank, and other deposits. The money supply
growth rate in the Claremont model was made a distributed lag function of real
government expenditure and the KD/dollar exchange rate. Finally, Ghuloum
(1984) tried several specifications for the money supply function and
concluded that in the short run, government expenditure and domestic credit
expansion are the most important determinants of the money supply.
With a minimum reserve requirement of 3 percent, a KID 1 million increase in
reserves could lead to a maximum of KB 33.3 million in the money sup5ly. This
maximum can be realised only as long as there is no hoarding either by banks
or by the public. If banks choose to hold the added reserves (KB 1 million)
idle, instead of converting them into earning assets, the money supply
increases by KID 1 million only. In making a decision of this kind, commercial
banks must also satisfy the liquidity ratios (see Chapter 5). Similarly, the
process of expansion is limited by the extent of hoarding (cash) by the public.
We have seen that the Central Bank of Kuwait can control the level of reserves
through direct lending, swaps and discounts. But the ability to control the
level of reserves does not necessarily imply the ability to control the money
supply, which means that there is no constant, proportional relationship
between reserves and the money supply, since banks are not likely to utilise
all of their excess reserves to purchase earning assets. That is why the
reserve to deposits ratio fluctuates considerably.
A rise in interest rate will encourage banks to purchase earning assets (e.g.
foreign assets, loans, or interbank deposits), and that leads to an increase
in the ratio of these assets to reserves and, consequently, the money supply.
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Thus, the "potential" money supply depends entirely on the level of reserves
and can, therefore, be treated as a policy variable. However, the divergence
between actual and potential money supply may fluctuate under the impact of
changing interest rates and uncertainty. This point is well expressed by
Bryant (1980) who asserts that the supply of money function must take into
account not only policy actions of the central bank and fiscal authority, but
also the profit-motivated actions of commercial banks.
In his model of the British monetary sector, Crouch (1967) specified the
supply of deposits to depend only on reserves -without any interest rate
variable. He justified his specification on the assumption that British banks
never hold excess reserves because of their prompt and speedy reaction to the
emergence of excess reserves which is facilitated by the "perfection" of the
London money market. In Kuwait, banks tend to hold substantial excess reserves
firstly, because of the absence of developed financial markets and secondly,
because the major part of reserves (Central Bank bills) carries interest.
Therefore, the supply of deposits in Kuwait is interest-responsive.
The interest-responsiveness of the supply function stems from the profit
inaxitnisation behaviour of commercial banks. When foreign interest rates rise,
banks will initially change the composition of their portfolios, increasing
their holdings of foreign assets. At a later stage, they will try to obtain
extra funds from the public by making their deposits more attractive (e.g. by
raising interest rate) and thus increasing the potential supply. This is
possible with the existence of excess reserves. Whether or not there will be
an increase in the equilibrium level of deposits depends on demand by the
public, who will have to choose between investing more funds in foreign or
local deposits, both of which are now more attractive. Some people will prefer
local deposits for security reasons, to avoid foreign exchange risk, or
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because of lack of knowledge. This supply-demand interaction has been a common
phenomenon during the recent monetary history of Kuwait. For example, in 1974
there was a sharp increase in quasi-money (up 31.2 percent) because of both
higher supply and demand. Higher supply resulted from higher deposit rates
emanating from the banks' strive to make deposits more attractive to finance
the increased demand for credit. Higher demand was the direct result of higher
personal income -a sequel to the goverrment's decision to raise the wages and
salaries of its employees in reaction to the rise in revenue induced by higher
oil prices.
The hypothesised positive correlation between the supply of deposits and
Interest rate may seem contradictory with the significantly negative
coefficient in Khouja and Sadler's (1979) money supply function, and the
Central Bank's approach to the determination of the money supply whereby
higher foreign rates induce capital outflows and render a contractionary
effect on the money supply. There Is, in fact, no contradiction. Khouja and
Sadler's function, and the Central Bank's approach describe long-run
equilibrium in total money supply, whereas the present equation explains the
short-run reaction of supply of deposits to changes in foreign interest rate.
Moreover, Khouja and Sadler's equation is in the reduced form, whereas this
one is in the structural form.
The same reasoning can be used to explain the responsiveness of the supply of
deposits to the Interbank rate or the difference between foreign and Interbank
rates, both of which were found to be significant in exploratory regressions.
However, the foreign rate Is used because it is theoretically more plausible
and produces better statistical results.
Scepticism about the existence of a deposit-supply function in Kuwait rests on
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the assumption that there is a free supply of reserves by the Central Bank.
But, this assumption is false, despite the Central Bank's commitment to
maintain a "sound" banking system. The reasons for believing that the supply
of reserves is not perfectly elastic are as follows:
(i) Lending by the Central Bank to commercial banks depends on the
availability of collateral.
(ii) The Central Bank can, and often does, refuse to discount a particular
commercial paper, without any given explanation.
(iii) The Central Bank can, and often does, set an upper limit on
discounts/direct lending.
(iv) The Central Bank refuses to discount commercial papers if it feels that
the proceeds of the discount will be used by commercial banks to acquire
Central Bank bills, which yield higher interest than the discount rate.
Indeed, if the supply of reserves were perfectly elastic, commercial banks
would not' have been unable to satisfy the private sector's demand for credit
during periods of liquidity strain. Such periods were quite common in the
years 1977-82 for which the model is estimated. Again, if the supply of
reserves were perfectly elastic, commercial banks would not have resorted to
other sources of funds, in particular, foreign liabilities and the interbank
market which have witnessed remarkable growth since 1974,
Moreover, even if the level of reserves does not affect the money supply
directly, it does have an indirect effect through the supply of credit because
credit expansion is followed by monetary expansion. This is a hypothesis for
which there is empirical evidence (Ghuloum (1984)). Lastly, even if the
required reserve ratio were not an effective constraint on the supply of
deposits, liquidity ratios certainly are.
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We have already seen that banks tend to hold more excess reserves in the
fourth quarter for the purpose of "window dressing." This means that there Is
a seasonal variation in the reserve-deposits ratio with banks maintaining a
higher ratio in the fourth quarter. This must imply that the supply of
deposits is negatively influenced by the seasonal rise in the reserve-deposits
ratio. Therefore, a seasonal dummy is included in the function which we may
specify as
T (R, rf, D3)
Figure 6.9 plots the standardised empirical residuals derived from the
regression of the supply of deposits on reserves and foreign interest rate
only. It Is obvious that the residuals tend to assume negative values in the
fourth quarter, which must surely imply the existence of seasonal variation
and justify the inclusion of a seasonal dummy in the function. In Chapter 4, a
time-series test just failed to detect seasonal variation in the broad money
supply which includes currency as well as total deposits. The difference' in
the two cases is attributed to currency which does not have seasonal variation.
6.4.6. Supply of Credit
The supply of credit by commercial banks to the private sector depends on
their ability and willingness to lend. Ability is determined by the flow of
total private and government deposits. The latter are, indeed, used as a
policy variable to enhance or otherwise banks' ability to grant credit.
Willingness depends on Interest rate considerations, more specifically, the
differential between foreign and local rates and a variable that reflects the
portfolio behaviour of banks with respect to the relationship between credit
to the private sector and the private sector's deposits with banks TD.
Figure 6.9
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It is plausible to assume that commercial banks have a long-run norm or
desired value of the credit to deposits ratio. In each period, banks adjust
this ratio by a fraction of the divergence between the desired ratio b and
last period's actual ratio. Figure 6.10 shows the behaviour of the actual
ratio relative to its mean value over the period 1977-82. Thus, we may specify
the following adjustment mechanism:
(CR/TD) - (CR/TD) t_l = k b - (CR/TD)t_i]
therefore
(CR/TD) = kb ^ (1-k) (CR/TD)t_i
or
CR kb (TD) + (1-k) TD (CR/TD)t_l
which means that to take account of the adjustment process, the supply of
credit function should contain as an explanatory variable the lagged ratio of
credit to total (private) deposits. Deviations of actual from desired ratio
are explained by the interest rate differential which determines the portfolio
behaviour of commercial banks. There are other variables that affect the
supply of credit such as the discount rate and required reserve ratio (Park
(1973)), but these do not apply in our case because they have been constant.
Therefore, the supply-of-credit function can be expressed as follows:
CR8	C ((TD + GD), (rf - rk), (CR/TD)t_l)
6.4.7. Demand for Credit
Previous attempts to estimate the demand-for-credit function focused on
non-oil GDP as a measure of economic activity. In the Claremont model, it was
simply made a function of non-oil CD? in a log-log form. In El-frfallakh and
Atta's (1981) model, the demand for credit was specified to depend on the
contemporaneous and lagged values of non-oil GDP. Ghuloum (1984), on the other
Figure 6.10
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hand, used a different specification in which the change in the demand for
credit was made a function of government expenditure and a lagged dependent
variable. The goodness of fit for Ghuloum's specification turned out to be
poor (R2
 = 0.53), and the coefficient of government expenditure was
insignificant, though correctly signed. A negative sign was expected on the
grounds that higher government expenditure reduces the Immediate demand for
credit. It seems, however, that all of these studies overlooked the role of
the banking system in financing imports through letters of credit, and that is
why none of them used Imports as an explanatory variable in the demand for
credit function.
Credit Is used to finance domestic economic activity as well as Imports.
Therefore, the demand for credit should depend on non-oil GDP Yn and Imports
CRd = a (Yn, IM)
Since credit is also used to finance stock market transactions, an attempt was
made to employ the value of traded shares as an explanatory variable, but the
resultswere insignificant. This may sound peculiar, but Ghuloum's (1984)
explanation was a good one, in that the bulk of stock market transactions were
financed by overdrafts (on which no data are available) and not by "regular"
credit.
Moreover, the function does not include an interest rate variable. This is so
because the existence of interest rate ceiling makes the cost of borrowing
negligible compared with the high rates of return on real investment, e.g. In
the business of retail trade. High rates of return usually result from
substantial profit margins and outweigh the cost of borrowing, even when
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banks overcome the ceiling by imposing administrative charges and commissions.
Thus, in boom periods, the private sector tries to get the maximum amount of
credit allowed by its collateral, financial position and other factors
irrespective of the loan rate. Attempts to Incorporate as explanatory
variables the difference between inflation rate and interest rate or the
difference between local rate and foreign rate failed, to improve the results.
This. has a very interesting implication for the credit market, at least in the
period under consideration: there is excess demand for credit but interest
rate does not have a rationing role. Instead, rationing is done by banks'
preference, which is governed by such factors as collateral and personal
relationships with the decision makers at commercial banks. The Central Bank
also plays a rationing role because it is empowered to set a limit for loans
to any individual borrower.
Finally, a seasonal dummy Is added In order to account for the decline in the
demand for credit in the fourth quarter. This may be due to book-squaring at
the end of the calendar year which is equivalent to the financial year. Figure
6.11 shows that the behaviour of standardised residuals derived from a
regression without a seasonal dummy justifies its Inclusion. Therefore, the
demand for credit function becomes:
CRd = R (Yn, IN, D3)
6.4.8. Imports
Since imports are conceived to be an important determinant of the demand for
credit and the money supply, it would be useful to specify an imports function
as part of the model.
Several attempts have been made at estimating this function for Kuwait, the
Figure 6.11
Standardised Residuals of the Credit
Demand Equation Without Dummy Variable
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majority of which employed annual data. Khouja (1973) estimated the simple
specification of making imports a function of GNP. Later, Khouja and Sadler
(1979) estimated a better specification by making imports a function of GP,
change in the price level and the ratio of money supply to disposable income.
The last variable which Khouja and Sadler termed "monetary liquidity" was
introduced on the grounds that the banking system plays an important role in
financing imports. The lag was explained by the procedure involved in
financing imports which requires opening letters of credit six to twelve
months in advance of final delivery of the imported goods, i.e. when imports
are actually recorded. The results also indicated that the change in the price
level was significantly negative. This is not convincing, however, because the
general domestic price level was incorrectly taken to be a proxy for import
prices, and also because the high marginal propensity to import, and the
extent of Kuwait's dependence on. imported goods and services, make the demand
for imports price inelastic. The scatter diagram in Figure 6.12 shows that
imports are not responsive to changes in import prices where the latter are
proxied by the variable Pm which was used as an explanatory variable in the
price equation. Also, the term "monetary liquidity" Is not so much a
determining factor as much as it is a "catalyst" to increased imports. The
availability of bank financing may be a necessary, but certainly not a
sufficient, condition to trigger an increase in imports. Indeed, imports
should be determined by more fundamental factors, with any increase in the
demand for imports resulting In a greater demand for credit. El-Mallakh and
Atta (1981) later made imports a function of gross domestic absorption, which
they defined as the sum of consumption and investment. Finally, in the
Claremont model, imports were made a function of total GDP in a log-log form.
In the present model, imports are conceived to be a function not of current
income, but rather of wealth or permanent Income, the concept of Yp that we
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came across earlier. This is particularly true for the Import of consumer
durables. Another important determining factor of imports that has been
overlooked in other studies on Kuwait is re-exports, I.e. the portion of
imports re-exported to neighbouring countries, particularly' Iraq, Iran and
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, re-exports RX as a proportion of total exports K is
another explanatory variable.
Two dummy variables are also included: a seasonal dummy D3 to account for the
seasonal increase in imports In the fourth quarter, and a war dummy D4 to take
account of the impact on imports of the Iraq - Iran war. It is felt that the
initial shock of the war Influenced imports negatively in 1981, but the effect
dissipated in 1982 as people started to conceive the war as a long one and
adjusted to the new situation. Therefore, D4 takes the value of 1 in each of
the four quarters of 1981 and zero otherwise. The standardised residuals
plotted in Figure 6.13 verify the need to incorporate the dummy variables D3
and D4. The Import function may look like this
IM = M (Yp, RX/X, D3, D4)
6.5. The Full Model and Estimation Results
The preceding discussion suggests that a model of Kuwait's monetary sector can
be represented by the following system of equations. Unsubscrlpted variables
are at time t.
P = ao ^ a1 Gt ..... 3 ^ a2 Gt_4 ^ a3 TDt....2 + a4 Pin + u1
Yd = b0 + b1 ( G/Gti) + b2 (TDt....1/TDt....2) + u2
= Yd ^
Yn = PYn*
Figure 6'. 13
standardised Residuals of the Imports
Equation Without Dumy Variable
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Yp	 +
Cd Co + c1 Yn +
Rd = d0 + d1 C+ d2 rf ^ d3 D3 + U4
R =Rc+Rb+Rk
NP =---ERb + Rk - SW - DC - LN)t_j
rk e + e1 r1	 NP +
DDd fo±flYp+f2 rk+f3DOt_l+f4Dl+u6
QMd go ^ gl Yp + g2 rf + g QM.1+ g4 D2 + U7
QM S ^ T + F
=	 + h1 R+ h2 f + h3 D3 ^ U8
TDQM+DD
ti
CR9
 10 + I (TD + GD) + j2 (r f - rk) + 13 (CR/TD)t_i + u9
IMj0+j1Yp+j2(RX/X)+j3D3+j4D4+u10
CRd =k0+k1Yn+k2 IM--k3D3+u11
The following responses are expected from our previous discussion:
a1>O , a >O , a3>O , a4>O
b1>O , b2>O
C'>0
d1>0 , d2<O , d3>O
el>O ,
fi>0 , f2< 0 , f3>O , f4>0
gi>O , g>O , g3>O , g4>O
hi>O , h2>0 , h3<0
il>0 i <0 13>0
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j l>0 12>0 , j3>0 , i4<O
k2>0 , k3<0
The predetermined variables are the lagged endogenous variables plus G, GD,
NP, Pm, rç, 1, Yo, Yp and T as well as the dummy variables Dl, D2, D3 and D4.
The u's are error terms whereas the a's ..........., k's are parameters to be
estimated empirically. The superscripts d and s denote demand and supply
respectively. The following notation is used where all variables are measured
in 1(D million unless otherwise stated
C = Currency in circulation.
CR Commercial banks' credit to the private sector.
Dl Dummy variable for stock market boom = 1 in 81(4), 82(1) and
82(2), 0 otherwise.
02 Dummy variable for stock market collapse = 1 in 82(3) and
82(4), 0 otherwise.
D3 Seasonal dummy = 1 in th fourth quarter, 0 otherwise.
04 Dummy variable for the war shock = 1 in 81(1), 81(2), 81(3)
and 81(4), 0 otherwise.
DC Discounts to commercial banks.
DO Demand deposits
F	 Foreign currency deposits
G	 Government domestic expenditure (real)
GD Government deposits with commercial banks
IM Imports
LN = Loans from the Central Bank to commercial banks
NP Net position of commercial banks with the Central Bank
(two—quarter moving average)
P	 Consumer Price index (1978 100)
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Pm = Import price index (1976 = 100)
QM Quasi-money
R	 Reserves of commercial banks
Rb Balances of commercial banks with the Central Rank
Rc = Cash reserves of commercial banks
Rk Central Bank bills held by commercial banks
RX Re-exports
rf	 3-month Eurodollar interest rate (percent p.a.)
= 3-month K]) interbank interest rate (percent p.a.)
S	 Saving deposits
SW Currency swaps
T = Time deposits
TD Total deposits of the private sector with commercial banks
X	 Exports
Yd = Deviation of real non-oil GDP from its trend value
Yn Non-oil GDP (nominal)
Non-oil GDP (real)
Yo = Oil GDP (nominal)
Yp = Permanent or expected income (nominal)
= Trend value of non-oil GDP (real)
The ordering of the equations in this particular manner is not without
significance. The system is recursive in the sense that the solution for the
uth endogenous variable involves only the first a equations of the model. For
example, given the value of Yn we can solve for C, and given the value of C we
can solve for R and so on. Now if E (uiuj) = 0 for ij then the endogenous
variables appearing on the right hand side of each equation are independent of
the equation's error term. Referring to the model we have
Cd=C (Yn, 113)
Rd = R (C, rf, D3, u4)
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Since u3 and ut+ are independent and Cd depends on u3, it is also independent
of U4, i.e. Coy (C, U4) = O,'which uieans there is no simultaneous equations
bias. In this case OLS produces consistent estimators. Wold and Jureen (1953)
have shown that the estimators will be identical to those of the full
information maximum likelihood if the error terms are normally distributed and
homoscedastic.
For the estimation of recursive systems, 2SLS estimates do not have any
advantage over OLS estimates. Moreover, recursive systems have the added
advantage that the identification problem does not arise. Sims (1980) points
out that recursive systems are identified but result in equations which are
linear combinations of the reduced form equations which he calls multip1e
possible normalisations." For these reasons, some econoinetricians have
advocated the use of recursive systems to model economic relationships. Wold
and Jureen (1953) suggest that economic theory usually defines the most
important explanatory variables of a relationship and that minor determinants
of the dependent variable may well be excluded from the function, simply
because each one of them has a negligible effect and their influence as a
whole may be reflected by the random variable. Under these circumstances, they
argue, economic relationships are overidentified but may be adequately
represented by recursive systems.
In fact, Wold (1949) objects to simultaneity - the notion of everything
occurring at the same time - on the grounds that the true description of
economic events has to be along a temporal sequence. For example, current
consumption cannot be a function of current income since we must have income
before we can spend it. Wold even argues that simultaniety is inisspecification
and what appears to be simultaneous occurrence is in fact a consequence of the
data being available over long intervals and that lags are obliterated by
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low-frequency data. He concludes that economic models are recursive in the
sense that the matrix of coefficients of endogenous variables is triangular or
even diagonal (see also Wold (1954), (1956), (1959), (1964)).
Theil (1971 P.462) argues that Wold's criticism of interdependence was
exaggerated, but he admits that Wold had contributed to a better understanding
of the importance of recursive models. In particular, Theil points out that
the condition Coy (ujuj )=O is very restrictive because the omitted variables
which are represented by the error terms are correlated. Theil also argues
that long time periods mean simultaniety; this conforms with Wold's basic
argument for recursive models, i.e. economic agents usually react after some
lag. Thus, it is conceivable to say that simultaneous models are associated
with low-frequency data (e.g. annual), whereas recursive models are associated
with high-frequency data. In a sense, then, there is a form of conflict
between data and economic specification; this is a point that has been raised
by proponents of continuous time-dynamic models (see Wymer (1976), (1979)).
Fisher (1967) has suggested that simultaneous models are limiting
approximation to non-simultaneous models in which certain time lags converge
to zero. Finally, Tobin (1982) implicitly defended recursive models in his
Nobel lecture, by stating that simultaneous equations systems are a convenient
representation of interdependence, but it is more persuasive to think of the
economic processes that solve them as taking time than as working
instantaneously. In fact, he argues that representation of economies as
systems of simultaneous equations always strains credibility because "it takes
extraordinary suspension of disbelief to imagine that the economy solves and
re-solves such systems every microsecond."
Recursive systems do appear in empirical research. The St. Louis Federal
Reserve model of the U.S. economy (Andersen and Carlson (1970)) is a purely
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recursive system, and Crouch (1967) presented a recursive system to describe
the British monetary sector from the mid l950s to the mid 1960 g . David Laidler
(1973) built a simple recursive model for the United States over the period
1953-72 to test the influence of money on real income and Inflation -one of
the 6bjectives of our Kuwait model. Recursive or block recursive systems
appear more frequently in models of LDCs; the latter appear particularly in
full models of the economy. We have already seen that El-Mallakh and Atta's
model of the Kuwaiti economy turned out to be block recursive, with monetary
variables grouped In one block that was estimated by OLS because of
within-block equation recursiveness. Similar examples are found in Atta's
(1980) model of Ghana and the model of the Syrian economy built by Butterfield
and Kubursi (1980).
Butterfield and Kubursi did not justify the use of OLS on the basis of the
block-recursiveness property of the model only, but also on the grounds of
measurement errors and the small sample size. It is interesting to note that
one of the conclusions of the conference on large-scale macroeconometric
models (Michigan, October 26-27, 1978), was that despite econometric and
computing advances, OLS remains the most prevalent estimating technique.
Indicative of this is the fact that of the 12 large scale models of Project
Link (Waelbroeck (1976)), ten were estimated by OLS. The remaining two were
estimated by FIIYIL (West Germany) and a combination of LIML and 2SLS (Holland).
At the same conference, the general discussion revealed preference (sometimes
conditional) for OLS. For example, Arnold Zeilner noted that OLS may be
superior in small samples under very specific circumstances, but that
consistent and efficient estimators are preferable in large samples. Michael
Darby pointed out that In a number of existing models there are so many
predetermined variables relative to the number of observations, that 2SLS
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estimators are identical to OLS. Franco Modigliani declared his preference for
OLS with autoregressive transformations on the grounds that OLS estimators are
"objective", since they do not call for a choice of exogenous variables as in
the case of 2SLS or 3SLS. Finally, the Howrey et al (1981) survey revealed
that whilst there has been extensive experimentation with various alternative
estimation procedures for simultaneous equations models, alternatives to OLS
achieved no more than modest improvement in model performance.
Greater emphasis seems to have been placed on the importance of flexibility to
deal with data refinement, data revisi on and incorporation of new blocks of
equations. Various studies involving the application of different econometric
techniques to different data sets have shown that variations in estimates are
much greater between different data sets, than between different estimation
methods. This is why some econometricians believe that the results of
empirical research will be improved by upgrading techniques of data collection
and processing, rather than by devising and employing more sophisticated
estimation methods. This point is particularly true in the case of Kuwait.
In what folLows, model estimates are presented. The model was estimated by OLS
using 24 quarterly observations of seasonally unadjusted data over the period
1977-82. Empirical results include the t-statistics, coefficient of
determination (R 2 ) and the Durbin-Watson statistic (OW). To begin with,
validation of the model involves a check to see whether the estimated
coefficients are statistically significant with the proper sign, and later,
whether the simulated time series correlate well with the historical time
series.
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(1) Price Level
P = 58.2 + 0.012 Gt_3 ^ 0.016 Gt_4 + 0.0088 TDt._2
(15.66) (3.45)	 (4.47)	 (12.36)
^ 0.177 Pm
R2 = 0.995	 SE = 1.03	 DJ =1.67
(2) Real Output
Yd	 -808.8 + 203.08 (G/ Gt_i) + 566.43 (TDt_l/TDt_2)
(-3.07) (3.85)	 (2.24)
R2 = 0.528	 SE = 46.29	 DW = 1.64
(3)Demand for Currency
Cd = 6.7 ^ 0.381 fn
(0.24) (7.89)
R2 = 0.739	 SE	 33.22	 DW = 1.81
(4)Demand for Reserves
Rd = - 149.9 ^ 2.11 C - 15.01 rf ^ 115.4 D3
(- 3.26) (8.88)	 (- 4.13)	 (4.17)
R2 =0.845	 SE58.1	 txJ=1.49
(5)Interest Rate
5.13 + 0.234 tf - 0.0086 NP
	
(4.84)	 (2.45) (- 4.84)
	
R2 = 0.847	 SE	 1.21
	
= 1.50
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(6) Demand for Demand Deposits
DDd	 59.7 ^ 0.029 Yp - 16.56 rk
(1.36) (4.91)
	 (- 3.36)
+ 0.53 DDt_i ^ 347.03 Dl
(9.68)	 (9.05)
R2	0.972	 SE = 50.44	 DW = 2.28
(7) Demand for Quasi-Money
QMd	 - 105.5 + 0.0442 Yp + 13.32 rf
(- 2.91) (4.44)	 (4.48)
^ 0.73 QMt_1 + 320.5 D2
(7.55)	 (16.33)
R2 =0.998	 SE=34.78	 DW=2.40
(8)Supply of Total Deposits
TD3
	275.5 ^ 5.54 a ^ 111.59 rf - 650.5 D3
(1.21)	 (9.31)	 (6.36)	 (- 3.54)
R2 = 0.880	 SE	 343.73	 1.62
(9)Supply of Credit
Ca5 = - 1106.9 ^ 1.053 (TD ^ CD) - 34.53 (r f - rk)
(- 3.48)	 (26.45)
	 (- 3.26)
+ 961.87 (CR/.TD)t_i
(2.36)
R2 = 0.991
	 SE = 113.69	 DW	 1.67
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(10) Imports
tM	 12.9 + 0.027 Yp ^ 1640.8 (RXIX)
(0.54) (9.30)	 (7.48)
+ 59.73 D3 - 92.86 D4
(5.03)	 (- 5.33)
R2 = 0.957	 SE = 25.05 DW = 1.89
(11) Demand for Credit
= - 1912.6 + 1.82 Yn + 7.81 In - 349.4 D3
(- 6.30) (2.09)	 (6.62)	 (- 2.03)
R2 = 0.915
	
SE = 342.2
	
DW = 2.12
Empirical results show that the equations are reasonably well determined in
the sense of having high explanatory power, with the exception of the output
equation which has R2 of 0.528. This explanatory power, however, only applies
to the divergence of real output from its trend value, not to its total value,
which means that the explanatory power for the total value is more than that
which is implied by this RZ*. All of the individual coefficients are
statistically significant in the sense that their standard errors are equal to
or less than half their values, i.e. they have t-statistics of 2 and more.
Moreover, all of them are correctly signed, i.e. in accordance with a priori
economic considerations. The DW statistics indicate only limited evidence of
autocorrelation although -as discussed before- this statistic is not strictly
appropriate for equations containing lagged dependent variables. However, the
alternative -Durbin's h statistic (Durbin (1970))- requires a large sample
which is not feasible in the present study.
* The low R2 of the output equation may also be attributed to errors of
measurement in the non-oil GD? series resulting from interpolation. Other
explanatory factors include the various reasons suggested by Boaihoff (1983)
and referred to in an earlier section of this chapter.
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The price equation shows that the impact of the monetary stimulus on the price
level is both stronger and faster than the fiscal stimulus. A 100 percent
increase in the money supply produces a 16.9 percent increase in the price
level two quarters hence, whereas a 100 percent increase in government
expenditure leads to an increase of 4.9 percent three quarters hence and a 6.2
percent increase a year hence. Import prices remain the major determinant of
domestic prices: a 100 percent increase in import prices produces a20.4
percent contemporaneous increase in import prices. This may seem relatively
small but this is because the import price index as constructed here does not
take into account changes in exchange rates, as it expresses import prices in
currencies of exporting countries. The increase in import prices is in most
cases outweighed by the appreciation of the KD against foreign currencies. As
for real output, the effect of government expenditure, though contemporaneous,
Is less powerful than the effect of the money supply which, though lagged, has
a coefficient of nearly three times that of government expenditure. Again it
must be stressed that these effects relate to the divergence of real output
from its trend value.
In the demand for currency equation the intercept term is insignificant,
Implying a proportional relationship between the demand for currency and
non-oil GDP, and confirming the applicability of the quantity theory with
respect to the demand for currency, i.e. currency is held for transactions
purposes only. The income elasticity of the demand for currency is 0.97 which
Is nearly 1, implying that there are no economies of scale in the demand fcr
currency. The demand for demand deposits is more elastic than the demand for
quasi-money with respect to 'permanent Income" and interest rate; and the
coefficient of adjustment (one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable) is larger in the case of demand deposits than in the case of
quasi-money, (0.47 versus 0.27) implying faster adjustment in the case of
demand deposits.
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For banks, an increase of one percentage point in the Eurodollar rate will
induce a reduction of excess reserves by about KD 15 million, whereas on
average, KD 115 million is held in the fourth quarter for the purpose of
"window dressing." Moreover, a 100 basis points increase in the Eurodollar
rate will induce a 23 basis points increase in domestic interest rates and
about a KD 112 millIon increase in potential supply of deposits.
Banks' supply of credit to the private sector depends mostly on the size of
their total deposits. The relationship is slightly more than proportional as a
100 percent increase in total deposits induces an increase in the supply of
credit of about 113 percent. A doubling of the interest rate differential will
only produce about a 5 percent decrease in the supply of credit. On the demand
side, credit is influenced more by imports than by domestic economic activity.
This is because the bulk of imports is financed by bank loans, whereas the
bulk of domestic economic activity is financed either by government
expenditure, directly or indirectly as in the case of construction, or by
cheap non-commercial loans from specialised banks as in the case of housing
(the Credit and Savings Bank) or Industrial projects (the Industrial Bank of
Kuwait).
Finally, imports are more influenced by "permanent income" than by the need to
re-export. A 100 percent increase in permanent income or the ratio of
re-exports to total exports will respectively produce 69 percent and 29
percent Increase in total imports.
Table 6.1 shows some of the more interesting elasticities which emerge from
the model. If y f (x, Yt-1), then short-run elasticities are calculated as
follows:
0.97
-1.06
	
0.56
	
1.19
	
-0.26	
-0.55
	
0.26
	
0.96
	
0.09
	
0.33
0.56
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x
E (y,x)=
y
Long-run elasticities, naturally larger than short-run elasticities are
calculated using the long-run reaction of y with respect to x in equations
involving a distributed lag adjustment process, i.e. lagged endogenous
variables. So, long-run elasticities are calculated by the formula
y/öx	 x
E(y,x)
1- 8y/ 8Yt-1
	
Y
This is because in a geometrically declining distributed lag function
=	 ak1-xt_j
Thus, the long-run reaction of y to a change in x is given by
Ea1	
a	
since O<k(l
1-k
After the Koyck transformation is performed, a is the coefficient of x
( y/ ox) and k is the coefficient of Yt-1 ( y/ Oyt-i).
Table 6.1: Some Short-Run and Long-Run Elasticities
Elasticity	 Short-Run	 Long-Run
E (C, Yn)
E (R, rf)
E (DD, Yp)
E (DD, rk)
E (QM, Yp)
E (QM, f)
E (TD5, rf)
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At this final stage, a word of warning is warranted. This model represents the
first "serious" attempt to model Kuwait's monetary sector in a disaggregated
form, and to trace out the effect of money on output and prices. Because of
the deficiency of some series, results should be treated with caution. As new
and better-quality data become available, the model can be improved and tested
over longer periods. After all, model building itself is a dynamic process in
the sense that various developments may lead to changes in the specification
of the model. These, inter alia, include changes in legislative and
institutional arrangements, advancement of economic theory, the emergence of
new empirical evidence, the re-interpretation of old evidence and changes in
policy objectives.
Khouja and
Sadler (1979)
2SLS
2 SLS
2 SLS
2SLS
2 SLS
0.925
0.771
0.969
0.987
0.789
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Cp	 f(Yd,	 P)
IP = f(M2/Yd,(Ip+Ig)_)
IM	 f(Y,P,M2/Yd)
GE	 f(Y,GR,(M2/Yd)t_i)
(M2) 3
 = f(GE, rf)
APPENDIX 6.1
SELECTED RESULTS FROM PREVIOUS ECONOMETRIC STUDIES
OF THE KUWAITI ECONOMY
Model	 Function	 Data Estimation
Method
Khouja (1973)
	 Cp = f(Y)	 Annual	 OLS	 0.956
Ip = f(Y)	 Annual	 OLS	 0.816
IM = f(Y)	 Annual	 OLS	 0.967
GE f(GR)	 Annual	 OLS	 0.961
GR f(X-NF)	 Annual	 OLS	 0,954
Crockett and	 (M1/P)d = f(Yn/P)**	 Annual	 OLS	 0.928
Evans (1980)	 (M2/P) d = f(Yn/P)**	 Annual	 OLS	 0.984
El-Beblawi and	 SP = f(,rf,Sp_l)	 Monthly	 OLS	 0.960
Fahmi (1981)
E1-Mallakh	 IM = f(GDA)	 Annual
	
OLS
	
0.990
and Atta (1981) (M2) 5 = f(CR,GDC,FAC,OD)
	
Annual	 OLS
	
0.990
CR f(Yn, Ynt_l)
	
Annual
	
OLS
	
0.910
P = f(M2, Pm)	 Annual	 OLS	 0.990
0.632
0.899
0.740
0.913
0.721
0.378
0.780
0.940
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Model	 Function	 Data Estimation	 R2
Method
Moosa (1983a)	 Yo = f( Ewixi)	 Annual	 OLS	 0.976
Moosa (1983e)	 (MlY	 f(GE,rk, t_i,M1t_i)	 Quarterly IV	 0.961
Claremont Econ- Yo = f(COP,COQ)**
ouiics Institute Yn
	 f(LEa,LEu,Lu)*
(1983)	 X = f(COP,COQ)**
P = f(Pm,LGEa,LGEu)*
(frn2) 3
	f(LGE,LE)*
d f(yn)**
QMd
 f(yn)**
rk = f(rf,COp,S)
r k	 f(rf,LGE,L)*
Annual	 OLS
Quarterly OLS
Annual	 OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
Annual	 OLS
Annual	 OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
0.980
0.978
0.990
0.987
0.807
0.990
0.910
0.840
0.937
Ghuloum (1984) R/TF=f(GE,DC,rf,SP,(R/TF)_l)
FA/TFf(GE, DC,rf,SP,(FA,TF)l)
Ci./TF=f(GE, DC,rf,Sp,(CR/TF)l)
0A/TFf(GE, DC,rf,Sp,(OA,TF)_l)
(Itl)5 =
(f2) = f(B,è,,E)
(Mi) 3 = f(GE, ACR)
(M2) 3 = f(GE, ACR)
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly OLS
Quarterly 2SLS
Quarterly 2SLS
Ku.iait tnt.	 COX = f(COXt_2,COXt_4,COQ)	 Quarterly OLS	 0.992
mv. Co. (1984) ROQ = f(C0QC0X,C0QC0X t ..i)	 Quarterly OLS	 0.898
O TAT ION
•	 Rate of change
First difference
L	 Distributed lag
d	 Demand (superscript)
s	 Supply (superscript)
*	 Output and/or expenditure measured in real terms
** Equation estimated in log-log form
Variables
tJnsubscripted variables are at time t.
B =	 Monetary base
c	 Currency to demand deposits ratio
COP =	 Crude oil price
COQ	 Crude oil production
COX =	 Crude oil exports
CP	 Private consumption
CR =	 Credit of commercial banks to private sector
DC =
	 Discounts to commercial banks
E =	 KD/dollar exchange rate
Eu =
	 Unanticipated change in KD/dollar exchange rate
FA	 Foreign assets of commercial banks
FAC =
	
Foreign assets of Central Bank
GDA	 Gross domestic absorption
GDC	 Government deposits at Central Bank
GE	 Government expenditure
GEa	 Anticipated government expenditure
GEu	 Unanticipated government expenditure
GR	 Government revenue
Ig	 Government investment (capital formation)
IN	 Imports
=Ml =
M2 =
NF
OA =
OD =
P =
Pm =
QM =
R =
r =
rf
=
ROQ
S =
sP =
I:	 =
TF
=
K =
xi =
Y =
Yd =
=
=
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Private investment (capital formation)
Narrow money
Broad money
Net factor payments
Other assets of commercial banks
Other deposits
Price level
Import prices
Quasi-money
Reserves of commercial banks
Reserves to demand deposits ratio
Foreign interest rate
Local interest rate
Refined oil production
Foreign risk
Stock prices
Quasi-money to demand deposits ratio
Total disposable funds of commercial banks
Principal-component weight of categcry i oil product
Exports
Value of category i oil product
GNP
Disposable income
Non-oil GDP
Oil GDP
/
APPENDIX 6.2
EXCHANGE RATE AND INFLATION
We have seen that Import prices significantly affect the domestic price level.
However, the variable Pin that was used to estimate the price equation does not
take into account changes in the exchange rate which have proved to be an
independent cause of inflationary pressures (Wanniski (1975)), and that may
explain why the coefficient of Pin in the price equation turned out to be
smaller than expected.
It has been argued (for example Mundell (1976)) that the inflationary impact
of exchange rate variability depends on the hypothesis that price increases
resulting from exchange rate depreciation have a larger, or more lasting
effect, than reductions that occur when the exchange rate appreciates. This
mechanism is attributed to several reasons such as:
(i) price setters respond more rapidly to developments that tend to erode
their incomes than to those that increase them;
(ii) the existence of a ratchet effect operating on the price level,
especially in periods of buoyant demand; and
(iii) because It is easier for price setters to put through an increase in
prices when there is an external factor (declining exchange rate) on
which to place the blame.
There are two methods whereby we can incorporate the effect of the exchange
rate in the original price equation:
(I) By adjusting the import price index Pin which was originally calculated as
a weighted average of the unit values of exports of the four major
exporters to Kuwait, i.e.
Pin = EXiE'i/EXI
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where P j is the unit value of exports of country i and Xj is its exports
to Kuwait. To adjust for exchange rate variability, we use the following
formula
4 XjP	 /4)/EXi
i::1
	
Ej /	 i
where Ej is an index of the exchange rate measured as number of units of
currency i per one KD.
(ii) By adding another explanatory variable, the KD effective exchange rate B
which is measured as a weighted average of its exchange rates against the
currencies of its top four exporters, i.e.
E =EEixi/xi
The following are the results of re-estimating the price equation using both
methods of adjustment to take account of the effect of exchange rate
P = 66.43 + 0.0162 Gt_3 + 0.0187 Gt_4 ^ 0.0093 TDt_2
(10.96) (3.49)	 (3.76)	 (7.00)
+ 0.0852 Pm*
(1.38)
a2 =0.989	 SE=l.42	 DW=l.39
P = 71.78 + 0.0096 Gt_3 + 0.013 Gt_4 + 0.0097 TDt_2
(8.66) (2.77)	 (3.39)	 (11.67)
^ 0.158 Pin - 0.116 g
(4.17)	 (-1.81)
R2 = 0.996	 SE = 0.970	 DW = 1.67
These results show that both variables accounting for exchange rate variation
(Pm* and B) are of low statistical significance. Pm* is insignificant at the 5
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percent level, whereas E is only significant on the basis of a one-tailed test
-though it is correctly signed- implying that the appreciation of the KD
(higher E) has a negative effect on the price level. The reason for the low
statistical significance of both variables is the asymmetry in the
relationship between the exchange rate and domestic prices under buoyant
demand; this characterised most of the estimation period (1977-82). The
relationship is asymmetric in the sense that lower exchange rates lead to
higher domestic prices, but the opposite is not necessarily true, at least in
terms of scale. This asymmetry is due to any, or all, of the three reasons
mentioned earlier, and it results in distorting the response of domestic
prices to exchange rate variablility and thus the low statistical significance
of pm* and E.
APPENDIX 6.3
DEMAND FOR REAL BALANCES
e have seen that demand functions for currency, demand deposits and
quasi-money were estimated in nominal terms, and several reasons were given to
justify such a procedure. The most important reason given was the
unavailability of a proper deflator, but it was also argued that if money
illusion is present, then it is justifiable to specify demand functions in
nominal terms.
Some empirical studies of advanced countries over the 1950s and 1960s have
verified the absence of money illusion by showing that the demand for nominal
money balances is homogeneous of degree one with respect to the price level.
Laidler and Parkin (1970) found evidence of a proportional relationship
between the demand for nominal balances and the price level. Similarly,
Goodhart and Crockett (1970) obtained results consistent with a long-run price
level elasticity of approximately unity. However, empirical evidence on this
issue is inconclusive, encouraging some economists to resort to Friedman's
(1959) notion of 'permanent price level" -measured as some average of current
and lagged values of prices- to explain "undesired results."
La this appendix a test for money illusion in Kuwait is conducted, and the
demand functions are re-estimated using real balances. The broad money
aggregate £42 will be used to test for money illusion since the functional
relationship used here does not contain an interest rate variable. Following
Conlisk (1970) we can test for money illusion using the following demand
function
M/Pi ayd
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where
= money stock (nominal)
P price level
I = money illusion parameter ( 1 when there is no money illusion)
a = velocity parameter which is equal to velocity when i=p=l
Y real Income
If we linearise the function by taking logs
log M- i log P log a+ b logY
or
log N = log a ^ b log Y + I log P
Therefore, testing for money illusion boils down to testing the significance
of i. If this function is estimated for Kuwait over the period 1975-82 using
non-oil GDP for income, we get the following results:
log N = -8.65 + 0.212 log Yn* + 3.21 log P
(-26.88) (2.63) 	 (27.54)
R2 0.989	 SE=0.057	 DW=1.l0
Estimation results show that i is significantly different from zero (t27.54),
and significantly different from one (t=18.89). Results show that any increase
In the price level leads to a more than proportional increase in the demand
for money, implying that the demand for money function is not homogeneous of
degree one with respect to the price level and thus the existence of strong
money illusion. However, it is felt desirable to present estimates for real
money balances using the same specifications as in the model, except that
money and income will now be measured in real terms (deflated by CPI).
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Demand for Currency
(CIP)d = 67.24 + 0.256 y*
(2.10) (4.04)
R2	0.427	 SE	 25.91	 DW	 1.07
Demand for Demand Deposits
(DD/P) d	24.41 + 0.0304 p* - 14.19 r
(0.43) (4.01)	 (-3.34)
+ 0.55 (DD/P)t-1 + 266.35 Dl
(9.09)	 (8.43)
R2 = 0.959	 SE = 40.29	 DJ	 2.18
Demand for Quasi-Money
(QM/P) d
	-73.08 ^ 0.0432 p* + 12.91 rf
(-1.47) (3.94)	 (4.49)
+ 0.699 (QM/P) t_i + 255.33 D2
(14.75)	 (6.51)
R2 = 0.995	 SE	 33.62	 D'1	 2.19
The only marked difference that emerges from these regressions concerns the
income elasticity of the demand for currency. En the case of real balances,
the income elasticity is significantly less than unity, implying that there
are economies of scale in the real demand for currency.
CHAPTER 7
MODEL SIMULATION AND PREDICTIVE POJER
7.1. Introduction
In Chapter 6 a model of Kuwait's monetary sector was estimated and validated
by examining the goodness of fit using such tatistics as R2 and t. In this
chapter, the model will be validated by simulation to see how well it
reproduces actual data. This exercise is not only important for validation per
se, but also for policy analysis, because simulations can be used to compare
the effects of alternative policies where policies are stated as changes in
the value of policy parameters.
In this context, it is important to elucidate the concept of model validation,
although part of the validation was undertakem in Chapter 6. Naylor and Finger
(1971) define model validation in general as proving the model is true.
Specifically, they argue that the model must have a high degree of goodness of
fit and that the assumptions upon which it rests must be valid. Sowey (1973)
presents an alternative definition with less stringent conditions than those
implied by Naylor-Finger. He defines validation simply as the process of
determining whether the model fulfils the demands made of it, i.e. whether it
does an adequate job of prediction both within and beyond the estimation
period.
Practicing econonietricians seem to think of validation in terms of a
combination of the two definitions mentioned above. The Howrey et al (1981)
survey presents views of some well-established model builders on the subject
of model validation. Keith Carlson favours validation to be based on dynamic
simulations of the model, whereas Gregory Chow gives a more detailed account
of the process. Chow looks upon validation as encompassing some, or all, of
the following procedures: examining properties of individual equations
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such as the standard errors of the individual parameters and the sizes and
behaviour of the residuals, studying goodness of fit of the entire system
using ex-post and ex-ante forecasting errors, properties of the reduced form
and the final form including various multipliers and stochastic properties,
and the checking of properties of subsystems imbedded in the model. Otto.
Eckstein responded to the question of validation by outlining the procedures
used by econoinetricians at Data Resources Incorporated (DRI), which include
S
the following: (i) individual equation testing through the standard test
statistics and dynamic single-equation simulation, (ii) full dynamic
historical simulation, (iii) tests for simulation properties including those
suggested by economic theory, (iv) "destructive" testing by assuming extreme
values for policy and other variables, and (v) ex-ante solution to assure that
the model has sound simulation properties In the forecast interval. Garry
Fromm believes that more work needs to be done on validation criteria and
procedures, but he points out that his current practice is to validate models
by predictive tests (conditional and unconditional) and by checking
correspondence with theory and institutional characteristics. Finally, Albert
Hirsch believes that validation depends on the specification, but that in
general the following procedures should be used: (i) single-equation criteria
(statistical, theoretical, judgemental), (ii) sector simulations, (iii) full
model simulations, and (iv) analysis of multipliers.
In Chapter 6 we satisfied the validation condition set out by t1aylor and
Finger. Here, we shall examine whether or not the model fulfils the validation
condition stated by Sowey, and some other validation procedures will be used
such as stochastic simulations. A question now arises as to whether model
validation should be based on its ex-ante or ex-post predictive power.
Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976), there are three types of
simulation/forecasting exercises:
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(i) Ex-post simulation, which may also be called historical simulation or
within-sample prediction. In this case the model is simulated (solved)
for the period for which historical data for all variables are
available, which serves the purpose of comparing the original data
series with the simulated series for each endogenous variable. It is the
kind of simulation that is particularly useful for policy analysis,
since by letting policy variables follow different time paths the
outcomes of different policies can be examined. This practice is,
however, subject to the Lucas critique discussed in Chapter 6. It may be
useful here to add that Christopher SIms (1982) argues that the types of
policy changes that are subject to the Lucas critique rarely occur.
(ii) EX-post forecasting, which may also be called out-of-sample prediction.
In this case the simulation Is done forward in time beyond the
estimation period, and this is useful for testing the forecasting
accuracy of a model.
(iii) Ex-ante forecasting, or conditional forecasting. This exercise requires
predictions of the exogenous variables, making the forecasts conditional
on the values of exogenous variables in any event (scenario). En this
case the simulation starts in the current period and goes Into the
future over the forecast horizon.
Ex-arite forecasts are important for policy making concerning future events,
but the comparison of forecasting performance of different models should be
based on ex-post results. This Is so because ex-ante forecasting involves the
subjective judgenient of the forecaster concerning future values of exogenous
and policy variables. The same point is true of model validation as McNees
(1981) Illustrates, stating that the traditional approach to model validation
dismisses ex-ante evidence because it reflects both the quality of the model
and the forecaster's subjective estimate of the future values of the exogenous
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variables in the model." Indeed, bad ex-ante forecasting results may have
nothing to do with the quality of the model. If any other than the actual
values of exogenous variables are used to solve the model, the resulting
errors would be partly attributable to the incorrect values of the exogenous
variables -which are not part of the model per Se- and not solely to the
deficiencies of the model.
Artis (1982) is more specific and illustrative on this issue as he proposes
four sources for the variations amongst different ex-ante forecasts: (i)
differences iii the information set available on the recent past, (ii)
differences in the judgement exercised to produce the forecast path of
equation residuals or constant adjustments, (iii) variations in the paths set
for exogenous variables, and (iv) differences in the models themselves -both
in their economic structure and in the set of variables considered to be
exogenous. Of these sources, only (iv) reflects the intrinsic quality of the
model, whereas (i),(ii) and (iii) pertain to the skill of the forecaster and
his ability to obtain unpublished information. For example, forecasting models
of the U.K. economy assume a fiscal and monetary policy stance consistent w'ith
the medium-term financial strategy of the government. However, the strategy
does not indicate an exact set of policy instrument changes (Wallis (1984)).
It is the forecaster's skill and ability to obtain inside information that
translates the broad indicators of the strategy into a set of figures that are
subsequently used to obtain ex-ante forecasts.
Differences in forecasts may also be due to residual adjustment which is a
tortally subjective procedure (Savage (1983)). What is meant by residual
adjustment is the introduction of non-zero residuals into the forecasts
instead of assuming a residual mean of zero. One argument for this practice is
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the belief that there are several social, political, acid economic factors that
impinge on the model in the forecast period which are not accounted for in the
original specification of the model. In this respect, a very interesting
observation was made by two professional economists who recently wrote the
following as they compared economic forecasters with weather forecasters,
.... but at least the weather forecasters do not have to make hasty
adjustments to their equations to cope with a strike among the thunder gods or
a cartel of the four winds ....' (Financial Times, 3rd July, 1985, P. 10).
This was written in the context of how forecasters took account of the effect
of the miners' strike on the British economy. Specifically, they said that
'... economic forecasters need to be psychologists and fortune-tellers as well
as economnetricians to allow for all the effects of the year-long strike."
On this issue, McNees (1981) concludes that "model validity can only be
established by ex-post simulatio1, using actual values of the exogenous
variables to solve the model." Because ex-ante forecasting reflects the skills
or otherwise of the forecaster, it has traditionally been regarded as
irrelevant to model validation. Piadyck and Rubinfeld (1976) explicitly state
that ex-post simulation should be used for model validation. It must be
mentioned, however, that ex-ante forecasts can b€ used to serve the purpose of
model validation because Artis (1982) has demonstrated the possibility of
decomposing them into differences arising from exogenous assumptions,
differences arising from residual judgenients and differences arising from the
models themselves. This methodology has been used to compare ex-ante forecasts
of models of the British economy (Wallis (1984) pp. 87-91).
7.2. Measures of Predictive Power
If the model is to be validated by ex-post simulation, we must find a measure
of predictive power that indicates how well it (the model) predicts the
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actual values of endogenous variables.
Several measures have been suggested (see for example Pindyck and Rubinfeld
(1976 pp. 314-320)) based on the deviation of predicted from actual values (or
changes). Theil's inequality coefficient (Theil (1962), (1966)) and the mean
absolute deviation have the advantage of avoiding the problem of positive and
negative errors cancelling each other. The inequality coefficient and the mean
square error both have the property of penalising large individual errors more
heavily. However, unlike the mean absolute deviation and the mean square
error, Theil's inequality coefficient has the additional advantage of
eliminating the scale factor, which makes it possible to compare the
predictive power of a model with respect to various endogenous variables
irrespective of the scale or units of measurement. For example, it . is
difficult to tell directly if the prediction of the money supply with mean
square error of 5000 is better or worse than the prediction of interest rate
with mean square error of 200. Ia the case of Theil's inequality coefficient,
the sum of predicted relative changes is divided by the sum of actual relative
changes and thus the scale factor as well as the units are eliminated in a
process similar to the standardisation of variables, and that makes comparison
easy.
Another advantage of Theil's inequality coefficient is that it can be
decomposed into three components in a fashion similar to the analysis of
variance (see Koutsoyiannis (1973) p. 493 and Gilchrist (1976) p. 235). Each
of the three components, which are called partial inequality coefficients,
shows a different source of forecast error: difference betweenineans,
difference between variances, and imperfect covariance of actual and predicted
values.
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Finally, Theil's inequality coefficient provides a relative basis for
comparison with naive methods through the interpretation of its numerical
value. A value of zero implies that the model attains perfect forecasts, a
value of one means that the model forecasts no better than a naive zero-change
prediction, and a value greater than one implies that the predictive power of
the model is worse than the zero-change prediction, which meafts that there is
no point in using it for forecasting.
A similar and related measure of predictive power has been suggested by
McLaughlin (1975) who refers to his measure as a "batting average" BA. This
measure Is related to Thell's coefficient U as follows
BA 100(4-U)
Thus if U = 0 (the case of perfect accuracy), BA = 40ci and if U = 1, BA = 300
and so on.
However, the problem with Thell's inequality coefficient (and also
McLaughlin's batting average), is that its numerical value does not indicate
the seriousness of prediction errors. For example, we know that values of 0.3
and 0.4 for Theil's inequality coefficent both indicate better prediction than
the naive zero-change model, and we also know that a value of 0.3 indicates
better prediction than a value of 0.4. But we do not know the seriousness of
prediction errors implied by these two values. A measure that tells us the
seriousness of prediction errors, and yet has most of the characteristics of
Theil's inequality coefficient, is the ratio of root mean square error to the
mean which is defined as follows:
___	 - Yp) 2
 In
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whee
Ya actual value
Yp = predicted value
Ya mean actual value
a = sample size
This measure tells us the seriousness of prediction errors because the
"average" error is expressed as a percentage of the mean value of the variable
concerned. Thus, we can feel the seriousness of errors better if we are told
that the average error Is, for example, 10 percent of the mean value of the
variable concerned. It also eliminates the units and the scale factor which
makes comparison easy. Therefore, this measure will be used to evaluate the
predictive power of the model.
All of the above mentioned measures, and their different variants, look at the
deviation of actual from predicted values (or changes) with the criterion that
the lower the deviation, the better is the model. However, this criterion is
not sufficient particularly for variables with frequent turning points in
their time path, e.g. interest rate. Indeed, many forecasters (for example
Cicarelli (1982)), argue that missed turning points are more important than
the magnitude of the error, i.e. predicting the direction of change is more
important than predicting its magnitude. Of course, It will be better to
predict both direction and magnitude correctly, and for this purpose the
prediction-realisation diagram will be utilised (see Koutsoyiannis (1973)
p. 490)). This tool serves the purpose of exposing graphically the existence
of direction (turning-point) errors, their magnitude, and the magnitude of
non-direction errors. In essence, it is a scatter diagram plotted on the old
familiar rectangular coordinate system of elementary analytical geometry (see
Figures 7.7-7.12). Actual changes in the variable concerned are measured along
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the vertical axis and predicted changes along the horizontal axis, such that
both actual and predicted changes are measured relative to the latest actual
observation. Thus, points lying in the first and third quadrants show' that the
model predicts the direction of the change in the dependent variable correctly
whereas those lying in the second and fourth quadrants imply direction or
turning-point errors. If a 45-degree line Is imposed such that it passes
through the origin with a positive slope, we will have a graphical measure of
prediction accuracy in the sense that points falling on the line imply perfect
prediction. Thus the 45-degree line is called the line of perfect prediction.
Table 7.1 illustrates all of the possibilities in the prediction-realisation
diagram.	 -
Table 7.1: Possibilities in the Prediction-Realisation Diagram
Position Relative to Line
Quadrant	 Above	 Below
1	 Underestimation	 Overestimation
2	 Turning Point Error
3	 Overestimation	 Underestimation
4	 Turning Point Error
It must be mentioned, however, that some forecasters have developed
quantitative measures of the ability of models to predict turning points (see
for example Cicarelli (1982)).
73. Predictive Power of the Kuwait Model
The model developed in Chapter 6 was simulated over the estimation period
1977-82 to see how' well It reproduces historical data for six endogenous
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variables: price level, real output (non-oil GD?), interest rate, money stock,
credit, and imports. Table 7.2 shows the ratio of the root mean square error
to the mean over the sample period, arid the number of turning point errors
which can be identified through the prediction-realisation diagram (Figures
7.7-7.12) as the points falling in the second and fourth quadrants. Figures
7.1-7.6 plot the actual and predicted values of the six variables.
Table 7.2: Within-Sample Predictive Power
Variable	 RMSE/Meaa (7.)	 Turning Point Errors
Price Level
	
0.8	 1
Real Output	 8.7
	
6
Interest Rate	 13.2	 3
Money Stock	 6.2
	
5
Credit
	
7.9
	
4
Imports	 5.2	 2
The model predicts price.level extremely well. The root mean square error is
only 0.8 percent of the mean value and there is only one turning point error
which occurred at the third quarter of l981. The model predicted a decline in
the price level by 0.5 when it actually rose by 0.5. The model predicted that
decline because government expenditure decreased by 18.4 percent in the fourth
quarter of 1980 (i.e. the explanatory variable Gt_3).
For real output, root mean square error is 8.7 percent of the mean value, not
bad considering the seasonal volatility of this variable. There are six
turning point errors: in four of them the model predicts an increase in real
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output whereas in fact it declined (78(1), 78(4), 81(1), and 81(4)), while in
the other two, the model predicts a decrease when in fact it increased (79(3)
and 80(3)).
Interest rate has the highest and the only double-digit ratio of root mean
square error to the mean (13.2 percent), but the model is very good in
predicting turning points of this highly volatile variable (only three turning
point errors). For the second quarter of 1978, the model predicts a decline of
20 basis points -because of improved liquidity position- when in fact it rose
by 10 basis points. For the second quarter of 1981, the model predicts a rise
of 140 basis points -because of a 338 basis point rise in the Eurodollar rate-
but the rate actually declined by 110 basis points. For the fourth quarter of
1981, the model predicts a rise of 20 basis points -because it underestimated
the effect of improved liquidity position on lowering the rates- when it
actually declined by 40 basis points. These errors may be taken to indicate
that the net position of commercial banks with the Central Bank does not
always fully reflect the liquidity of the banking system.
The 1982 turning points in the money stock are very well predicted by the
model, something that a time-series extrapolative model would not have done
just as well. The model, however, excessively overestimates the money stock in
1977 and in the first quarter of 1980, largely reflecting the effect of the
volatile behaviour of reserves on the supply side. There are five turning
point errors, in all of which the model predicts a decline, again because of
the behaviour of reserves. This may be taken to mean that a better
specification of the deposits-supply function is viarranted. A better
specification would incorporate the liquidity ratios and, also, distinguish
between excess and required reserves. However, it is not possible to estimate
such a function for the time being, because of some data problems.
4.3
7.1
16.5
11.7
14.4
8.8
138.7
556.3
6.91
4268.6
4565.1
532.6
Price Level
Real Output
Interest Rate
Money Stock
Credit
Imports
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For credit, the ratio of root mean square error to the mean is 7.9 percent.
There are four turning point errors, in all of which the model predicts a fall
on demand considerations, which may imply inadequacy of the specification of
the demand-for--credit function, perhaps because it should incorporate a
measure of activity in the domestic stock market as a source of demand.
Finally, imports are predicted very well, especially turning points as there
are only two turning point errors for the third quarter of both 1979 and 1981.
Predicted values are so close to actual values with the exception of two
relatively large deviations for the first quarter of 1978 and the second
quarter of 1982.
The model was also simulated over the four quarters of 1983 to measure the
out-of-sample predictive power. Results are shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Out-of-Sample Predictive Power
Variable	 Mean	 RMSE/Mean (7.)
Out-of-sample prediction performance is reasonably good, though not as good as
the within-sample performance, particularly with respect to the price level.
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However, I tend to suspect the accuracy of the published 1983 CPI figures.
These figures imply an annualised inflation rate of 6.5 percent in the first
quarter, which declined in the three subsequent quarters to 0.9, 0.4 and 0.3
percent. This is difficult to comprehend as no drastic policy or other changes
took place in that period. Out-of-sample predictions for real output and
interest rate are good in the particular sense of structural stability. The
ratio of out-of-sample mean square error to cithin-sanip1e mean square error
for the two variables is 0.8 and 1 respectively. A value of this ratio close
to unity is suggestive of structural stability (see Wold (1964) pp. 229-35).
7.4. Dynamic Stability of the Model
En this section the dynamic stability of the model is examined with respect to
the effect of a once and for all exogenous shock. This property is important
because if the model is not stable, any economic implications drawn from it
would lose their credibility.
Stability testing will be confined to the effect of fiscal and monetary shocks
on the price level and real output. Stability requires that the system tends
to return to the original equilibrium state that existed before the shock was
given. The following shocks will be given to the price level:
(i) 50 percent cut in government expenditure in each quarter of 1976.
(ii) 50 percent reduction in total deposits in the third and fourth quarters
of 1976.
And the following shocks will be given to real output:
(iii) The growth rate of government expenditure is left unchanged in the fitst
quarter of 1977 (22.9 percent), but raised in the second quarter from the
original 15 percent to 130 percent.
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(iv) The growth rate of total deposits is left unchanged in the fourth quarter
of 1976 (6.1 percent) but lowered in the first quarter of 1977 from the
original 7.7 percent to -28 percent.
The model was simulated over the estimation period using these four changes.
The newly-simulated series (after the shock) were compared with the
originally-simulated series (base run). For the model to be stable, the ratio
of the new series to the original series should tend back to unity after a
while.
Figures 7.13-7.16 illustrate the results of this exercise. Figure 7.13 shows
that the effect of shock (i) is to reduce the price level in 1977, but the
initial equilibrium state is restored aftr four quarters as the ratio of the
two series converges on unity. Figure 7.14 shows that the effect of a
two-quarter monetary contraction on the price level is felt in four quarters,
then the initial state is restored. Figure 7.15 shows that the effect of shock
(iii) is to boost real output since the deviation of actual from trend values
of output depends in part on contemporaneous growth rate of government
expenditure. Finally, Figure 7.16 shows that the effect of shock (iv) is an
initial contraction of real output. In both cases (iii and iv), the initial
equilibrium state is restored after two quarters. These results provide
evidence on the proposition that the model will eventually return to the
original equilibrium with varying degress of speed of adjustment following a
shock disturbance. Therefore, the model is stable.
7.5. Properties of Symmetry
Zeilner and Peck (1973) have demonstrated that it is important from an
economic point of view to examine asymmetric responses of econometric models.
Figure 7.13
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For example, does an x percent increase in government expenditure have the
same extent of inflationary impact as an equivalent decrease has a
deflationary effect? The following analysis is confined to two endogenous
variables: price level and real output. Similar tests.can, of course, be
carried out for other endogenous variables.
The experimental design is as follows. First, the estimated price and output
equations are simulated over the period 1977(1) to 1982(4) using the
historically observed values. Second, the output of this "base run" is
compared with the output of other runs in which certain exogenous and policy
variables are changed from their observed values. Specifically, the following
changes are introduced:
(i) 20 percent change in import prices
(ii) 20 percent change in total deposits
(iii) 20 percent change in government expenditure
(iv) 20 percent change in the growth rate of total deposits
(v) 20 percent change in the growth rate of government expenditure
In particular, the results are related to the symmetry of the response of
price level to changes (i),(ii) arid (iii), and the symmetry of the response of
real output to changes (iv) and (v).
The results of experiments are shown in Figures 7.17 and 7.18. We can see that
the price and output responses to fiscal and monetary changes are remarkably
symmetric, and so is the case with the response of price level to import
prices. Figure 7.17 shows that upward and downward deviations of the price
level from the base run values are identical in magnitude, which is
represented graphically by the fact that the curves in the upper half of the
0.999
0.999
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diagram are mirror images of those In the lower half. The same is true for the
response of output as shown in Figure 7.18.
In addition to this visual examidation, Table 7.4 presents some numerical
measures of symmetry. The measure AD is the average deviation of the
endogenous variable from the base run value, such that equal absolute values
indicate high degree of symmetry. The measure Sif is the ratio of aso2ute
deviations on the 'plus and minus sides, such that values close to unity
Indicate a high degree of symmetry. Obviously, results presented irr the table
substantiate results of the visual inspection of Figures 7.17 and 7.18.
Table 7.4: Numerical Measures of Symmetry
Change in	 Price Level	 Real Output
AD	 SM	 AD	 SM
G
Pm
+2.5371
-2.5392
+3.8017
-3.8038
+4.5896
-4.5917
	
0.999	 +40.6150
-40.6188
	
0.999	 +113.2850
-113.2888
0.999
It must be mentioned that symmetry, in this case, is due to the fact that the
price and output equations are already in the reduced form, in the sense that
there are no endogenous variables on the right hand side. In testing their
model of the Korean economy, Otani and Park (1976) found some asymmetric
responses (for example net foreign assets to changes in interest rate), which
they attributed to the fact that some of the endogenous variables are affected
Figure 7.17
Symmetry of Price Level Response to Exogenous Changes
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.02
1.01
1.00
0 . 99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.95
0.94
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
Figure 7.18
Symmetry of Real Output Response to Exogenous Changes
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
- 372 -
not only directly, by the exogenous variable in question, but also indirectly,
by other endogenous variables.
7.6. Dynamic Elasticities
Dynamic elasticities indicate how the demand for goods (in this case money)
changes over time, in response to a change in one of the explanatory
variables. In Chapter 6, the interest and income elasticities of the demard
for demand deposits and quasi-money were calculated without epllc.itly
recognising that the value of the elasticity depends on how much time is
allowed to elapse after the interest rate or income has changed. Because of
the time factor, it is much more meaningful to look at dynamic elasticities.
The dynamic interest elasticity after time s is defined as
rt	 Mt^s -
Er(s)
Mt
where
rt = interest rate at time t
Mt = demand for money at time t
rt change in interest rate occurring at time t
Mt^s - Mt change in the demand for money after a time interval
s has elapsed
Similarly, the dynamic income elasticity Ey is defined as
Yt	 Mt^g-Mt
Ey(s)
Mt	 yt
Figure 7.19 shows the behaviour of the dynamic interest elasticity of demand
Figure 7.19
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deposits (with respect to rk), and quasi-money (with respect to rf), as
derived from the model. In the case of the fortner, the elasticity increases
rapidly (in absolute value) with time, then approaches the asymptotic value of
-0.58. Similarly, the dynamic interest elasticity of the demand for
quasi-money increases rapidly at first, then approaches the asymptotic value
of 0.49, although it takes a longer time period to approach this value than in
the case of demand deposits. This difference is due to the unequal speeds of
adjustment as reflected in the coefficient of lagged dependent variables in
the two demand equations.
Figure 7.20 shows the dynamic elasticities iith respect to (permanent) income
of demand deposits and quasi-money. Both increase rapidly at first, then
approach the asymptotic values of 1.62 and 1.54 respectively. It is noteworthy
that all of the asymptotic values are higher than the short-run and long-run
elasticities which were calculated at the means and presented in Chapter 6.
7.7. Stochastic Simulations
So far attention has been focused on the deterministic solution and simulation
of the model. In all of the simulation exercises, deterministic values have
been assumed for the estimated coefficients and zero error terms. In the case
of stochastic simulations these two assumptions are discarded, and.a
probability distribution is specified for the error term and estimated
coefficients of each equation of the model. Using these probability
distributions, a large number of simulations can be performed, such that the
error term and estimated coefficients assume different values chosen from
their respective probability distributions. Thus, for each endogenous
variable, a set of predictions equal to the number of performed simulations is
obtained, and can be subsequently used to define a confidence interval.
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The appropriate probability distribution for the error terms and estimated
coefficients can be obtained by making the following assumptions:
(i) Error terms are normally distributed with zero mean and standard
deviation equal to the standard error of the regression.
(ii) The estimated coefficients of each equation follow a joint normal
distribution, where the mean of each coefficient is given by its
estimated value, the standard deviation of each coefficient is given by
its estimated standard error, and the covariances between coefficients
are given by the estimated covariance matrix. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to assume that the cov-ariances between ceofficients are zero,
although this results in overestimating the prediction error (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld (1976) p. 362).
The procedure can be explained by referring to the price equation, which is
rewritten as follows
p = (58.2 + v1 ) + (0.012 + vz) Gt_3 + (0.016 + v3) Gt..4
^ (0.0088 + v4) TD t...2 ± (0.177 + v5) Pm +
Thus, the random variables v1 ....... ,v5 and u1 are normally distributed with
means and standard deviations as shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Probability Distributions of Random Variables (Price Equation)
Random Variable	 Mean	 Standard Deviation
0	 3.71629
v2	 0	 0.00343
V3	 0	 0.00348
v4	 0	 0.00071
V5	 0	 0.03410
uj	 0	 1.02632
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sow, suppose that we would like to obtain a stochastic one-period--ahead
forecast of the price level, say for the first quarter of 1983. We do this by
performing a large number of simulations. In each simulation we select, at
random, a value from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard
deviation 3.72 and repeat the procedure for the rest of the random variables
V2 ....., u1. Thus, we obtain a set of predicted values for which we can
calculate the mean and standard deviation to determine a confidence interval.
To forecast ovet a time horizon longer than one period, we select a different
random value for u1 for each period, but use the same random value for
, v5 during the whole simulation because the equations of the model
were specified and estimated under the assumption that the coefficients are
constant over time (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976) p. 363). Two further
important points should be clarified:
(i) In the case of linear models, as the number of simulations increases, the
sample mean will approach the deterministic forecast.
(ii) To conduct ex-ante stochastic simulations, the exogenous variables are
treated as normally distributed random variables with means equal to
their predicted values, and standard deviations equal to their standard
errors of prediction.
This methodology can be used to simulate six endogenous variables (price
level, real output, interest rate, money stock, credit, and imports) over four
periods, beginning with the first quarter of 1983 and ending with the last
quarter of that year. The simulations are conducted using the actual values of
the exogenous variables.
The results of a sample of 20 simulations are shown in Figures 7.21-72& where
each simulation is represented by a different path for the eridogenous variable
that resulted from different random errors. The starting point is the actual
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value of the endogenous variable at the fourth quarter of 1982. It is obvious
that there is considerable dispersion in the simulated values, this is partly
due to the fact that the covariances between the coefficients of each equation
are not accounted for. This procedure tends to overestimate the prediction
error because negative covariances cancel part of the variance in each
coefficient. However, this procedure is followed because of the difficulty of
generating random numbers from joint probability distributions. Another reason
for the dispersion is that random numbers were generated from a 99 percent
confidence interval, i.e. three standard deviations above and below the mean
(see computer program listing in Appendix 7.1). Dispersion would have been
less considerable if the random numbers were generated from a 95 percent
confidence interval, i.e. two standard deviations above and below the mean.
With reference to the computer program listed in Appendix 7.1, this can be
done by changing statements 100-140 inclusive and statement 180. For example,
the number 11.15 (three standard deviations of the constant term in the price
equation) should be changed to 7.45 (two standard deviations) and so on. In
fact if the program is re-run using a 95 percent confidence interval,
dispersion -as measured by the standard deviation of the simulated s,alues of
the price level- will be reduced drastically. For example, the standard
deviation for the first quarter will fall from 14.2 to 7.9.
It is a property of linear models that as the number of stochastic simulations
becomes large, their mean will approach the deterministic simulation. In
practice the choice of how many simulations to perform depends partly on
computation cost. In the present case, the mean of 20 stochastic simulations
turned out to be close to the deterministic simulations as calculated in
section 7.3. Table 7.6 shows the values of deterministic and mean stochastic
(in parentheses) simulations for four endogenous variables over the period
1983(1) - 1981(4).
Money Stock
Credit
Imports
(7 . 00)
3643.4
(3580.9)
4138.0
(4084.9)
490.4
(474.5)
(8.80)
4270.8
(4225.2)
3863.9
(3792.3)
516.0
(498.0)
(7.90)
3651.9
(3581.4)
3753.0
(3718.2)
446.8
(428.4)
(5.40)
3700.7
(3635.0)
.4017.2
(3967.2)
508.9
(492.3)
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Table 7.6: Comparison of Deterministic and Stochastic Simulations
Variable	 1983(1)	 1983(2)	 1983(3)	 1983(4)
Price Level
	
132.8
	
132.1
	
132.1
	
134.5
	
(131.3)	 (131.1)	 (130.3)	 (133.5)
Real Output
	 587.5
	
580.6
	
554.6
	
597.5
	
(600.6)	 (594.8)	 (573.4)	 (611.0)
Interest Rate
	 4.81
	
6.61
	
7.47
	
8.46
7.8. Conclusion
Chapters 6 and 7 have been devoted to the task of formulating, estimating arid
validating a quarterly econometric model of Kuwait's monetary sector. It must
be stressed here that the exercises conducted in this chapter on the basis of
the model are not all that can be done. The model seems sufficiently robust to
be useful for policy analysis, and virtually unlimited number of policy and
other simulations can be performed using the relationships that comprise the
model. However, this model is by no means the only one that can be built, and
its empirical performance leaves some room for improvement. Thus, it opens up
a potentially fruitful line for further research, and creates some sort of
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standard against which any future empirical work on the Kuwait! economy can be
evaluated.
Once again, it must be emphasised that building an econometric model to
capture the structure of an economy or a sector is not an easy task. No matter
how large or complex a model may be, it is still very simple compared with
reality, and one canonly strive to achieve a close approximation to the real
world. As Franco Modigliani distinctly puts it, "the problem is not that
econometric models fail to capture the real world, but that the real world is
difficult for policy makers to control."*
p
* This statement was made in a general discussion during a 1978 conference
organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on "Persistence of High
Inflation and High Unemployment." Modigliani's position is also supported by
Richard Lipsey (1981). See also Lang (1983) for a simplified but a very
interesting discussion of the issue.
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APPENDIX 7.1
COMPUTER PROGRAM LISTING
This appendix contains a listing of the BASIC program used to generate random
numbers and conduct 20 stochastic simulations on the price level using the
procedure outlined in section 7.7. The following notation was used in the
program
Vl(20). . .V5(20)	 vectors of random numbers used to adjust
the coefficients
Ul(20,4)	 20x4 matrix of stochastic error terms
X(t,f4)	 4x4 matrix of actual (1983) values of
exogenous variables
S(20,4)	 2Ox4 matrix of simulated values of
endogenous variables
The following is a brief explanation of the program by statement numbers
	
10-20	 Initialising the program
	
30-70	 Reading actual data of exogenous variables
	
80-150	 Generating random numbers for v1 ....., v5
	
160-200	 Generating random numbers for ui
	
210-300	 Calculating and printing simulated values
of endogenous variables
310-410
	
Calculating and printing means and standard
deviations of simulated values
420-450	 Actual data of exogenous variables
I...'
40
ci
f- il
I.. U
i-I
•-' 14
100
110
120
130
140
ci
lEO
170
•1 	 -U
1 '-'U
U U
I U
230
240
250
E. I
270
U
- ci ci
3 10
340
t
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CIAPTER 8
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1. Recapitulation and Main Findings
The recent monetary history of Kuwait has provided substantial evidence on the
lack of "monetary discipline" in this small open economy. It has also become
apparent that the monetary phenomena of the 1970s and early l980s have had a
direct impact on all sectors of the economy.
The pro-cyclical activities of cormnercial banks, coupled with the lack of
effective monetary policy, have pushed the Kuwaiti economy into turbulent
waters on several occasions. Indeed, these factors taken together contributed
to the ethergence of inflationary pressures, recession and the collapse of the
stock market on two occasions in less than five years, not to mention the
sharp ups and downs of the real estate market and the recurring problem of
capital outflows. Moreover, the pattern of sactoral growth, which has bean
inappropriate for development, has largsly been guided by the credit policy of
the coimnercial banks.
Such observations prompted the initiation of this study, with two objectives
in mind: (1) to provide guidelines and tools enabling the monetary authorities
in Kuwait to conduct a more effective monetary policy, i.e. one that should
facilitate the avoidance of the upheavals experienced in the l97Os and early
l9BOs; and (ii) to illuminate some of the still mysterious aspects of the
structure and working of Kuwait's monetary sector.
Monetary policy has failed, particularly as a short-run stabilisation tool via
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the control of the money supply. This study represents an attempt to find out
whether or not it was feasible to control the money supply in Kuwait, identify
the reasons for failure and sketch broad guidelines for a programme of
monetary control. The following are the broad characteristics of the Kuwaiti
economy which provide a framework for studying monetary phenomena:
Ci)	 The Kuwaiti economy is extremely open and depends heavily on the
external world for imports, foreign currency earnings and labour force.
(ii) The volatile pattern of economic growth is due mainly to fluctuations in
the oil sector, triggered by exogenous factors.
(iii) The relationship between growth of the oil sector and non-oil sectors is
long-term, i.e. a drop in oil GDP in one year does not necessarily lead
to a drop in non-oil GDP In that year.
(iv) There is no one-to-one relationship between the government's total
revenue and total expenditure, and the latter is more Influenced
by oil revenue than by investment income. 	 -
(v) Oil exports are the prime determinant of the balance of trade, whereas
imports have no significant effect.
It is argued that because of property (iv) above, domestic money supply tends
to be insulated from the effect of the balance of payments in the short run,
indicating that there is scope for short-run manipulation of the money supply.
In order to design a programme for monetary control, this study considered the
four points which comprise the components of a policy in terms of the money
stock; they are as follows:
(I)	 The most appropriate definition of money.
(ii) The relationship between money and real and price variables.
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(iii) The process by which the stock of money is determined.
(iv) The role played by the Central Bank's policy instruments in that process.
Point (i) was treated both theoretically and empirically. Empirical testing
was carried out on various monetary aggregates ranging from the narrow Ml to
M2A which includes government as well as private deposits. Three kinds of
tests were used: the Friedman-Meiselnian test for correlation with real
economic activity, stability (Chow) test for the relationship between the
demand for money and income, and a test for the predictability of this
functional relationship. The results were in favour of using the broad M2 for
conducting monetary policy, and it was shown that the addition of government
deposits to this aggregate did not alter the results significantly. Moreover,
a version of the Granger-Sims causality test revealed a unidirectional effect
from money to income, although some reservations were expressed concerning
this result.
Point (ii) was studied within the framework of a structural econometric model.
It was found that the deviation of real output (non-oil GDP) from its trend
depends on the contemporaneous growth rateôf government expenditure and the
lagged growth rate of the money supply (excluding currency); also that the
monetary stimulus is approximately three times stronger in its effect than the
fiscal stimulus. While the monetary stimulus was also found to have a
considerable effect on the price level, both in terms of strength and speed,
no factor exerted a greater influence on domestic prices than import prices.
However, this multi-factorial syndrome tends to discredit the traditional via
that inflation in Kuwait is purely imported.
Point (iii) was dealt with using two models, a reduced-form model and a
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structural modal. In the first modal, the money supply process was formulated
in terms of the multiplier framework, such that the money stock was envisaged
to be some multiple of the monetary base. A Chow test showed that the
relationship between the money stock and monetary base has been unstable.
Evidence was also found to support the hypothesis that changes in the base
tend to affect the multiplier through interest rate, although the effect was
found to be small. This approach showed that the money supply can be
controlled if it is possible to forecast the multiplier and control the
monetary base. Therefore, two behavioural equations were estimated for the
components of the multiplier: the currency to deposits ratio, and the reserve
to deposits ratio; it was shown that such a model can be used to forecast
these two ratios, the multiplier and, consequently, the money supply. The
control of the monetary base was found to be more feasible with the joint
collaboration of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance because one of
the components of the base, government deposits with the Central Batik, is
under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The second component, discounts,
can be controlled directly by the Central Bank but the third component, net
foreign assets of the Central Bank, is rather difficult to control because it
depends on the balance of payments position. Since exports are exoganously
determined and imports are insignificant in determining the balance of
payments, the only way to control net foreign assets is through the control of
capital flows.
The process by which the stock of money is determined was also dealt with in
the framework of a disaggragated structural supply-demand modal in which broad
money is disaggragated into currency, demand deposits and quasi-money.
Disaggregated demand functions were estimated on the grounds that an aggregate
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function would distort the interest rate effect. A deposits-supply function
was also estimated, showing that the supply depends on reserves and interest
rate. According to the modal, the equilibrium stock of money is determined by
the solution of the model, and so both supply and demand factors are
effective. The model also suggests that controlling banks' reserves can, in
part, accomplish the objective of controlling the money supply. It must be
mentioned, however, that the examination of within-sample predictive power of
the model suggested that a re-specification of the deposits supply function
was warranted, but the estimation of the re-specified function can only be
possible In the future when longer time-series on required and excess reserves
are available. The model also determines interest rate, banks' credit to the
private sector and the effect of the monetary sector on output and prices.
The failure of monetary policy in Kuwait to control monetary growth can be
attributed to a lack of understanding of the growth process; the commitment of
the Central Bank to accommodate fiscal expansion; and the shortage, inadequacy
and misuse of policy tools implied by point (iv). It was shown that the
discount window has been inappropriately used, i.e. only to boost banks'
ability to grant credit rather than to affect the level of borrowed reserves,
this has fuelled inflation and speculation. The discount rate has been changed
only once since the system was introduced in 1975, which implies that this
important policy variable has neither been effective in controlling the cost
of borrowed reserves, nor in influencing the structure of interest rates.
Moreover, up to June 1980, there had been no required reserve ratio, rendering
the liquidity system limited in its usefulness as a controlling device.
Normally, liquid asset ratios are used to reinforce the effect of changes in
the reserve ratio, for without the former, banks can offset changes in the
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latter simply by liquidating some of their liquid assets. Even the reserve
ratio has been ineffective in controlling reserves, firstly because the
prescribed 3 percent level was too low, and secondly, because the commercial
banks in Kuwait, due to the unavailability of diversified money market
instruments and the fact that part of the reserves (Central Bank bills) are
interest-bearing assets, tend to hold substantial excess reserves. Rather like
the discount rate, the required reserve ratio has remained unaltered sinceits
introduction in 1980, when one expects this tool to be used in a flexible
manner and as dictated by monetary and economic conditions. Finally, while
open market operations were non-existent, the Central Bank of Kuwait has taken
a step in this direction by the issuance of bills with the ultimate objective
of using them as a vehicle for conducting open market operations. However,
Central Bank bills cannot perform this function effectively because they are,
themselves, part of the reserves; • thus, any measure by the Central Bank. to
reduce banks' reserves by selling bills will fail because it will only affect
the composition, not the size, of reserves. This is so, because Central Bank
bills are a perfect substitute for cash.as far as the reserve requirements are
concerned, and because there is no minimum required cash reserve ratio.
Moreover, monetary policy has failed in curbing capital outflows despite the
preoccupation of the monetary authorities with this particular problem.
Ironically, it is the combination of interest rate and exchange rate policies
that has provided a wide differential between KD and dollar deposit rates, and
a stable KD/dollar exchange rate. Such a combination has created the ideal
environment for interest rate arbitrage and, hence, capital outflows,
particularly since there are no restrictions on capital transfers. These two
policies have proved inadequate in other respects. Firstly, the interest rate
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policy has been concerned primarily with the role of interest rate as a loan
rate i.e. the means of regulating the cost, availability, and sectoral
distribution of bank credit. As such, it has overlooked other functions of the
interest rate, i.e. the mobilisation of resources (resulting in capital
outflows), and the optimum allocation of savings between consumption and
investment. Secondly, the interest rate policy has also failed in diverting
resources (bank credit) to productive sectors and contributed to boosting
speculative activity and eventually the collapse of the stock market. Thirdly,
the exchange rate policy has only resulted in the stability of the KD/dollar
exchange rate and its consequences have not been significantly different from
those of pegging to a single currency (the dollar), which was originally
abandoned in favour of the present policy.
8.2. Other Findings
This study contains many other findings which were reached either via a
thorough theoretical discussion or, whenever possible, through empirical work.
Major findings are as follows:
There has, indeed, been evidence of financial development in Kuwait since the
foundation of the Central Bank of Kuwait. Positive indicators include the
opening of more bank branches, the emergence and growth of specialised banks
and other financial institutions, the general increase and diversity of
banking activities, and increased sophistication of financial markets.
Estimation of the demand-for-money functions over the two periods 1975-78 and
1979-82 provides evidence of growing financial sophistication, and examination
of the DW statistics of equations containing income and lagged dependent
variable as explanatory variables reveal that there are missing variables
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in the equations estimated over the period 1979-82. This has been interpreted
to mean that the missing variable (interest rate) was more important in the
latter period, again indicative of growing financial sophistication. However,
there is still room for significant improvement especially in the area of
diversification of financial instruments.
It was argued in this study that the lack of autonomy and independence of the
Central Bank of Kuwait has not only constrained its proper functioning, but is
also in direct contrast with article 13 of the Central Bank Law. Another
finding concerns the role of the bank-client relationship as a rationing
device in the process of granting credit to the private sector. The Central
Bank was found to play a rationing role iii the process due to its power to
restrict credit to any single borrower. The model presented in Chapter 6
showed that the demand for credit is not sensitive to interest rate, at least
in the period under consideration (1977-82), because of the then prevailing
high rates of return on real and financial investment. Thus, there was always
excess demand for credit but interest rate did not have any rationing role.
It was shown that the velocity of circulation of money was positively
correlated with per capita real Income, and, negatively correlated with
interest rate. The implication of this finding is that financing economic
development by expanding the money supply is inflationary In the short run,
though not necessarily so in the long run.
Time-series analysis of the broad monetary aggregate 12 showed that there is
no seasonal variation in the money supply. However, this was due to the
inclusion, of curtenc."j it t2 because when a different seasonality test was
conducted on total deposits (M2 less currency), by examining the empirical
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residuals of a regression equation containing reserves and interest rate as
explanatory variables, it was found that there is seasonal variation in the
supply of deposits. This seasonality can be attributed to excess reserves,
these tend to increase in the fourth quarter due to accumulation by banks for
the purpose of "window dressing" towards year-end.
It was also argued that a rule of constant monetary growth is not feasible in
the long run, because given an exchange rate system of managed floating,
domestic money supply is determined by the balance of payments position.
However, it was argued that a rule for government expenditure could be useful
as a "disciplinary tool."
Some additional conclusions can be drawn from the econometric modal presented
in Chapter 6. Firstly, the model revealed that a one percentage point increase
in the 3-month Eurodollar rate will induce a reduction of banks t excess
reserves holdings by about KD 15 million, an increase of 23 basis points in
the 3-month KD interbank rate, and KD 112 million increase in the potential
supply of deposits. Secondly, the model shows that banks' supply of credit is
governed by a desired ratio of credit to total private deposits, with
deviations from this ratio caused by the differential between foreign and
local interest rates. The sum of private and government deposits of commercial
banks seems to be the factor that determines banks' ability to grant credit,
and thus government deposits can be used as a policy variable to influence the
volume of credit to the private sector. Thirdly, it was found that the
Iraq-Iran war had but an initial depressive impact on the level of imports.
While a drop was experienced in 1981, the original trend was restored in 1982
as people realised that the war would continue for some considerable time and
adapted to the new situation.
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Further experimentation with the model showed that it was dynamically stable,
i.e. it tended to return to the original equilibrium with varying degrees of
speed of adjustment following a shock disturbance. The model also showed
symmetrical reactions of output and price level to exogenous shocks. Finally,
various validation tests showed that the modal was sufficiently robust to be
useful in practice. It can, thus, be used by policy makers to test a variety
of specific policy actions.
8.3. Policy Recommendations
In the light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations can
be made. If followed, these are likely to prevent a recurrence of the
misfortunes of the l970s and the early 1980s, which undoubtedly resulted from
the lack of an effective monetary policy. Specifically, these recommendations
will result in tightar control and a more well-behaved monetary growth, curb
capital outflows, and achieve a distribution of bank credit that is compatible
with development priorities.
(1) The Central Bank should be given more autonomy in formulating and
executing monetary policy.
(2) The Central Bank should embark on a programme aiming at improving its
research capabilities to support its policy actions.
(3) Urgent attention must be given to the development of financial markets,
especially in the direction of introducing a variety of financial
instruments that can be acquired by financial institutions and the
public. There has already bean some move in this direction, since from
September 1985, KB-denominated bonds were listed on the Kuwait Stock
Exchange and market makers were allowed to operate.
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(4) Banks' reserves must be controlled more effectively through the discount
window, reserve and liquidity ratios, and open market operations. In
particular, the discount window should no longer be a source of cheap
funds for banks. The discount rate and reserve: ratio should be changed
frequently in accordance with monetary conditions, and the latter should
be raised. To upgrade open market operations, Central Bank bills should
no longer be considered as part of the reserves, and operations should be
based on other financial instruments, e.g. KD bonds or financial papers
issued by the Ministry of Finance. The latter may be issued to finance,
partially, domestic expenditure by borrowing from the public, and could
serve the additional purpose of insulating the money supply from the
influence of the external sector.
(5) The Ministry of Finance could assist by controlling its deposits with the
Central Bank (component of the monetary base) and with commercial banks
(a determinant of banks' ability to grant credit). It would also be
useful if the Ministry of Finance adopted a simple constant change rule
as far as government expenditure i concerned.
(6) The present structure of interest rates and, in particular, the system of
differential ceilings on loan rates should be abolished. All interest-
rates should be left to be datarmnined . by market forces, as is the case
with the interbank rates.
(7) The present exchange rate policy of pegging the KD to a basket of
currencies heavily weighted in dollar should be abandoned, and -replaced
by a policy whereby the KD is pegged to an import-weighted basket that
reflects its effective exchange rate.
(8) Some measures must be taken to ensure that more bank credit goes to
productive sectors, and less to finance speculation. Selective credit
controls should be imposed by the Central Bank on commercial banks by
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introducing differential reserve ratios and discount rates. The
traditional fears of commercial banks concerning medium-term or long-term
loans to productive sectors should be allayed by appropriate government
guarantees. Bank credit to productive sectors should be increased via the
following channels: pressure from government representatives on banks'
boards of directors, moral suasion, or by the estabilishment of more
specialisad banks, an agricultural bank (for example). All of these
factors affect supply, but demand can also be influenced by some
government action e.g. subsidisation and protection from foreign
competition.
(9) The Central Bank should be empowered to specify the margin requirement in
transactions involving the sale and purchase of shares, and to act in the
field of consumer credit control.
8.4. Concluding Remarks
This study is the most comprehensive on Kuwait's monetary sector but it is by
no means the end. In addition to its findings concerning policy and other
issues, the study opens new horizons for research. The various models
presented in the previous chapters can be re-specified, updated and
re-estimated in the light of new findings or when more data series are
available, as suggested on more than one occasion. Specific areas of further
research include: the analysis of residuals of the structural model to arrive
at a better specification as suggested by Ashley and Granger (1979), studying
the effect of monetary phenomena on various economic sectors as shown by
Wenninger (1984), and more detailed empirical work on all of the issues
pertaining to the rules versus discretion controversy for the special case of
Kuwait.
The immediate benefit of this work lies in the determination and specification
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of policy changes, which, if adopted, should avoid a recurrence of earlier
niisfortunas. A positive indicator regarding the usefulness of this study, and
the need to conduct further work of this kind to •support monetary policy, is
found in the words of the Central Bank Governor at a conference on banking
control and supervision held in London in May 1985. Ha said, "the Central Bank
must broaden the spectrum of monetary policy tools at its disposal and
increase their effectiveness. The Bank will be required to continue to
redirect bank credit away from overdrafts and towards credit for productive
purposes through programmed lending." This study has been motivated by the
desire to find the means to accomplish objectives such as those just
mentioned. ow that it is finished, it can, hopefully, serve as a spring—board
for further empirical research on Kuwait's monetary sector.
STATISTICAL A2PE1DIX
This appendix contains data series used throughout this study. The main source
of these data is the Central Bank's quarterly bulletins and annual economic
reports, but other sources have been used as indicated. The following notes
should be pointed out:
(i) Some data series were calculated by interpolating annual data (non-oil
and oil GD?).
(ii) Data on the trend value of real non-oil GD? were estimated by a simple
regression on time.
(iii) The import price index Pm was calculated as a weighted average of the
unit values of exports of the four major exporters to Kuwait.
It must also be mentioned that there is a great deal of inconsistency in data
series obtained from the Central Bank's publications in the sense that some
numbers change from one issue to another. This, indeed, is a problem that was
explicitly stated in every major empirical study on Kuwait (see for example
Khouja and Sadler (1979) and E1-Mallakh and Atta (1981)). However, every
endeavour was made to reconcile conflicting data series and pick the most
reasonable ones as presented in this appendix.
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Table A.l: Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices (KD million)
1970	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976
GDP	 1026.3 1381.8 1464.0 1604.1 3853.0 3487.0 3839.7
Oil	 618.8	 907.8	 914.5	 996.6 3022.6 2459.0 2524.1
Non-oil	 407.5	 474.0	 549.5	 607.6	 790.3 1028.0 1315.6
Agriculture and Fisheries
	
2.9	 3.2	 3.8	 4.7	 5.9	 8.8	 10.3
Manufacturing Industry	 42.8	 54.2	 65.4	 77.8	 168.6	 195.1	 229.8
Electricity, Gas and Water 7.2 	 9.3	 10.8	 11.8	 12.6	 13.1	 18.8
Construction	 28.1	 33.3	 38.4	 44.4	 62.8	 73.7	 122.6
Wholesale and Retail Trade 81.0	 90.0	 106.4	 112.7	 140.4	 211.3	 288.7
Transport & Communications 29.3 	 31.8	 34.5	 41.8	 50.4	 60.1	 72.4
Financial Institutions 	 20.9	 23.3	 25.3	 27.7	 29.9	 45.2	 65.2
Other	 195.3	 228.9	 265.0	 286.7	 319.7	 420.7	 507.7
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
GDP
Oil
Non-oil.
Agriculture and Fisheries
Manufacturing Industry
Electricity, Gas and Water
Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transport & Communications
Financial Institutions
Other
4049.1 4264.7
2483.0 2530.3
1566.1 1734.4
	
13.1	 13.5
	
239.5	 280.3
	
19.9	 24.2
	
158.4	 176.1
	
370.6	 390.5
	
77.4	 90.6
	
84.7	 116.1
	
602.6	 643.0
6743.4
4420.4
2323.0
16.7
574.3
26.6
210.0
426.0
106.4
148.6
814.4
7451.2
5062.2
2388.9
17.3
439.9
25.0
220.0
468.0
124.3
183.5
910.8
6772.2
4125.1
2647.1
28.0
372.8
26.8
263.0
485.0
145.5
232,3
1093.7
5727.5
2766.6
2960.8
31.0
373.4
30.1
283.0
521.0
171.8
288.0
1262.5
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Table A.2: Gross Domestic Product as Measured by Expenditure (KB million)
1970	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976
Consumption:
Government
Private
Total
Gross Capital Formation
Change in Inventory
Exports
Imports
GDP
	
139.3	 173.3	 198.7	 214.6	 279.1	 385.5	 432.3
	
396.3	 420.0	 427.4	 438.7	 563.8	 758.7 1029.8
	
535.6	 593.3	 626.1	 653.3	 842.9 1144.2 1462.1
	
126.0	 126.6	 127.3	 145.8	 221.7	 417.6	 563.1
	
-2.1	 3.0	 8.9	 6.8	 36.7	 26.1	 72.1
	
613.9	 916.8 1004.3 1153.9 3239.5 2806.0 2992.4
	
247.5	 257.9	 302.6	 355.6	 527.8	 907.0 1250.0
1026.3 1381.8 1464.0 1604.1 3813.0 3487.0 3839.6
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
Consumption:
Government
Private
Total
Gross Capital Formation
Change in Inventory
Exports
Imports
GD?
589.0
1319.3
1908.3
853.5
129 .4
2918.0
1760.0
4049.1
615.9
1478.0
2093.9
793.9
69.0
3008.0
1700.0
4264.7
757.2
1741 .6
2498.8
189.6
93.0
5333.0
1971.0
6743.4
857.2
2200.2
3057.4
878.8
105.0
6065.0
2655.0
7451.2
	
988.8	 1188.6
	
2457.6	 2969.5
	
3446.4	 4158.1
	
1072.8	 1277.5
	
89.0	 137.0
	
4840.0	 3393.0
2676.0 ' 3238.0
	
6772.2	 5727.5
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Table A.3: Public Finance: Revenue (KD million)
Fiscal	 Oil	 Investment	 Other	 Total
Year*	 Revenue	 Income	 Revenue	 Revenue
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972 / 73
1973/74
1974/7 5
1975/76
1976/77
1977 / 78
19 78/79
197 9/80
1980/ 81
1981/82
291.8
321.1
500.9
537.5
584.0
2534.8
2793.3
2598.2
2575.3
3036.1
5940.5
4434.2
2764.1
36.5
31.8
42.2
50.8
89.0
152.1
328.1
329.4
384.2
521.4
880.3
1743.9
1364 .0
23.2
44.4
27.6
40.9
42.3
63.0
103.0
105.5
133.9
140.3
147.5
225.1
221.1
351.5
397.3
570.7
629.2
715.3
2749.9
3224.4
3033.1
3093.4
3697.8
6963.3
6403.2
4349.2
* Fiscal years 1969/70 - 1974/75 inclusive start in April
Fiscal years 197 6/77 - 1981/82 inclusive start in July
Fiscal year 1975/76 was extraordinary, stretching between March 1975 and
June 1976.
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Table A.4: Public Finance;: Expenditure (KD niillion)
Fiscal	 Current	 Investment	 Land	 Foreign -	 Total
Year	 Acquisition
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
197 2/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
197 6/77
1977 /7 8
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
173.2
180.2
243.4
277.0
280.9
431.8
658.4
746.0
759.5
881.4
1252.6
1483.4
1745.0
65.1
68.9
73.5
99.1
146.3
359.3
454.5
563.4
797.6
761.1
694.2
1240.6
1344.0
9.6
24.4
19.9
15.7
19.4
47.7
147.0
108.4
188.4
107.4
263.9
391.8
449.2
51.7
50.7
32.9
44.9
106.3
324.1
77.5
101.5
213.7
194.0
213.0
262.1
244.8
299.6
324.2
369.7
436.7
552.9
1162.9
1337.4
1519.3
1959.2
1943.9
2423.7
3377.9
3783.0
- 410 -
Table A.5: Foreign Trade (KD million)
Oil	 Other	 Total	 Imports	 Trade
Exports	 Exports	 Exports	 Balance
1970	 564.5	 26.4	 590.9	 223.3	 367.6
1971	 859.4	 34.4	 893.8	 232.3	 661.5
1972	 931.7	 49.6	 981.3	 262.2	 719.1
1973	 1059.9	 69.8	 1129.7	 310.6	 819.1
1974	 3097.5	 117.2	 3214.7	 455.1	 2759.6
1975	 2492.6	 170.4	 2663.0	 693.2	 1969.8
1976	 2658.9	 215.5	 2874.4	 972.0	 1902.4
1977	 2557.1	 235.5	 2792.6	 1387.1	 1405.5
1978	 2628.7	 235.4	 2864.1	 l2639	 1600.2
1979	 4735.7	 307.4	 5043.1	 1437.0	 3606.1
1980	 4960.8	 408.1	 5368.9	 1764.9	 3604.0
1981	 3969.2	 561.6	 4530.8	 1945.4	 2585.4
1982	 2614.5	 572.6	 3187.1	 2370.0	 817.1
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Table A.6:: Central Bank: Assets and Liabilities (KB million)
Foreign Discounts	 Monetary	 Govt.	 Capital &	 Total Assets
Assets	 Base	 Deposits Reserves	 = Total Liabi-
lities
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
8.0
27.9
27.9
30.0
30.0
30.0
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
65.2
72.5
96.7
121.6
148.2
393.7
486.6
548.5
817.0
700.7
812.8
1094.3
1172.7
1737.9
4.5
2.1
20.7
30.6
195.3
298.6
282.4
276.7
50.8
51.1
59.0
71.0
95.8
129.1
169.2
224.8
431.5
318.7
379.2
506.2
679.3
1097.7
7.1
14.7
30.9
36.6
28.4
213.1
271.5
270.8
325.1
274.8
446.1
768.1
671.3
796.1
77.5
72.9
98.9
122.1
151.9
398.0
499.9
554.2
843.8
738.1
1014.3
1424.2
1479.4
2039.7
Assets	 = Foreign Assets + Discounts + Other Assets.
Liabilities Monetary Base + Govt. Deposits ^ Capital and Reserves + Other
Liabilities.
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
30.8
30.8
31.0
31.0
35.6
43.6
49.9
69.7
31.4
31.6
31.7
31.7
31.7
31.7
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Table A.7: Central Bank: Foreign Assets (KD nil illon)
- Gold	 Reserve Position	 Deposits	 Other	 Total
in IMF
4.5
7.6
9.4
9.4
6.9
89.4
201.7
249.2
240.8
199.3
138.9
144.3
144.3
164.7
20.6
33.0
52.5
76.6
101.0
200.3
152.6
199.5
495.0
413.7
508.6
906.3
988.7
1534.5
9.3
1.1
3.8
4.6
4.7
60.4
82.4
30.1
49.8
56.1
133.6
12.0
8.0
7.0
65.2
72.5
96.7
121.6
148.2
393.7
486.6
548.5
817.0
700.7
812.8
1094.3
1172.7
1737.9
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Table A.8: Central Bank: Composition of Monetary Base (KD million)
Issued	 Banks'	 Central Bank	 Total
Currency	 Deposits	 Bills
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1973
1979
1980
1981
1982
48.7
49.4
56.0
61.6
75.8
36.9
107 .8
137.0
161.3
188.3
229.5
268.7
303.5
365.5
2.1
1.7
3.0
9.4
20.0
42.2
61.4
87.8
270.2
130.4
136.2
129.5
208.4
244.2
13.5
108.0
167 .4
488.0
50.8
51.1
59.0
71.0
95.8
129.1
169.2
224.8
431.5
318.7
379.2
506.2
679.3
1097.7
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Table A.9: Commercial Banks: Assets and Liabilities (KD million)
Reserves	 Foreign Claims on Private	 Govt.	 Foreign Total Assets
Assets	 Private	 Deposits Deposits Liabi-	 Total Liabi-
Sector	 lities	 lities
1969	 6.5
1970	 6.2
1971	 8.5
1972	 13.8
1973	 26.9
1974	 58.0
1975	 67.2
1976	 92.4
1977	 270.9
1978	 122.7
1979	 143.3
1980	 221.7
1981	 321.6
1982	 625.9
369.2
439.5
477.9
513.5
479.1
561.4
616.1
674.9
823.2
1214.2
1407.5
1880.0
2245.4
2251.0
135.0
141.2
161.4
187.4
266.3
361.9
506.7
934.3
1238.5
1559.4
2119.3
2671.4
3453.6
4292.5
334.8
317.3
405.6
466.6
500.8
638.9
789.5
1091.2
1432.4
1773.3
2073.8
2606.2
3583.0
3840.1
54.2
80.9
72.4
62.5
50.7
73.2
87.3
71.0
114.9
99.3
139.9
171.3
211.0
393.8
78.4
115.6
104.2
103.6
136.1
143.4
169.0
324.1
419.8
601.5
803.9
1134.3
1264.1
1526.5
531.5
610.6
679.8
736.7
803.4
1037.6
1300.7
1839.0
2398.6
2967.2
3787.9
4896.5
6319.7
7373.0
Assets	 = Reserves + Foreign Assets + Claims on Private Sector ^ Other
Assets.
Liabilities Private Sector Deposits + Govt. Deposits + Foreign Liabilities ^
Capital and Reserves + Other Liabilities.
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Table A.l0: Commercial Banks: Claims on Private Sector (1(D million)
Credit	 Other*	 Total
Facilities
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
135.0
137.1
146.9
175.7
247.6
351.7
462.5
849.3
1072.6
1374.5
1917.5
2418.5
3172.7
3897.2
4.1
14.5
11.7
18.7
10.2
44.2
85.0
165.9
184.9
201.8
252.7
280.8
395.1
135.0
141.2
161.4
187.4
266.3
361.9
506.7
934 .3
1238.5
1559.4
2119.3
2671.2
3453.5
4292.3
* Claims on specialised banks and local investments.
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Table A.11: Commercial Banks: Foreign Assets (KD million)
Deposits	 Loans	 Investmeats*	 Total
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
272.4
354.1
394.6
369.4
293.9
384.3
392.5
459.1
626.3
923.9
1028.9
1436.7
1738.5
1673.8
67.0
55.5
49.2
61.1
86.7
98.3
127.8
89.2
81.2
104.3
203.3
252 .7
305.9
382.5
29.8
29.9
34.1
83.0
98.5
78.8
95.8
126.6
115.7
186.0
175.3
190.7
201.1
194.8
369.2
439.5
477.9
513.5
479.1
561.4
616.1
674.9
823.2
1214.2
1407.5
1880.1
2245.5
2251.1
* Mostly shares and bonds.
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Table A.12: Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Monetary Sector: Selected Items
(KD aillion)
Net Foreign	 Claims on	 Narrow	 Quasi-	 Govt.	 Other
Assets	 Private Sector Money	 Money	 Deposits	 (Net)
1969	 356.0	 135.0	 107.6	 271.5	 61.3	 50.6
1970	 396.4	 137.1	 95.2	 266.9	 95.6	 75.8
1971	 470.4	 161.4	 112.3	 343.7	 103.3	 72.5
1972	 531.5	 187.4	 145.7	 378.0	 99.1	 96.1
1973	 491.2	 266.3	 174.7	 397.2	 79.1	 106.5
1974	 811.7	 361.9	 199.5	 521.0	 286.3	 166.8
1975	 933.7	 506.7	 290.3	 600.9	 358.8	 190.4
1976	 899.3	 934.3	 393.8	 826.5	 341.8	 271.5
1977	 1220.4	 1238.5	 490.6	 1092.7	 440.0	 435.6
1978	 1313.4	 1559.4	 599.0	 1351.3	 374.1	 548.4
1979	 1416.4	 2119.3 /	 626.5	 1663.2	 586.0	 660.0
1980	 1838.4	 2671.4	 669.7	 2187.8	 939.3	 713.0
1981	 2139.8	 3453.6	 1214.8	 2652.9	 882.3	 843.3
1982	 2439.2	 4292.5	 1179.7	 3003.1	 1189.9	 1358.9
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Table A.13: Specialised Banks: Assets and Liabilities (KB million)
	
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
Assets
Cash and Deposits with
Central Bank	 9.2	 6.9	 7.4	 16.4	 24.6	 33.3
Deposits with	 -
Commercial Banks
	
126.3	 141.5	 182.2	 202.9	 287.6	 377.7
Local Loans	 301.7	 410.9	 473.7	 576.6	 704.4	 993.9
Local Investments	 14.1	 31.3	 29.1	 29.5	 32.0	 41.1
Foreign Assets
	 196.2	 216.4	 224.2	 254.5	 267.7	 267.0
Other Assets	 57.7	 61.5	 71.9	 86.9	 117.5	 63.2
Total Assets	 705.2	 863.5	 988.5	 1166.8	 1433.8	 1776.2
Liabilities
Capital and Reserves	 206.0	 282.2	 351.9	 412.8	 513.4	 713.3
Private Sector Deposits 237.9 	 237.6	 261.7	 286.8	 367.6	 465.8
CDs and Bills	 28.3	 67.8.	 64.3	 68.5	 69.9	 72.5
Govt. Deposits & Loans 	 73.8	 94.5	 115.8	 156.2	 234.2	 260.7
Foreign Liabilities 	 95.0	 105.0	 111.4	 115.3	 134.1	 101.2
Other Liabilities	 64.2	 81.4	 83.4	 127.2	 114.6	 162.7
Total Liabilities	 705.2	 868.5	 988.5	 1166.8	 1433.8	 1776.2
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Table A.14: Investment Companies: Assets and Liabilities (KD million)
1977	 1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982
Assets
Cash and Deposits with
Commercial Banks 	 63.4	 75.0	 22.4	 35.8	 33.0	 92.5
Local Loans	 34,3	 52.0	 80.1	 124.0	 261.2	 467.5
Local Investments	 56.5	 78.0	 115.8	 164.7	 194.8	 352.8
Foreign Assets
	
274.5	 359.5	 429.3	 545.9	 754.7	 828.1
Other Assets	 41.8	 46.5	 67.8	 81.8	 187.4	 245.5
Total Assets	 470.5	 611.0	 715.4	 952.2	 1431.1	 1986.4
Liabilities
Capital and Reserves	 87.8	 103.1	 155.4	 162.2	 224.9	 404.6
	
Resources from Residents 164.2 	 217.6	 237.4	 317.7	 429.2	 560.0
Foreign Liabilities	 130.7	 217.8	 255.1	 403.9	 610.6	 762.9
Other Liabilities	 87.8	 72.5	 67.5	 68.4	 166.4	 258.9
Total Liabilities	 470.5	 611.0	 715.4	 952.2	 1431.1	 1986.4
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Table A.15: The Composition of M2 (KD million)
Currency in	 Demand	 Saving	 Time	 Foreign Currency
Circulation	 Deposits	 Deposits	 Deposits+CDs	 Deposits
	
1975 1
	 86.1	 132.2	 151.5	 223.2	 110.5
	
2	 93.9	 164.5	 165.2	 240.8	 102.7
	
3	 94.3	 169.3	 172.6	 266.6	 121.0
	
4	 101.7	 188.6	 175.8	 303.5	 121.6
	
1976 1
	
106.2	 241.7	 187.4	 331.1	 98.0
	
2	 114.2	 287.8	 209.1	 366.0	 124.2
	
3	 116.2	 271.2	 203.4	 414.6	 139.5
	
4	 129.1	 264.7	 204.6	 456.2	 165.7
	
1977 1	 136.9	 287.2	 230.4	 527.2	 130.8
	
2	 139.8	 309.2	 244.0	 619.2	 102.5
	
3	 143.4	 304.4	 247.5	 637.4	 110.4
	
4	 150.9	 3.39.7	 253.6	 737.0	 87.5
	
1978 1	 160.3
	
389.7
	
275.4
	
712.0	 105.9
	
2
	
167.1
	
427.9
	
302.6
	
758.2	 105.2
	
3
	 178.2	 416.2	 315.5	 787.0	 129.9
	
4
	
177.0
	
422.0
	
313.4
	
856.6
	
181.3
	
1979 1	 187.8
	
410.8	 319.4
	
857.6	 210.6
	
2
	 189.7
	
442.1	 308.3
	
873.4
	
225.0
	
3	 212.4
	
474.4
	
309.3
	
963.8	 287.8
	
4
	
215.9
	
410.6
	
302.1	 1005.5	 355.6
	
1980 1
	
222.3
	
431.6
	
298.9	 1089.6
	
439.8
	
2
	
223.6
	
499.7
	
297.6	 1141.3	 470.2
	
3
	
237.0
	
500.5	 288.8	 1242.5
	
489.9
	
4
	
251.3
	
418.4
	
272.5
	
1327.4
	
588.0
	
1981 1	 248.3
	
502.7	 276.1	 1368.9	 578.8
	
2
	
261.6
	
682.7
	
293.5	 1488.2
	
659.5
	
3
	
264.3
	
662.9	 291.8	 1675.9
	
630.6
	
4
	
284.7
	
930.1	 307.7	 1750.1	 595.2
	
1982 1
	
310.7	 1215.7	 322.9	 1888.5	 467.2
	
2	 324.4	 1281.8	 319.5	 1860.7	 476.1
	
3	 334.8	 851.3	 307.8	 2271.3	 347.9
	
4	 342.7	 837.0	 336.8	 2333.2	 333.0
52.7
50.9
51.3
50.9
54.8
51.2
49.7
49.5
47.1
50.3
51.9
51.1
60.2
57.0
60.6
65.8
70.9
70.3
68.1
62.9
69.1
70.0
73.0
71.0
- 421 -
Table A.16: Monetary Aggregates (KD million)
Ml	 M2	 B	 Ml	 M2	 B
1970 - JAM
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SE P
OCT
NOV
DEC
1972 - JAM
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1974 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
108.6
107.9
111.8
109.3
111.7
107.8
103.2
100.8
98.6
101.1
101.3
99.0
126.7
120.9
140.3
135.5
139.9
140.4
138.8
132.6
137.3
137.9
142.8
147.5
184.4
191.7
195.9
195.8
202.0
203.3
199.8
201.4
218.0
231.7
214.9
206.9
340.8
342.3
345.2
357.9
361.9
362.5
359.8
359.1
353.6
356.6
358.2
362.1
426.2
423.6
432.8
455.4
482.1
485.1
474.6
474.6
480.5
482.9
496.3
493.6
543.7
585.3
606.6
609.9
634.4
647.0
651.8
668.7
693.5
718.5
697.4
684.6
89.7
111.1
105.8
98.9
121.4
110.0
99.6
102.6
131.3
112.7
138.0
129.2
1971 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1973 - JAM
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1975 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
100.7
104.0
105.9
101.5
112.0
106.6
104.7
104.8
108.6
109.9
108.4
113.8
144.1
169.6
170.0
171.5
171.2
171.3
170.3
169.1
177.1
182.5
178.3
182.9
220.8
222.2
218.3
223.3
266.1
258.4
254.8
255.2
263.6
277.8
278.0
290.3
359.0
369.1
371.4
371.9
385.3
389.6
382.4
384.4
385.0
388.3
415.4
418.7
494.4
502.9
510.4
494.3
511.9
513.1
512.7
520.1
528.7
530.1
530.0
536.3
656.4
648.8
703.5
719.0
773.7
767.1
779.0
804.4
823.8
835.7
866.6
891.1
50.9
50.4
49.7
50.0
56.5
50.9
48.5
46.8
49.5
51.8
49.9
59.0
71.0
71.2
79.0
83.9
120.2
115.6
131.0
109.1
109.2
113.4
100.5
95.8
121.7
139.5
168.3
151.9
228.4
192.8
167.3
172.1
155.0
166.5
177.2
169.2
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Table A.16:	 . continued
Ml	 M2	 B	 Ml	 M2	 B
1976 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1978 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1980 - JAN
FEB
MAR
A2R
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
310.1
320.6
348.6
363.2
375.9
402.0
357.3
376.0
387.6
389.8
392.1
393.7
542.3
525.1
550.4
547.9
574.0
596.0
596.0
634.8
630.6
640.9
629.3
636.4
690.4
720.2
699.6
702.5
764.2
792.7
827.2
815.3
795.5
778.0
776.5
720.8
926.0
936.3
964.2
1012.1
1046.8
1101.3
1101.5
1115.5
1145.1
1180.1
1199.0
1220.1
1577.4
1606.2
1611.7
1625.0
1680.4
1724.0
1764.6
1798.5
1845.6
1850.5
1897.6
1950.4
2368.5
2418.9
2482.2
2509.9
2631.0
2632.4
2687.5
2766.0
2758.7
2732.3
2814.8
2857.6
164.5
217.8
189.0
192.3
204.4
190.4
155.9
160.0
157 .3
183.9
194.3
224.8
451.4
481.0
468.7
486.5
452.3
446.7
383.9
421.1
397.1
375.2
319.4
318.7
290.2
308.0
327.5
343.6
352.6
419.1
431.6
390.4
395.8
397.0
460.8
506.2
1977 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1979 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1981 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
423.9
418.7
424.1
434.2
440.2
449.0
439.2
446.2
447.8
461.4
465.2
490.7
604.1
666.6
666.9
622.8
642.3
675.3
655.6
676.3
725.8
622.5
666.9
669.4
770.0
829.5
823.7
866.7
945.2
1041.9
1005.4
936.3
1019.9
1107.9
1170.5
1290.2
1250.7
1237.1
1312.4
1317.1
1351.8
1405.8
1413.4
1429.5
1443.0
1459.8
1515.7
1568.7
1858.4
1971.5
1986.2
1931.7
1993.6
2038.4
2073.3
2084.6
2247.6
2146.9
2254.3
2262.7
2855.7
2927.0
2974.7
2999.9
3228.1
3385.6
3438.3
3467.3
3525.4
3641.6
3725.5
3866.0
185.1
162.0
240.3
259.1
295.4
266.4
290.8
310.3
363.2
302.7
343.5
431.5
312.3
300.8
255.7
289.8
282.0
260.3
271.4
282.2
277.4
270.3
265.7
379.2
454.7
445.4
447.5
463.1
478.5
545.8
457.9
484.9
474.7
461.2
517.7
679.3
1982 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1547.5
1673.0
1629.9
1596.0
1662.3
1695.7
1508.9
1317.8
1263.7
1203.0
1269.8
1247.6
4028.4
4132.9
4205.0
4202.6
4148.0
4262.4
4160.0
4082.2
4113.2
4073.3
4168.8
4182.7
623.3
565.0
593.9
569.0
652.7
685.0
656.1
676.4
688.9
825.6
1027.3
1097.6
Source: ThIF
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Table A.17: Exchange Rates vis-a-vis the U.S. Dollar
KDI -
	 STG1	 DM/	 YEN7
	
sF/$
1977 - JAN
FE B
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1978 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1979 - JAN
FE B
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1980 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR.
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
0.2870
0.2894
0.2885
0.2885
0. 2868
0. 2872
0.2878
0.2851
0.2866
0.2863
0.2850
0.2838
0. 2800
0. 2810
0.2737
0.2752
0.2779
0. 2776
0.2735
0.2722
0.2135
0. 2715
0.2712
0.2748
0.2735
0.2746
0.2746
0.2771
0.2796
0.2792
0.2759
0.2746
0.2765
0.2764
0.2791
0.2785
0.2740
0.2724
0.2738
0. 2759
0.2719
0.2684
0. 2666
0.2677
0.2671
0.2681
0. 2684
0. 2729
0. 5839
0.5829
0.5834
0.58 11
0.5815
0. 5817
0.5811
0. 5763
0.5738
0.5691
0.5439
0. 5505
0.5263
0. 5131
0.5153
0.5336
0.54 72
0.5480
0.5342
0.5192
0.5159
0. 5030
0.5074
0.5130
0.49 69
0.5014
0.4943
0. 4839
0.4831
0.4860
0. 4490
0.4404
0.4457
0.4559
0.4803
0.4595
0.4485
0. 4419
0.4451
0.4578
0.4437
0. 4303
0. 4211
0.4224
0.4140
0.4160
0. 4091
0.4266
2. 3491
2.4218
2.3909
2. 39 17
2.3503
2. 3587
2.3405
2.2584
2.3164
2. 3042
2. 2475
2.2273
2. 1130
2. 1121
2.0116
2.0254
2.0770
2. 0965
2.0510
2.0425
1. 9933
1. 8934
1. 87 82
1. 9230
1.8513
1. 8633
1. 8506
1. 8824
1. 8988
1. 9191
1. 8334
1. 8275
1. 8215
1.7516
1. 8040
1. 7475
1. 7155
1. 7350
1. 7861
1. 8915
1. 7985
1.7760
1. 7360
1. 7638
1. 7 805
1. 8015
1. 9435
1. 9415
292.10
288.00
281.95
276.99
276.75
277.23
267.69
264.78
267.40
260.56
247.84
245.05
240.34
241.56
237.94
217 .17
226.08
222.17
201.18
186.05
190.00
186.38
187.28
196.55
197 .10
201.27
202.32
214.47
224.76
221.03
216.77
215.83
221.60
223.50
237.84
245.91
238.50
239.20
246.89
251.00
238.64
221.62
218.57
226.38
217.26
216.06
212.05
214.60
2. 4473
2. 5178
2.5509
2. 5463
2.5187
2. 5009
2.4652
2.3957
2.3919
2. 3363
2. 2200
2. 1646
2.0213
1. 9827
1. 8284
1.8660
1. 9588
1. 8992
1. 8077
1.7 208
1.6530
1.5613
1.6195
1.7270
1.6535
1. 6 911
1. 6675
1. 7042
1.7 207
1. 7389
1. 6502
1. 6565
1. 6537
1. 5670
1. 6626
1. 6069
1. 5800
1. 6190
1. 7096
1.7915
1.6640
1. 6502
1. 5870
1. 6255
1. 6371
1. 6490
1. 7462
1. 7515
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Table A.17	 • continued
KD/	 STG/	 DM/	 YEN/S
	
SF/$
1981 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1982 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
1983 - JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
0.2720
0.2730
0.2745
0.2743
0.2761
0.2794
0.2825
0.2856
0.2831
0.2837
0.2822
0.2822
0.2812
0.2845
0.2845
0.2861
0.2861
0.2873
0.2875
0.2876
0.2913
0. 2900
0.2936
0.2915
0.2898
0.2910
0.2925
0. 2924
0.2912
0. 2923
0.2935
0.2961
0.2925
0.2900
0. 2918
0.2923
0. 4188
0.4252
0.4514
0.4460
0.4668
0.4966
0.5234
0.5537
0.5429
0. 5562
0. 5330
0.5137
0.5186
0.5346
0.5491
0.5613
0.5549
0.5603
0.5746
0. 5771
0.5814
0.5880
0 .5949
0. 6120
0.6164
0.6579
0.6616
0. 6620
0. 6317
0. 6275
0.6533
0. 6542
0. 6700
0. 6727
0.6741
0. 6835
1.9589
2.1222
2.1196
2.0973
2.2095
2.3633
2.4072
2.5089
2.4374
2. 3181
2.2133
2.2272
2.2471
2.3435
2.3672
2.4155
2.3220
2. 3830
2.4578
2.4735
2.4922
2. 5237
2.5540
2. 4572
2.3484
2.4830
2.4246
2. 4111
2.4439
2.5411
2.5375
2. 6216
2.7066
2.5958
2. 6509
2.7018
203.25
203.00
207.56
211.65
214.49
223.95
227.96
240.79
229.70
232.39
227.81
216.15
218.75
233.10
235.95
247.16
235.22
245.26
255.14
260.13
259.20
268.37
276.20
248.11
229.06
241.10
237.08
237.17
236.78
239.71
238.92
240.91
246.76
232.39
234.54
233.85
1. 7695
1. 9180
1. 9265
1.9159
2.0125
2.0911
2.0586
2.1880
2.1445
1.9739
1. 7870
1. 7867
1.7985
1.8775
1. 8750
1.9370
1.9422
2.0342
2.1022
2.1009
2. 1230
2.1675
2.1948
2. 1132
1.9641
2. 0365
2.0484
2.0476
2.0588
2. 1025
2. 0983
2. 1154
2.1924
2. 0978
2. 1542
2. 1690
Source Orion Royal Bank
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
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Table A.18: Exchange Rates vis-a--vis the Kuwaiti Dinar
STG/KD	 D4/KD	 YEN/KB	 SF/KB
1977 -
1978 -
1979 -
1980 -
2.0346
2.0141
2.0222
2.0144
2.0274
2.0252
2. 0189
2. 0213
2.0022
1. 9877
1. 9085
1.9398
1. 8798
1.8260
1.8828
1.9390
1. 9692
1. 9740
1. 9534
1.9074
1.8864
1.8527
1.8708
1.8667
1. 8168
1. 8259
1.8003
1. 7463
1. 7 280
1. 7408
1. 6275
1. 6039
1.6120
1. 6495
1.7209
1. 6497
1.6369
1. 6222
1. 6257
1.659
1. 6319
1. 6032
1. 5796
1. 5778
1. 5499
1.5516
1. 5243
1. 5632
8. 1849
8.3680
8. 2878
8. 2903
8.1948
8.2125
8. 1323
7.9214
8.0826
8.0482
7.8862
7.8483
7.5468
7.5162
7.3494
7.3599
7.4739
7. 5524
7.4994
7.5041
7. 2881
6. 9740
6.9254
6. 9976
6. 7692
6. 7856
6.7393
6.7933
6.7911
6. 8735
6. 6451
6. 6554
6.5877
6. 3373
6.4637
6.2746
6. 2609
6.3692
6.5233
6. 8558
6. 6147
6. 6171
6.5119
6. 5886
6. 6657
6. 7191
7.2411
7.1143
1017.74
995.12
977.33
960.16
964.98
965.26
930.11
928.72
933.04
910.09
869.66
863.46
858.40
859.64
869.33
789.18
813.51
800.35
735.58
683.54
694.71
686.47
690.54
715.22
720.69
732.96
736.80
773.98
803.87
791.65
785.71
786.01
801.46
808.66
852.19
882.95
870.47
878.10
901.72
909.72
877.72
825.74
819.88
845.64
813.37
805.85
790.06
786.38
8.5271
8. 6995
8. 8424
8.8263
8. 7 820
8. 7075
8.5656
8. 4031
8.3460
8.1604
7. 7898
7. 6272
7. 2191
7.0560
6.6803
6. 7807
7.0485
6.8415
6.6098
6. 3223
6.0439
5.7505
5.9716
6. 2842
6.045 8
6.1584
6.0725
6.1500
6. 1543
6.2280
5. 9813
6.0325
5. 9811
5. 6696
5.9570
5.7695
5.7665
5.9434
6.2439
6.4934
6.1201
6. 1484
5.9531
6. 0781
6.1289
6. 1505
6.5061
6.4181
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SE P
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
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Table A.18:	 . continued
STG/KD	 DM/KD	 YEN/RD	 SF/KD
1981 -
1982 -
1983 -
1. 5398
1.5575
1.6445
1. 6260
1. 6907
1.7775
1.8527
1.9387
1. 9177
1. 9603
1. 8889
1. 8206
1.8442
1.8790
1. 9301
1.9617
1.9396
1. 9503
1. 9984
2.0064
1.9959
2.0274
2.0263
2. 0993
2.1269
2.2607
2.2618
2.2642
2. 1693
2. 1469
2.2258
2. 2093
2.2906
2. 3199
2. 3101
2.3385
7.2023
7.7738
7.7217
7.6461
8.0025
8.4588
8. 5209
8. 7849
8.6100
8. 1707
7.8431
7.8927
7.9913
8.2371
8.3201
8.4426
8.1153
8. 2941
8.5488
8.6000
8.5558
8.7027
8. 6991
8.4292
8.1037
8.5325
8.2890
8. 2460
8. 3925
8. 6933
8. 6455
8. 8536
9.2532
8. 9510
9.0849
9.2430
747.27
743.58
756.14
771.61
776.85
801.57
806.90
843.14
811.40
819.13
807.28
765.97
777.94
819.30
829.28
863.87
822.13
853.65
887.43
904.45
889.84
925.41
940.79
851.10
790.41
828.51
810.51
811.14
813.11
820.08
814.03
813.61
843.62
801.37
803.80
800.03
6.5059
7.0257
7.0183
6.9850
7.2889
7.4845
7.2868
7.6613
7.5753
6.9576
6.3328
6. 3314
6.3962
6.5992
6.5902
6.7700
6.7885
7.0802
7.3119
7.3047
7.2882
7.4741
7.4756
7.2492
6.7775
6.9983
7.0030
7.0029
7.0698
7.1929
7.1491
7.1441
7.4954
7.2337
7.3824
7.4202
Source: Orion Royal Bank
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Table A.19: Data Used to Estimate the 1odel of Chapter 6*
C	 CR	 Dl	 D2	 D3	 D4
1975 1
2
3
4
19761
2
3
4
	
1977 1
	 136.9	 947.1	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
2	 139.8	 1082.8	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
3	 143.4	 1177.5	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
4	 150.9	 1242.3	 0	 0	 1	 0
	
1978 1
	 160.3	 1190.0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
2	 167.1	 1277.0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
3	 178.2	 1349.8	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
4	 177.0	 1559.4	 0	 0	 1	 0
	
1979 1
	
187.8	 1665.9	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
2	 189.7	 1814.4	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
3	 212.4	 2085.1	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
4	 215.9	 2118.3	 0	 0	 1	 0
	
1980 1	 222.3	 2241.9	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
2	 223.6	 2300.0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
3	 237.0	 2559.2	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
4	 251.3	 2671.4	 0	 0	 1	 0
	
1981 1	 248.3	 2800.3	 0	 0	 0	 1
	
2	 261.6	 2989.5	 0	 0	 0	 1
	
3	 264.3	 3170.6	 0	 0	 0	 1
	
4	 284.7	 3453.6	 1	 0	 1	 1
	
1982 1	 310.7	 3984.3	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
2	 324.4	 4155.5	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
3	 334.8	 4346.2	 0	 1	 0	 0
	
4	 342.7	 4292.5	 0	 1	 1	 0
* Some data series start before 77(1) to take account of the values of lagged
variables.
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Table .19 • . continued
DD	 G	 GD	 IM	 NP	 P
19751
2
3
4
	
1976 1
	
211.0	 85.6
	
2	 252.7	 86.7
	
3	 206.8	 87.9
	
4	 264.7	 256.8	 90.5
	
1977 1
	
287.2	 315.5	 70.5	 340.0	 81.9	 93.5
	
2	 309.2	 362.9	 74.8	 340.1	 91.6	 93.5
	
3	 304.4	 455.9	 77.1	 314.5	 91.0	 95.5
	
4	 339.7	 397.0	 112.8	 392.5	 160.0	 98.1
	
1978 1
	
389.7	 429.9	 74.6	 276.1	 264.8	 98.7
	
2	 427.9	 447.9	 77.0	 331.6	 285.1	 103.9
	
3	 416.2	 425.2	 71.1	 290.1	 246.7	 103.8
	
4	 422.0	 427.5	 99.2	 366.1	 156.7	 105.6
	
1979 1
	
410.8	 498.2	 62.1	 323.0	 44.6	 105.9
	
2	 442.1	 439.6	 59.7	 346.2	 -91.5	 106.4
	
3	 474.4	 454.9	 62.4	 347.5	 -207.4	 107.5
	
4	 410.6	 624.3	 149.0	 420.2	 -246.5	 108.4
	
1980 1
	
431.6	 469.7	 159.7	 363.3	 -306.7	 111.4
	
2	 499.7	 684.0	 160.0	 437.8	 -323.2	 113.7
	
3	 500.5	 695.7	 150.3	 439.3	 -321.2	 114.9
	
4	 418.4	 567.8	 171.3	 524.5	 -361,0	 117.8
	
1981 1
	 502.7	 626.3	 183.8	 397.9	 -361.3	 120.1
	
2	 682.7	 863.8	 186.0	 493.3	 -292.0	 122.7
	
3	 662.9	 746.7	 182.8	 485.8	 -246.3	 123.2
	
4	 930.1	 760.2	 211.0	 568.4	 -171.0	 125.6
	
1982 1	 1215.7	 710.6	 204.7	 579.9	 -172.0	 127.9
	
2	 1281.8	 688.1	 193.7	 649.1	 -294.7	 132.2
	
3	 851.3	 587.6	 191.3	 579.2	 -242.0	 133.9
	
4	 837.0	 714.0	 393.8	 598.8	 123.7	 135.9
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Table A.19 • . continued
TD	 X	 Iii	 10
	1975 1
	 233.9	 619.4
	
2	 280.1	 604.5
	
3	 228.8	 656.6
	
4	 283.2	 578.5
1976 1
2
3
4
1977 1
2
3
4
1978 1
2
3
4
1979 1
2
3
4
1980 1
2
3
4
1981 1
2
3
'4
858.2
987.1
1028.7
1091.2
1175.6
1265.9
1299.7
1417.8
1483.0
1593.9
1648.6
1773.4
1798.4
1848.8
2035.2
2073.9
2259.9
2408.7
2521.6
2606.3
2726.5
3123.9
3261.2
3583.0
664.6
645.5
662.7
819.8
617.3
636.7
744.8
865.3
950.0
1185.4
1364.6
1588.5
1663.6
1214.4
1159.7
1331.2
1543.5
1012.4
1032.7
942.2
299.4
358.5
293.4
364.3
322.7
371.2
466.2
406.0
430.7
448.9
426.2
428.6
573.8
506.3
523.9
719.0
464.2
676.0
687.6
561.1
553.2
763.0
659.5
671.4
542.4
526.2
602.7
852.8
590.3
590.9
603.3
698.4
560.6
549.2
684.7
735.9
842.6
989.9
1178.6
1409.3
1483.1
1184.1
1120.6
1273.7
1441.8
950.6
865.2
867.4
403.1
411.4
419.7
428.0
436.3
444.6
452.9
461.2
469.5
477.8
486.1
494.4
502.7
511.0
519.3
527.6
535.9
544.2
552.5
560.8
	
1982 1
	
3894.4	 767.8	 786.9	 620.5	 569.1
	
2	 3938.0	 726.0	 762.0	 667.0	 577.4
	
3	 3778.3	 820.3	 650.7	 729.8	 585.8
	
4	 3840.1	 814.2	 790.6	 768.6	 594.1
Source:
Yn and Yo: interpolated from annual data.
YT : Calculated by regressing Yn/P on time T such that T = 1 in 1976(1).
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Table A.20: Unit Value of Exports of Kuwait's Major Trading Partners (1975=100)
	
Period	 U.S.A.	 Japan	 Germany	 U.K.
	
1976 1
	
102.1	 94.2	 100.5	 110.7
	
2	 103.1	 96.5	 101.0	 116.1
	
3	 104.3	 98.1	 103.3	 123.1
	
4	 106.5	 103.3	 102.9	 130.5
	
1977 1	 107.4
	
105.3
	
103.7
	
136.2
	
2
	 109.0	 103.3	 103.4	 141.9
	
3
	
108.4	 100.3	 103.6
	
145.8
	
4	 109.2	 98.1	 103.6	 148.5
	
1978 1	 111.0
	 95.4
	
104.5	 149.6
	
2
	 113.4
	
100.0	 104.8	 153.7
	
3
	
116.6
	
92.3	 105.3
	
157.6
	
4
	
120.2	 91.0	 106.3	 161.1
	
1979 1	 127.7
	
95.7	 106.6	 166.0
	
2
	
132.1	 102.3	 107.4	 169.2
	
3	 136.2	 106.4	 108.8	 173.2
	
4
	
139.3	 111.0	 110.8	 178.8
	
1980 1	 142.9	 116.6	 113.5	 187.2
	
2
	
143.8	 117.5	 115.0	 191.7
	
3
	 149.1	 113.9	 116.5	 195.7
	
4
	
156.0	 112.9	 118.9	 196.7
	
1981 1
	 159.5	 113.8	 120.6	 200.5
	
2	 161.2	 117.8	 122.3	 206.3
	
3	 162.4	 121.7	 124.7	 213.4
	
4	 163.8	 122.7	 125.2	 218.8
	
1982 1
	 166..6	 123.3	 126.9	 220.9
	
2	 164.9	 126.3	 128.4	 220.8
	
3	 162.8	 126.8	 129.7	 226.3
	
4	 162.5	 125.7	 129.8	 230.4
Source: IMP
26.5
31.1
21.8
35.3
27.0
36.4
28.4
37.4
36.8
48.7
33.9
46.7
43.4
50.6
47.1
66.5
38.7
36.5
31.6
37.6
33.5
37.9
38.0
42.7
38.8
41.4
33.5
38.3
23,2
29.2
24.1
33.3
28.7
34.9
39.8
48.1
47.2
49.8
55.9
81.0
46.9
72.7
59.9
76.3
56.8
71.8
64.4
78.9
58.1
60.8
66.2
61.4
54.0
59.3
65.7
83.4
72.2
82.5
88.5
127.3
91.4
118.0
110.7
121.8
1978 1
2
3
4
1979 1
2
3
4
1980 1
2
3
4
1981 1
2
3
4
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Table A.21: Ki.nait's Imports from Major Exporters (KD million)
	
Period	 U.S.A.	 Japan	 Germany	 U.K.
	
1976 1
	
34.3	 42.4	 22.5	 17.6
	
2	 34.5	 49.7	 26.1	 23.9
	
3	 32.7	 49.9	 24.3	 15.8
	
4	 46.8	 59.7	 33.2	 21.9
	
1977 1	 50.7
	
68.6	 35.0
	
27.5
	
2
	
48.0	 68.7	 34.3
	
31.4
	
3
	
29.6
	
61.9	 30.1	 25.8
	
4
	
60.9
	
76.1	 29.0	 52.8
	
1982 1
	 86.8	 119.1	 93.1	 41.6
	
2	 82.0	 161.4	 89.4	 42.3
	
3	 66.5	 144.0	 74.8	 38.3
	
4	 67.7	 151.3	 75.3	 45.3
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